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Disiplinlerarası Afrika Çalışmaları Dergisi uluslararası, bilimsel ve hakemli bir dergidir. Yılda iki sayı (Mayıs ve Kasım) olarak yayımlanır. Dergide yayımlanan yazıların her türlü içerik sorumluluğu ve etik ihlalleri yazara aittir. Yazılar yayıncının izni olmadan kısmen veya tamamen başka bir yerde yayımlanamaz.

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TAKDİM / EDİTÖRDEN

Değerli okurlarımız,

Ülkemizin Afrika kıtasıyla yürütmekte olduğu başarılı ortaklık politikaları her alanda olduğu gibi akademi alanında da etkisini göstermektedir. Özellikle de son yirmi yılda Afrika'dan Türkiye'ye; Türkiye'den Afrika'ya olan karşılıklı ticaret hacmi giderek artmıştır. Kazan kazan politikasını daha eşit ve daha adil bir politika düzlemine oturtan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Afrika kıtasının insani ihtiyaçlarını ön planda tutmuş ve kıtanın geleceğinin teminatı olan insan gücünü iyileştirmeye yönelik faaliyetlere öncelik vermiştir. Bu bağlamda Afrika kıtasıyla son 20 yılda kurulan eğitim diplomasisi başarılı sonuçlar vermeye başlamış ve bu sayede kıta ile kurulacak olan ilişkiler daha kolay ve daha güvenilir hale gelmiştir. Söz konusu başarılı eğitim politikaları neticesinde binlerce Afrikalı öğrenci Türkiye'de eğitim görmüş, kendi ülkelerinin ve kültürlerinin tanınırlıklarını artırmıştır. Özellikle akademik alanda olan çalışkanlıkları ve başarıları sayesinde dünyanın geri kalanında olduğu gibi Türkiye'de de Üniversiteler ve eğitim kurumları bünyesinde çalışmaya başlamıştır. Akademi ve araştırma alanında birlikte çalıştığımız Afrikalı öğrencilerin ve araştırmacıların disiplinliliği ve çalışkanlığı böyle bir derginin akademi alanında var olmasına öncülük etmiştir. Bu dergi aracılığıyla Afrika kıtasına ve Türkiye-Afrika ilişkilerine hizmet etmekten ve Afrikalılarla birlikte bu dergiyi daha saygın konuma getirmekten son derece mutluluk ve memnuniyet duyarım. Disiplinlerarası Afrika Çalışmaları Dergisi gücünü ve başarısını Afrika kıtasına gönül vermiş araştırmacılardan alacaktır. Bu şuurla ilk sayısını 25 Mayıs 2023 Dünya Afrika Gününe hitaben yayınlamış olduğumuz sayımızda Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki Uluslararası Rekabet Unsurları; The Third Coming of the Fulani and its Security Implications for Southwest Nigeria; The Analysis of Tax Buoyancy and Determinant in Sierra Leone; Gouvernance de l'eau en Afrique : Analyse des paradoxes de gestion d'une ressource « ultra fragile »; Ethio-Türkiye's relation from the past to the future: Ethiopia's Potential areas in focus; The Issue Of Insufficient Capital Accumulation In Developing Countries; Community Radio and the Audience in Uganda: A Survey on the Community Radio Performance of Community Service olmak üzere Türkçe, İngilizce ve Fransızca 7 bilimsel makaleye yer verilmiştir. Bir sonraki sayımızda tekrar bir araya gelene kadar, size tekrar keyifli bir okuma deneyimi sunma sözüyle "hoşça kalın" diyoruz.

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Murat DELİBAŞ
Editör
Ankara/TÜRKİYE
30 Mayıs 2023

EDITORIAL

Dear esteemed readers,

The successful partnership policies pursued by our nation with the African continent have manifested their influence not only across diverse domains but also within the realm of academia. Particularly over the past two decades, reciprocal trade volumes between Africa and Turkey have experienced a steady augmentation. The Republic of Turkey, having espoused a win-win approach aimed at fostering a more equitable and just policy framework, has accorded primacy to addressing the humanitarian exigencies of the African continent and prioritized endeavours targeted at enhancing the human resources, which serve as the cornerstone of the continent's future. In light of these circumstances, the educational diplomacy established with the African continent during the aforementioned period has commenced yielding fruitful outcomes, thereby facilitating smoother and more reliable interactions with the continent. Consequently, as an outcome of these efficacious educational policies, a multitude of African students have pursued their educational endeavours in Turkey, thereby augmenting the prominence of their respective nations and cultural heritages. Particularly owing to their assiduity and accomplishments within the academic arena, these students have embarked upon engagements within Turkish universities and educational institutions, mirroring the developments witnessed throughout the global academic landscape. The discipline and diligence demonstrated by African students and researchers, with whom we collaborate in the spheres of academia and research, have spearheaded the advent of a scholarly journal of this nature within the academic domain. It is with utmost felicity and contentment that I partake in the service of the African continent and contribute to the Turkey-Africa relations through the auspices of this journal, while striving to elevate its standing in conjunction with the African scholarly community. The Interdisciplinary Journal of African Studies shall derive its vigor and accomplishments from scholars who have devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the African continent. With this awareness, we have published the first issue addressing the World Africa Day on May 25, 2023; In our first issue, we published 7 scientific including "The Elements of International Competition in the Horn of Africa; The Third Coming of the Fulani and its Security Implications for Southwest Nigeria; The Analysis of Tax Buoyancy and Determinant in Sierra Leone; Water governance in Africa: Analysis of the paradoxes of managing an "ultra fragile" resource; Ethio-Turkey's relation from the past to the future: Ethiopia's Potential areas in focus; The Issue Of Insufficient Capital Accumulation In Developing Countries; Community Radio and the Audience in Uganda: A Survey on the Community Radio Performance of Community Service". Until we reconvene in our next issue, we bid you farewell with the promise of delivering an enriching reading experience once again.

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Murat DELİBAŞ
Founding Editor
Ankara/TURKEY
30 May 2023

Disiplinlerarası Afrika Çalışmaları Dergisi
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Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki Uluslararası Rekabet Unsurları

Elements Of International Competition in The Horn of Africa

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İntihal / *Plagiarism*
Bu makale, en az iki hakem tarafından incelendi ve intihal içermediği teyit edildi.
This article has been reviewed by at least two referees and scanned via a plagiarism software.

Öz: Devletler arasındaki çatışma ve rekabet konusu, tarih boyunca plan, strateji ve araçlardaki değişikliklerle yenilenen eski bir olgudur. Ancak her hâlükârda güvenlik ve ekonomide temsil edilen ulusal çıkar, çatışan veya rekabet halindeki ülkelerin önceliklerinin başında gelmektedir. Bu çerçevede ulusal çıkardan bahsederken, stratejik açıdan önemli yerler ön plana çıkmaktadır. Burada, uluslararası düzeyde güvenlik ve ekonomi alanında etkili olan doğal kaynaklar ve coğrafi konumlarla ilişkilendirmeden stratejik yerlerden bahsetmemek mümkün değil. Afrika Boynuzu bölgesi, yukarıda belirtilen tüm stratejik özelliklere sahip olduğu için yıllardır uluslararası ve bölgesel güçler nezdinde bu bölgenin önemi kaybolmamıştır. Bu sebeple, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki uluslararası ve bölgesel rekabet unsurlarının seyri bu çalışmanın konusu olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afrika Boynuzu, uluslararası rekabet, uluslararası güçler, bölgesel güçler.

Abstract: The issue of conflict and competition between states is an old problem that has been renewed throughout history with changes in plans, strategies and instruments. However, in any case, the national interest represented in security and economy is at the top of the priorities of the countries in conflict or competition throughout history. When talking about national interest, strategically important places come to the fore. Here, it is impossible not to mention strategic places without associating them with natural resources and geographical locations, which are effective in the field of security and economy at the international level. The Horn of Africa region has all the strategic features mentioned above. For this reason, the importance of this region has not been lost in the eyes of international and regional powers for years. Thus, the story of the elements of international and regional competition in the Horn of Africa is the subject of this study.

Keywords: Horn of Africa, international competition, international powers, regional powers.

Giriş

Devletler arasındaki rekabet konusu hiç de yeni bir konu değil, aksine çıkar çatışması ve güç inşa etme kavramı doğrultusunda tarihin derinliklerine inmektedir. Afrika kıtası ve özellikle Afrika Boynuzu, stratejik konumu nedeniyle uluslararası ve bölgesel güçlerin gözünden kaçmayan bölgelerden biri olarak kabul edilmektedir. Günümüzde Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki uluslararası veya bölgesel güçlerin rekabet unsurlarını bakıldığında ilk başta İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya gibi eski sömürge güçleri arasından yer almaktadır. Bu eski sömürge ülkelere ek olarak ABD, Çin ve Rusya, Türkiye, İran, Hindistan, İsrail ve Arap Körfezi ülkeleri gibi uluslararası ve bölgesel güçler amaçları farklı olsa da Afrika Boynuzu'na yönelmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda bir takım sorular ortaya çıkmaktadır; Bu bölgeyi uluslararası ve bölgesel güçler nezdinde önemli kılan unsurlar nelerdir? Bu bölgede gerçekten var olan uluslararası ve bölgesel unsurlar nelerdir? Bu uluslararası ve bölgesel varlığın bölge ülkeleri üzerindeki olumlu ya da olumsuz etkileri nelerdir? Bu tür soruları cevaplamak için bu bölgedeki uluslararası ve bölgesel varlığın unsurlarına ayrı ayrı bir şekilde bakmak gerektiğini söylemek mümkündür.

Bu çalışma, bu hayati bölgedeki olayların seyri üzerinde şu ya da bu şekilde etkili olduğu düşünülen uluslararası ve bölgesel güçlerin varlığı da dâhil olmak üzere Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki durumu basitleştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu, Afrika kıtasının olaylarına ve özellikle Afrika Boynuzu meselelerine ilgi duyan öğrenciler ve araştırmacılar için Afrika Boynuzu meselelerinin basitleştirilmesine katkıda bulunması da amaçlanmaktadır. Ayrıca bu çalışma bir giriş ile başlamakta, ardından sömürgecilik döneminde Afrika Boynuzu'nu paylaşan Avrupa'nın varlığına değinmekte ve daha sonra Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde bu bölgeye ilgileri artan uluslararası ve bölgesel güçlerin varlığına ele alıp sonuçlanmaktadır.

1. Afrika Boynuzu'nda Geleneksel Uluslararası Güçler Varlığı

Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki geleneksel uluslararası güçlerin, özellikle İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya'nın varlığı sömürge dönemine kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu sömürgeci güçlerin bu bölgedeki varlığı, aşağıdaki satırlarda görülebileceği gibi geçen yüzyılın altmışlı ve yetmişli yıllarındaki bağımsızlık yıllarına kadar devam etmiştir.

1.1. İngiltere

İngiltere'nin Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki gerçek mevcudiyetinin başlangıcı, sömürge döneminde Batılı ülkelerin bu bölgeye doğru yarışmaya başladığı döneme kadar uzanmaktadır, özellikle 20. Yüzyılın başından itibaren İngiltere Sudan, Kenya, Uganda ve Somaliland "*İngiliz Somalisi*" ülkelerini kontrol altına aldıktan sonra Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki en etkili Avrupa ülkesi haline geldi. Bu, İngilizler tarafından işgal edilen alanlar, geçen yüzyılın altmış yıllarına kadar işgal altında kalmıştır (Degu, W. A., 2002: 182). Sömürge dönemlerinde Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki İngiliz politikasına bakıldığında, İngiliz politikası, zenginliği yağmalayan ve yerel halkı her şekilde sömüren diğer Batılı sömürge ülkelerinin politikasından farklı değildir. Hatta bu bölge ülkeleri bağımsızlıklarını kazandıktan sonra bile İngiltere, İngiliz Milletler Topluluğu "*Commonwealth of Nations*" aracılığıyla bölgeye bağlı kalmıştır. Ancak son zamanlarda Afrika Boynuzu bölgesindeki ABD, Çin, Türkiye ve diğer uluslararası ve bölgesel güçler arasındaki rekabet nedeniyle İngiltere'nin etkisinin zayıflamaya başladığı söylenebilmektedir (Madowo, 2018). Örneğin Kenya'da, Anglo-Amerikan nüfuz mücadelesi bakıldığında, Kenya'daki 2007 yılında Britanya'nın müttefiki Moi Kibaki ile ABD'nin müttefiki Raila Odinga arasındaki düzenlenen başkanlık seçimlerinde, Raila Odinga, ABD'nin desteğiyle seçimleri kazanmıştır (Dagne, 2008: 3-4). Bununla birlikte, İngiltere bu hayati bölgede kalıcı bir yer edinmeye çalışmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, İngiltere'nin Uganda ve Kenya gibi ülkelerle ilişkilerinin halen yakın olduğu söylenebilmektedir.

1.2. Fransa

Bölgede İngiliz mevcudiyetinde olduğu gibi, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki Fransız mevcudiyetinin kökleri, Afrika kıtasındaki Batı sömürge dönemine kadar uzanmaktadır. Ancak Fransızların odak noktası Kuzey, Batı ve Orta Afrika bölgeleri olmuştur (Adu, 1987: 22). O dönemdeki Afrika Boynuzu'nda Cibuti, Fransız kontrolü altında kalan tek ülkedir. Daha sonra Fransa, 1907'de Etiyopya'da ilk büyükelçiliğini açarak, XX. yüzyılın başından itibaren Etiyopya ile ilişkilerini pekiştirmeye çalışmıştır, özellikle de İmparator II. Menelik döneminde. 1917'de ise Fransa, Cibuti ile Addis Ababa'yı birbirine bağlayan demiryolunu inşa etmeye başlamıştır. Öte yandan Fransa, Afrika Boynuzu'na en çok bağlı olan batılı ülkedir. Burada Fransa'nın 1977 yılından beri Cibuti'deki askeri üssü bulunmaktadır (Sıradağ, 2014: 107). Aslında Soğuk Savaş döneminde Fransızların Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki politikasının çok aktif olmadığını söylemek mümkündür. Ancak bölgeye yönelik uluslararası yönelimin artmasıyla, özellikle Çin'in büyük yatırımları ile Fransa, Afrika Boynuzu'na dönme hedefiyle büyük çaba harcamıştır (Al-Nur, 2013: 584-586).

Son zamanlarda Afrika Boynuzu'na yönelik Fransız eğilimleri, Fransa'nın bu stratejik ve hayati önem taşıyan bölgede yeniden konumlanma ihtiyacına yanıt olarak jeostratejik, politik ve ekonomik boyutlar taşıyor gibi görünmektedir. Stratejik ve güvenlik açısından Fransa'nın dış politikası geçmişte sömürge döneminden kaynaklanan tarihi ve kültürel mirasa dayandırılmış olsa da şu anda Fransa, bu bölgede tanık olduğumuz uluslararası izdihamın ortasında Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki etkisini artırmak için daha fazla uğraşmaya çalışıyor gibi görünmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Fransız odak noktası, Fransız askerî üslerini kucaklayan en eski Afrika ülkelerinden biri olan Cibuti topraklarıdır (Marks, 1974: 95-104). Fransız dış politikasındaki konumunu yansıtan bir Fransız sömürgesi olarak Cibuti, Fransa için tarihi ve stratejik bir mirası barındırır. Bu nedenle hala Cibuti topraklarına odaklanmıştır. Özellikle Afrika Boynuzu bölgesindeki uluslararası rekabetin artmaya başladığı bu dönemde bölgeye, stratejik konumdaki Cibuti ülkesinde Fransa ile rekabet etmeye başlayan ABD gibi büyük güçler de dahil olmaktadır (Al-Nur, 2013: 585).

Her durumda, Fransa'yı diğer uluslararası güçler gibi Afrika'nın bu özel bölgesinde olmaya iten Afrika Boynuzu'nun coğrafî ve stratejik konumu olmuştur (Woodward, 2002: 11). Herhalde bunun başarısızlığı veya başarısı, Fransız politikasının benimsemesi gereken yaklaşımların işlevselliğine bağlıdır.

Bu bölgedeki yaşanan uluslararası rekabette Fransa'nın konumu, Fransız siyasetinin yönelimlerine bağlı olacaktır. Bu, Fransızların yumuşak olma ve bölge ülkelerinin iç işlerine müdahale etmeme eğilimi gösteren yeni bir politika benimsemesi gerektiği anlamına gelebilmektedir; ancak Fransa bu kıtanın sorunlarına karışırsa Afrika kıtası ülkelerinin şu anda istisnasız uluslararası güçlere açılma politikası başlattığı göz önüne alındığında, stratejilerinin kısa vadede başarısız olacağı düşünülmektedir.

1.3. İtalya

Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki İtalyan varlığı, 19. yüzyılın sonlarından 20. yüzyılın başlarına, İtalya'nın Afrika'yı işgal eden diğer Batı ülkelerine benzer şekilde Afrika kıtasında bir yer bulmaya çalıştığı döneme kadar uzanmaktadır. (Mattia, 2018: 4-7). Özellikle 1885'in başlangıcında (Adu, 1987: 49), yani Berlin Konferansı'ndan sonra İtalya, Eritre'ye ek olarak, Somali'nin büyük bölümlerini işgal etmiştir. Aynı zamanda İtalyanlar Etiyopya'yı işgal etmeye çalışmıştır; ancak 1896'da "*Adowa*" Muharebesi'nde Etiyopyalılar tarafından yenilgiye uğratılmıştır (Van, 2017: 3). Buna rağmen İtalyanlar bu bölgeyi Fransızlar ve İngilizlerle paylaşmakta ısrarcıydılar. Aslında, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki İtalyan işgali, sonunda onu kontrol altına alacak çeşitli yöntemler benimsiyordu. İtalya, askeri gücünün yanı sıra anlaşmalar yoluyla bölgeye girerek ve yerel halkın sempatisini kazanmaya çalışarak yavaş yavaş bu bölgeyi kontrolü altına almak istiyordu. Böylece İtalya, 1889-1891 yılları arasında padişahlar ve kabile büyükleri ile bir dizi anlaşma yapmıştır. Bu doğrultuda İtalyan Somaliland veya "*Jubaland*" olarak bilinen, İtalyanlar olarak adlandırılan güneybatı Somali'de koruma ilan etmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte İtalyanlar, II. Dünya Savaşı'ndaki yenilgilerinden sonra tüm bu bölgeleri kaybetmiştir, bu yüzden İtalyan Somaliland 1949'a kadar İngiliz yönetimi altında kalmış, sonra Birleşmiş Milletler vesayeti altında ve yine İtalyan yönetimi altında bir bölge olmuştur

(Wael, 2008: 48-49). Bu vesayet, Somali'nin bağımsızlığını kazandığı 1960 yılına kadar sürmüştür.

İtalyanların bu dönemde Eritre'deki varlığına ilişkin Eritre, Etiyopya'ya 02/12/1950 tarihinde yayınlanan 390 sayılı kararında Birleşmiş Milletler'in onayından sonra bir federasyon şeklinde katılmıştır (Abdullah İdris, 1990: 16). Fakat, 1952'de Birleşmiş Milletler Etiyopya ve Eritre'nin bir konfederasyon şeklinde olmasına karar vermiştir. Ancak Eritre'yi Etiyopya'nın ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak gören Haile Selassie, BM kararını reddetmiştir (Degu, 2002: 170). Bu 1960'larda Etiyopya'ya karşı bir isyan başlattı ve 1993'te Eritre'nin bağımsızlığıyla sona ermiştir (Gebru, 2009: 2).

Soğuk Savaş döneminde İtalya'nın Afrika Boynuzu'nda çok az rolü olduğunu söylemek mümkündür; ancak son yıllarda İtalya, Afrika Boynuzu'nda zaman zaman ayrı ve diğer zamanlarda Avrupa Birliği içinde diplomatik ve hatta askerî olarak hareket etmeye başlamıştır. Aslında İtalya, bu bölgenin Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana tanık olduğu uluslararası ve bölgesel rekabet ışığında bölge ülkeleriyle iş birliğini güçlendirmenin öneminin de farkındaydı. Böylece İtalya bu stratejik bölgede yer edinmeye çalışıyordu. Bu bağlamda İtalya, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki 2013'te ilk askerî üssünü kurmuştur. Burada belirtilen amaç korsanlıkla savaşmaktı; ancak asıl mesele, İtalyan donanmasının Kızıldeniz'deki operasyonlarını desteklemek ve bu hayati bölgeye yakın kalmak da amaçlanmaktadır.

2. Afrika Boynuzu'na Yeni Giren Uluslararası Güçler Varlığı

Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki yeni uluslararası güçler ile kastedilen, sömürgecilik dönemine kadar uzanan İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya gibi Avrupalı güçlerin varlığına kıyasla, son zamanlarda Afrika Boynuzu'nda var olan uluslararası güçlerdir. Burada, Afrika Boynuzu'na yeni giren uluslararası güçlerin en önemli unsurları, ABD, Rusya, Çin, Hindistan ve Japonya gibi devletlerdir. Aşağıdaki paragraflarda, bu uluslararası güçlerin varlığı, etkisi ve mekanizmaları ele alınmıştır.

2.1. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Afrika kıtasının tamamına ilgisi, İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya gibi uzun zaman önce kıtaya gelen Avrupa sömürge ülkelerine kıyasla gecikmiştir. Afrika kıtası başlangıçta Amerikan siyasetinin ilgili olduğu bir bölge değildi; Bununla birlikte, en önemlileri Soğuk Savaşın sonu ve doğu kampının çöküşünde ABD'nin öncülük ettiği Yeni Dünya Düzeninin ortaya çıkışı olan XX. yüzyılın doksanları boyunca uluslararası politika haritasında meydana gelen büyük dönüşümler olmuştur. Bu sıralarda, Başkan Clinton daha önce olduğundan daha fazla Afrika'ya yerleşmeye çalışmıştır (Al-Nur, 2013: 572). Bu kritik dönemin verilerine göre, ABD'nin dünya lideri gibi görülmesi, Afrika Boynuzu'nda da var olma hevesini artırmıştır. Tabii ki, ABD onlarca yıldır bu bölgede mevcut olan geleneksel güçlerin, özellikle Cibuti ve bazı Büyük Göller ülkelerinden gelen Fransız etkisinin kuvvetiyle şok yaşamıştır. Amerikan ile Fransız etkisi arasındaki çatışma bu nedenle ortaya çıkmıştır (Al-Nur, 2013: 585). 1994'te komşu olan Ruanda ve Burundi'de yaşanan kanlı çatışmalar Amerikan etkisinin güçlenmesine ve Fransız etkisinin ortadan kalkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu kanlı olaylardan sonra Ruanda, Fransız ekseninden uzaklaşıp Anglo-Sakson eksenine yakınlaşmıştır. Aynı zamanda, resmi Fransızca dilini bile terk etmiş, İngilizceye ek olarak yerel dil olan "Kinyarwanda" dilini benimsemiştir ve hatta İngiliz Milletler Topluluğu'na katılmıştır. ABD'nin Ruanda, Etiyopya, Eritre, Uganda ve Afrika'daki en büyük ABD askeri üssüne ev sahipliği yapan Cibuti gibi diğer Doğu Afrika ülkeleri ile ilişkilerini güçlendirmesi için elverişli bir fırsat ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda, ABD'nin özellikle de 11 Eylül 2001 olaylarından sonra güvenlik gerekçeleriyle Afrika Boynuzu'na yakın kalmak istediği de bilinmektedir (Yahya, 2006: 124-125).

Burada hem Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki hem de Afrika kıtasının genelindeki Amerikan varlığını güçlendiren en önemli adımlar arasında Afrika'daki ABD askeri üssü (*AFRICOM*) yer almaktadır. ABD bu bölgede askeri üs kurma gerekçeleri arasında terörle mücadele yer almaktadır. Ancak mesele, Amerikalıların bu stratejik bölgeye odaklanmasını sağlayan çatışma ve uluslararası rekabetle bağlantılıdır. Bunun için ABD'nin Cibuti'deki askerî varlığı sayesinde bölgede tanık olunan genel olaylarda önemli bir oyuncu haline geldiği dikkat çekmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Amerikan çıkarlarına ulaşacak şekilde yeniden biçimlendirilmesine yönelik bir dizi önlem başlatılmıştır. Burada, Amerikan konsepti olan Afrika Büyük Boynuzu "*The Great Horn of Africa*" (David, 2000: 2) haritasına bakıldığında olan buydu. Aslında, Amerikan askerî varlığı aşağıdakileri içeren bir dizi hedefe ulaşmayı amaçlamaktadır: ABD'nin politikasında stratejik öneme sahip petrol kaynaklarına erişmenin yanı sıra çıkarlarına bir tehdit olarak gördüğü silahlı (*Cihatçı*) örgütlerin varlığının gözlemlenmesi amaçlanıyordu (John, 1968: 15). Aynı zamanda, ABD uluslararası güçlerin etkisine, özellikle Afrika Boynuzu ve genel olarak Afrika kıtasında büyüyen Çin etkisine karşı koymaya çalışıyordu.

2.2. Rusya

Rusların Afrika Boynuzu ülkeleriyle ilişkileri bu bölgedeki Avrupalı güçler kadar eski değildir. Bununla birlikte, Sovyet döneminde Afrika-Rusya ilişkileri, özellikle XX. yüzyılın yetmişli yıllarında eski Somali Cumhurbaşkanı Mohamed Siad Barre döneminde sosyalist bir ülke haline gelen Somali gibi sosyalist bir yönelime sahip Afrika ülkelerinde güçlüdür (Woodward, 2002: 67). Aynı dönemde Mengistu Haile Myriam'ın iktidara gelmesiyle Etiyopya sosyalist bir devlete dönüşmüştür; ancak bu güçlü bağlantılar hem Somali hem de Etiyopya'daki sosyalist rejimlerin düşüşüne denk gelen Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünden sonra keskin bir şekilde kopmuştur (Daban, 2017: 155). Geçen yüzyılın doksanlı yıllarında Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünü takiben Afrika'nın Rus dış politikası gündeminde yaşadığı düşüşe rağmen, Rusya özellikle uluslararası sistemde büyük bir güç olarak siyasî varlığını geri kazanmaya çalışırken, hesaplarını tekrar Afrika kıtasına geri dönme üzerine yapmaya başlamıştır. Zaten uluslararası jeopolitik sistemde stratejik öneme sahip olan ülkeler, Afrika da dahil olmak üzere, dünyanın birçok yerinde ilgi görmektedir. Burada Afrika Boynuzu diğer bölgelere oranla ön plana çıkmaktadır, çünkü bu bölgeyi Afrika ve dünyanın geri kalan bölgeleriyle karşılaştırdığımızda bölgeyi önemli hale getiren birçok stratejik özelliği görmek mümkündür. Bu yüzden Cumhurbaşkanı Vladimir Putin'in yönetimi, Afrika Boynuzu gibi stratejik yerlerden yoksun olamayacak bir uluslararası güç olarak ülkesinin çıkarlarını en üst düzeye çıkarmaya çalışmış ve Afrika'ya yönelik politikasında büyük bir değişikliğe gitmiştir (Oğultürk, 2019: 121-143). Bu, Rusya'nın Afrika Boynuzu da dâhil olmak üzere uluslararası arenada yeri doldurulamaz bir ortak olarak sunulduğu bir zamana denk gelmektedir. Ayrıca, Rusya'nın çok kutuplu bir dünya düzeni oluşturma arayışı da uluslararası bir denge yaratmak için dünyadaki çıkarlarını ve bölgedeki etkilerini yeniden düşünmeye itmiştir. Böyle hedeflere ulaşmak için, Afrika ülkeleriyle yakınlaşmayı garanti eden bir mekanizma oluşturması gerektiğinin farkındadır. Bu nedenle Rusya Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünden hemen sonra Afrika ülkeleriyle ilişkilerini güçlü bir şekilde yeniden kurmaya başlamıştır (Hakan, 2010: 51).

Aynı bağlamda, Rus bilim ve kültür merkezleri, bölgedeki Rus varlığının güçlendirilmesinde rol oynamaktadır. Bu tür kurumlar Tanzanya, Kongo ve diğer ülkelerin yanı sıra Etiyopya'da da önemli ölçüde faaliyet göstermektedir. Rusya ayrıca Rus üniversitelerindeki Afrikalı öğrencilere burs vermektedir (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 5, 2018). Rusya, Afrika kıtasının BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nde veto hakkı ile daimî bir sandalye edinme hakkını talep eden Birleşmiş Milletler reform çağrısı doğrultusunda Afrika meseleleriyle uluslararası düzeyde etkileşim kurmaya çalışmaktadır. Tabii ki, Rusya, özellikle Sudan ve Eritre gibi devletlere uygulanan uluslararası yaptırımlardan dolayı, özellikle Afrika Boynuzu ülkeleri için diplomatik bir kalkan oluşturma olasılığına sahip olan BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nde ilk beş ülkeden biri olarak uluslararası statüsünden yararlanmaktadır.

ABD'nin bölgedeki bazı ülkelere karşı uyguladığı sopa politikası ışığında, Ruslar bunu kendi yararlarına kullanma politikası izlemişler ve izleyeceklerdir. Bölge ülkeleri Rusya ile ilişkilerini inşa etmek için boğucu ABD yaptırımlarından, özellikle de Sudan eski cumhurbaşkanı Ömer el Beşir'in 2017 yılında Rusya'ya yaptığı ziyarette Rusya'dan, ülkesinin Amerikan müdahalesinden korumasını istemesi Sudan için bir çıkış noktası olarak görülmektedir. Aynı zamanda Sudan ordusu, MiG-29 ve diğerleri gibi en modern Rus savaş uçakları da dâhil olmak üzere silahlanmasına büyük ölçüde güveniyordu (La Verle, (2015: 290). Öte yandan Rusya ayrıca, Kızıldeniz'de, Assab'ın stratejik Eritre limanının bulunduğu bir Rus askerî üssü kurmaya çalışmaktadır (Gregory, October 20, 2019).

Genel olarak, Ruslar, diğer uluslararası ve bölgesel güçler gibi, Afrika Boynuzu da dâhil olmak üzere, Afrika kıtasının ekonomik veya askerî olarak jeostratejik öneminin farkındadır. Tüm bunların ışığında, Ekim 2019'da Rusya'nın Soçi (*Sochi*) kentindeki ilk Rus-Afrika zirvesi, siyasi, güvenlik, ekonomi ve benzeri dâhil olmak üzere birçok alanı içeren Afro-Rus ortaklığı kavramının yeni temellerini atmaktadır.

2.3. Çin

Afrika'daki Amerikan ve Fransız varlığıyla karşılaştırıldığında, Çin varlığı, özellikle ekonomik açıdan en büyüğü olarak değerlendirilir. Aslında, Çin'in geçtiğimiz yüzyılda Batı sömürgeciliğine karşı Afrika direniş hareketleriyle dayanışma içinde olmasının Çin-Afrika yakınlaşmasına büyük katkı sağlamaktadır (Mulugeta, 2013: 1). Aslında Çin, Batı sömürgecilerine karşı Afrika'nın kurtuluş hareketlerinin yanında olarak görülür (Tevfik, 2013: 106). Bunun için, egemenliğe karşılıklı saygı, içişlerine karışmama ve yardım alışverişi gibi ilkelere göre Çin-Afrika ilişkilerinin temelleri 1955 yılında düzenlenen Bandung Konferansı'ndan beri net olmuştur (Harry, 2007: 6). Çin'in çıkarları çerçevesinde, Batı politikalarına karşı çıkan Afrika hareketlerinin yanında olması dikkat çekicidir. Örneğin, Sovyetler Birliği liderliğindeki sosyalizm ile ABD liderliğindeki kapitalizm arasındaki mücadelenin kurbanı olan Kongo savaşçısı Patrice Lumumba liderliğindeki Ulusal Kongolu Hareketi (*Mouvement National Congolais-MNC*) Çin'den destek alan diğer kurtuluş hareketleri de buna dâhildir (Khairuddin, t.y: 721).

Bununla birlikte, Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılmasından sonra, bipolarizmin ortadan kalkması, Amerikan hegemonyasının yükseliş korkusunu oluşturmuştur, özellikle Batı'yı tehdit eden medeniyetlerin İslâm ile Çin medeniyetleri olduğu sonucuna varılma korkusu ışığında Çin, tarihin derinliklerindeki tarihi ve kültürel mirasa dayanarak Afrika'ya karşı daha da açık bir strateji benimsemiştir (Maya, t.y: 274).

Bunun için Çin, Kenya ve Afrika'nın petrol zengini bölgeleri gibi Afrika Boynuzu da dâhil olmak üzere Doğu Afrika ülkelerine odaklanarak Afrika ülkeleriyle siyasî ve ekonomik ilişkilerini inşa ederken petrol bölgelerine yönelmiştir (Ian, 2006: 937-959). Bu doğrultuda Çin, Batı ülkelerinin izlediği politikadan tamamen farklı bir politika ile değiş tokuşa dayalı bir model sunmuştur. Örneğin, Çin Cumhurbaşkanı Xi Jinping, Çin-Afrika İş birliği Forumu'nun açılış oturumunda 2018'de Çin politikasını "*beş hayır*" olarak adlandırdığı model ile özetledi. Bunlar: "*Çin, Afrika ülkelerinin ulusal koşullarına uygun kalkınma yollarını keşfetme çabalarına müdahale etmeyecektir. Afrika'nın içişlerine karışmayacaktır ve iradesini başkalarına dayatmayacaktır. Çin'in yardımı Afrika'yı herhangi bir siyasî biçimde bağlamayacaktır. Çin, Afrika'daki yatırım ve finansman yoluyla siyasî çıkar elde etmek istemeyecektir*" (China Daily, Sept 3, 2018). Bu nedenle Çin, Afrika kıtasındaki birçok ülke ile ilk ve birincil ortak haline gelmiştir ve ne ABD ne de Avrupa güçleri bununla başa çıkamamışlardır. Bu politikanın sonucu olarak, 2015 yılından beri Çin ile Afrika arasındaki ticaret hacminin yaklaşık 200 milyar dolara ulaştığını bilmek gerekmektedir (DATA, China-Africa Trade).

Ekonomik boyutun yanı sıra, Çin askerî açıdan, BM Güvenlik Konseyi Somali sahillerindeki korsanlık olgusunu engellemeye ilişkin bir dizi uluslararası karar çıkardıktan sonra harekete geçmiştir. Afrika Boynuzu’ndaki Çin askerî varlığı 2008’de Somali kıyısı yakınlarında ilk kez başlamıştır. Buna ek olarak Çin, Sudan’ın Darfur ve diğerleri gibi Afrika kıtasındaki uluslararası barışı koruma operasyonlarına askerî katkılarda bulunmaktadır. Açıkçası Çin’in 1990’dan beri Afrika’da on üç BM barışı koruma operasyonuna katıldığı tahmin edilmektedir (Rafe Ali, t.y: 189). Bununla birlikte Çin, Kızıldeniz kıyısındaki Cibuti’de askerî üs kurma hakkını elde etmiş ve Çin bu askerî üssü, 2014 yılında Cibuti ile Çin arasında imzalanan bir güvenlik ve savunma anlaşması kapsamında kurmuştur (Michael, t.y: 4).

Açıktır ki, on yıl boyunca uzayan ve benzer bir süre için yenilenen bir sözleşme kapsamında yıllık kira bedeli karşılığında Cibuti’de bir Çin askerî deniz üssü inşa edilmesi de dâhil olduğu belirtilmiştir. Bu Çin askerî üssü, Çin’in bölgesel sınırlarının dışında inşa ettiği ilk askeri üstür. Bu askerî üs, “*Kemer ve Yol*” stratejisine göre Çin’in kara ve deniz Çin İpek Yolu’nu canlandırma stratejisi ile tutarlıdır (Azizah, 2017: 14). Sudan ve Güney Sudan ülkelerindeki petrol serveti, ekonomi açısından da Çin’in bölgedeki varlığının ana itici gücü olduğu söylenebilmektedir. Bu nedenle, Cibuti ülkesindeki Çin askeri üssü, Afrika Boynuzu ve Afrika kıtası boyunca Çin stratejisine hizmet eden hayatî bir üstür (Ian, 2006: 937-959).

Yukarıdakilerin hepsinin bir sonucu olarak belirtebiliriz ki Çin’in Afrika’ya yönelik bu çok yönlü stratejisi, küresel bir güç olma isteminin zorunlu bir gerekliliğidir ve kurduğu askerî üs bu istemini pekiştirmek adına önemli adımlarından biridir. Dolayısıyla, önümüzdeki yıllarda Çin’in Afrika kıtasındaki askerî varlığının artacağı muhtemeldir. Bu, Çin’in çıkarlarını koruma arzusunun yanı sıra Afrikalı liderlerin ekonomik ve hatta askerî alanlardaki uluslararası ortakları çeşitlendirme arzusu ışığında gerçekleşen bir durumdur. Afrika kıtasının Batı güçleri tarafından yaşadığı yağmalama ve büyük ıstıraptan sonra Çin’in Afrikalılar için en iyi alternatif olduğunu bilmek gerekmektedir. Aynı bağlamda, Çin’in Afrika’ya olan ihtiyacı sürekli artmaktadır, çünkü Afrika’nın kaynaklarının bitmek bilmez fazlalığı, güvenlik ve askerî açıdan Çin stratejisinin önemli bir parçası olarak giderek daha fazla büyüyebilir. Demek ki Çin’in büyüyen gücü, Çin’in Afrika Boynuzu ve genel olarak Afrika kıtasına yönelik yolunun en önemli istasyon taşlarından biridir (Yun, 2014: 6).

Sonuç olarak, yakın gelecekte Afrika’nın Çin askerî üssünün en önemli noktalarından biri olması beklenmektedir, bunun en önemlisi Çin’in büyüyen ekonomik ve askerî gücüdür. Yeni uluslararası sistemdeki siyasî ve ekonomik koşulların diktelerine göre, tüm bunlar Çin’in ekonomik ve askerî varlığının büyüklüğünün artmasında rol oynayabilecektir.

3. Afrika Boynuzu’ndaki Bölgesel Güçler Varlığı

Afrika Boynuzu bölgesindeki rekabet eden uluslararası güçler hakkında konuşurken, varlıklarını Orta Doğu ve Afrika Boynuzu bölgesinde fark edilir hale getiren İran, Türkiye ve Arap Körfezi ülkeleri gibi bölgesel güçler göz ardı edilemezdir. Bu ülkelerin Afrika Boynuzu'nda özellikle ekonomik ve askerî-politik durum üzerinde odaklandığı hayati alanlara odaklanarak, her bir ülkenin varlığı ayrı ayrı politikası olduğu görülebilmektedir.

Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki bölgesel güçlerden bahsetmek elbette Arap Körfez ülkeleri, Türkiye, İran ve İsrail ile bu Doğu Afrika bölgesi ülkeleri arasındaki ilişkileri ve bağları ele almaktır.

3.1. Arap Körfezi Ülkeleri

İlk başta soracağımız soru, Arap Körfezi ülkelerinin bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerin ilgi odağı haline gelen Afrika Boynuzu dışında kalıp kalmayacağıdır. Elbette hayır, çünkü Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki varlık sorunu, XXI. yüzyıldaki ulusal güvenlik kavramının stratejilerine göre en öncelikli olacak ekonomik ve güvenlik yönü de dahil olmak üzere çok yönlü bir konu haline gelmiştir. Bu koşullar Arap Körfezi ülkelerini Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki çatışma ve rekabete şu ya da bu şekilde dâhil etmiştir. Afrika Boynuzu bölgesindeki strateji yarışına katılan Arap Körfezi ülkelerinin ön saflarında Suudi Arabistan ve BAE bulunmaktadır.

Burada ekonomik ve güvenlik faktörleri de dahil olmak üzere bu Körfez ülkelerini bölgesel çevrelerinde genişlemeye iten çeşitli faktörler bulunmaktadır. Bir yandan Suudi Arabistan ile BAE ve diğer yandan İran arasındaki nüfuz çatışması, bu ülkeleri ekonomik ve güvenlik hedeflerine ulaşmak amacıyla Afrika Boynuzu'na girmeye itmiştir. Aynı şekilde, başka bir tarafta Suudi Arabistan ile BAE, diğer tarafta İran arasındaki bölgesel rekabet bağlamında ortaya çıkan İran genişlemesi karşısında durmaktadır. Böyle bir yarışta ve rekabette Afrika Boynuzu bölgesinde gerçek bir strateji mücadelesi başlamıştır.

BAE'ne gelince, askerî ve ekonomik bir strateji geliştirmiş. Ekonomik olarak, BAE, Somali'deki Berbera Limanı, Eritrean Assab limanı ve Cibuti'deki Durali Limanı gibi Aden Körfezi ile Hint Okyanusu ve körfez kıyıları olanlar olmak üzere hayati bölgesel limanların satın alınması konusuna odaklanmıştır (Gérard, Septembre 2016). BAE ayrıca Puntland ile Somaliland gibi Somali yarı ayrılıkçı bölgelerine yatırım yapmaya başlamıştır; ancak bu, Somali yetkilileri 2018'de Mogadişu Havaalanı'nda Emirates fonlarına ait bir uçağa el koymasıyla bu proje uzun zaman sürmemiştir (Charles, 2014: 19–60). Çünkü Somali zor durumda olmasına rağmen ayrılıkçı bölgelerle Mogadişu'daki merkezi hükümet pahasına uğraşmayı kabul etmemektedir.

Diğer tarafta Suudi Arabistan, insanî yardım örgütleri aracılığıyla, özellikle Somali'de insanî destek yoluyla Afrika Boynuzu ülkelerinin desteğini almaya çalışmaktadır. Aslında, Suudi Arabistan Afrika Boynuzu'na önemli yatırımlar yapmamıştır. Askerî açıdan, Suudi Arabistan'ın odak noktası, bir dizi uluslararası güç için çeşitli askerî üslere ev sahipliği yapan Cibuti ülkesi ile 2017 yılında güvenlik anlaşması imzalamıştır (Aglionby, 17 Jan. 2017); ancak Suudi Arabistan henüz Afrika Boynuzu'nda askerî üs kuramamıştır. Tüm bunlardan anlaşılmaktadır ki, bir yandan Suudi Arabistan ile BAE ve diğer yandan İran arasında var olan çatışma ve rekabet, bu Körfez ülkelerini etkilerini artırmak ve bölgedeki yavaş yavaş büyüyen İran etkisini çevrelemek amacıyla Afrika Boynuzu'na doğru itmekte rol oynamaktadır (Harry, 2018: 350). Suudi Arabistan ve BAE'nin bölgedeki İran genişlemesine rahatsız olmasına rağmen, İsrail'in Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki genişlemesi ile ilgili herhangi bir sıkıntı ifade etmemeleri dikkat çekicidir.

3.2. Türkiye

Başlangıçta, Afrika Boynuzu'nda Türk varlığı Habeşistan, Somali, Sudan, Cibuti, Kenya ve diğer Afrika bölgeleri gibi Osmanlı Halifeliği döneminden bu yana Afrika kıtasında önemli bir tarihî varlığa sahiptir. Yani Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Afrika Boynuzu arasındaki bağlantılar, Osmanlı amirali Ali Bey'in Somali kıyılarına ve Malindi limanına (*Kenya*) ulaştığı 1584 yılına dayanmaktadır (Numan, 2016: 142-143). Son yıllarda ise, Türkiye'nin Afrika kıtasını ihmal etmemesi gerektiğine inandığı stratejik vizyon doğrultusunda (Davutoğlu, 2002: 208) 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren güçlenmeye başlayan ilişkiler daha üst bir aşamaya taşınmıştır. Aslında, uluslararası politikada ve Afrika kıtası da dâhil olmak üzere çok sayıda stratejik öneme sahip bölgesel ortamda önemli bir rol oynayan Türk dış politikası sürecinde yaşanan gelişmelere dayanmaktadır. Bu nedenle Türkiye, 2002'den bu yana diplomatik, ekonomik ve kültürel bağları güçlendirmek amacıyla genel olarak Afrika kıtasına artan bir ilgi göstermiştir. Bunlara ek olarak Türk-Afrika ilişkileri, 2008 yılında İstanbul'da düzenlenen ilk Türkiye-Afrika Ortaklık Zirvesi'nden bu yana Afrika Birliği ile Türkiye arasında toplantı ile konferanslarla sonuçlanan ve çoğu Afrikalı liderin katıldığı önemli bir büyümeye tanık olmuştur (Numan, 2016: 297).

Her halükarda 1998'de özelliklerini göstermeye başlayan Afrika'ya açılım politikası, Afrika ülkelerinin iç işlerine karışmama ve karşılıklı yarar sağlama gibi her iki tarafa da hizmet eden önemli yaklaşımlara dayanmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, Türkiye-Afrika ilişkileri, en üst düzeyde birçok ziyaretle sonuçlanan yeni bir vizyon oluşturmuştur. Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Afrika ülkelerini en çok ziyaret eden dünya lideridir (Türkiye Cumhuriyet, Cumhurbaşkanlığı, İletişim Başkanlığı). Bu gerçekleşen ziyaretler arasında Eritre ve Güney Sudan hariç sekiz Afrika Boynuzu ülkesinden altısı yer almıştır. 2011 yılında, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın yaklaşık otuz yıl içinde Somali'yi ziyaret eden ilk ülke lideri olduğu göz önünde bulundurulması gereken bir detaydır (Abdurrahim, 2017: 704). Yani ülkede devam eden iç savaş nedeniyle Somali'deki merkezi hükümetin çöküşünden bu yana ülkeyi ziyaret eden ilk devlet başkanıdır.

Türkiye, siyasî, güvenlik, insanî, kalkınma ve hatta askerî açıdan Somali'ye büyük önem vermektedir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin Somali'deki varlığı, Somali'nin yeniden inşasına katkıda bulunmaktadır (Melahat, 2016: 32). Aynı bağlamda, Somali'deki kurulan Türk askeri üssü (TURKSOM Askerî Eğitim Üssü), bölgesel bir güç olarak Türkiye için büyük önem taşımaktadır. Zaten bu üs Türkiye'nin yurtdışında inşa ettiği en büyük askerî üs olarak kayıtlara geçmiştir. Öte yandan, Somali ordusu mensuplarının bu Türk askeri üssü aracılığıyla aldıkları eğitim ve öğretim göz önüne alındığında, bu Türk askeri üssü, Somali'de güvenliğin sağlanmasında büyük rol oynayacaktır (Middle East Monitor, 5 Oct. 2017).

Bir hatırlatma olarak, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki Türk varlığı sadece Somali ile sınırlı değil; Nitekim Türkiye'nin Etiyopya, Sudan ve diğer ülkelerle yakın ilişkileri vardır. Afrika Boynuzu'nun demografik ve ekonomik olarak en büyük ülkesi olan Etiyopya, Türkiye ile çeşitli alanlarda seçkin ortaklıklara sahiptir (Abdu, 2012: 207). Burada belirtmek gerekir ki, Afrika Birliği'nin genel karargahı olan Etiyopya, 2008 yılından itibaren Türkiye'yi stratejik ortak olarak görmektedir (Serhat, 2018: 185).

Sudan ile ilgili olarak, Sudan ve Türkiye'nin paylaştığı tarihî derinlikten çıkarılan stratejik ilişkiler vardır. Bu, uzun vadede her iki tarafa da hizmet eden stratejik bir boyutla ilişki kurmaya çevrildi ve Sevakin Adası, Sudan ile Türkiye'nin aradığı stratejik ortaklığın derinliği için açık bir örnektiir. Nitekim Türkiye, 2006 yılından bu yana Sudan ile olan ilişkilerine büyük önem vermeye başlamıştır (Serhat, 2018: 171).

Sonunda söylenebilecek şey, Türkiye'nin Afrika'ya yönelik dış politikası Afrika ülkeleri tarafından memnuniyetle karşılanmıştır. Buna göre, Afrika Birliği'nin 2008 yılında Türkiye'yi stratejik bir ortak ilan etme kararı ve 2008 yılında yapılan "*Türkiye-Afrika İşbirliği*" zirvesi iki taraf arasındaki sürekli iş birliğinin başlangıç noktası olmuştur (Numan, 2016: 297). Türkiye'nin, Afrika Boynuzu ülkeleriyle daha fazla siyasî, ekonomik ve diğer ilişkiler dizisi örmesine izin verecek çeşitli faktörler vardır, en önemli hususlar aşağıdaki gibidir:

a) Fransa ve İngiltere'de olduğu gibi, Türkiye'nin Afrika kıtasında sömürge geçmişi yoktur. Her ne kadar bu batı ülkeleri Afrika'nın zenginliğinden faydalanmış olsalar da kendilerini Afrika halklarının ve bölge halklarının dostu olarak sunmayı başaramadılar. Türkiye, kendisini Afrika Birliği'nin tanımladığı gibi stratejik bir ortak olarak sunmuştur. Bu, uzun vadede Afrika ve Türk işbirliğine hizmet eden bir neden olarak görülmektedir,

b) Türkiye'yi, Afrika Boynuzu ülkeleri de dâhil olmak üzere, genel olarak çok sayıda kıta ülkesi ile bir araya getiren, Türkiye'nin Afrika Boynuzu ülkelerine kültürel, tarihî ve hatta coğrafî olarak Fransa, İngiltere, Rusya, Çin ve diğerlerine kıyasla en yakın olduğu bilen kültürel, dinî ve tarihî faktörler vardır. Bu ve diğer hususlar için, Afrika Boynuzu bölgesindeki Türk politikası geniş kabul görmüştür.

Genel olarak, Türkiye'nin Afrika Boynuzu'na yaklaşımı, insanî yardım, eğitim, hastane inşası ve ortak çıkarlara hizmet verebilecek diğer şeyler gibi yumuşak bir eğilimin ürünüdür. Bunların yanı sıra ekonomik, diplomatik ve askerî eylemler arasında bir denge kurulduğu da göz önündedir, örnek olarak Somali davası tüm bunları özetleyen bir strateji içine girmektedir.

3.3. İran

Afrika Boynuzu bölgesinde uluslararası ve bölgesel rekabet konusunda, İran genel olarak Afrika'ya ve özellikle Afrika Boynuzu'na önem veren bölgesel ülkelerden biridir. Afrika ülkeleriyle siyasî ve ekonomik ilişkileri güçlendirme istekliliğini gösterdiği bilinmektedir. İran'ın bu hayati bölgeye askerî çıkarmaktan da uzak değildir.

Aslında İran devriminin başlangıcındaki İran stratejisinde, Afrika'ya girmek amacıyla XXI. yüzyılın başlangıcından, özellikle Muhammed Khatami döneminde reformcu hükümet döneminde yavaş yavaş yüzeye çıkmaya başlamıştır. Başlangıçta İran'ın odak noktası Kızıldeniz, Afrika Boynuzu ve Doğu Afrika'yı çevreleyen Afrika ülkeleri idi. Daha sonra uluslararası arenada yüzlerini önemli bir konumda olarak dayatan Afrika Boynuzu bölgesindeki uluslararası ve bölgesel rekabet ışığında İran dış politikası çıkarları listesinde çok önemli hale gelmiştir (Ayman, 2005: 26).

Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki İran faaliyeti, nükleer programı üzerindeki Batı ve Amerikan baskısına paralel ilerliyordu. Bu İran hamleleri, yaşadığı siyasî ve ekonomik baskılar ışığında İran'ın daha fazla Afrika desteği almaya çalışmak da dahil olmak üzere çeşitli hedeflerinin doğrultusunda gerçekleştiği söylenebilmektedir. Aynı zamanda İran, izolasyon duvarını kırmaya ve ABD'nin baskısı, yaptırımları ne olursa olsun İran'ın açılma yeteneğine sahip olduğunu göstermeye çalışmaktadır (Ayman, 2005: 23). Ayrıca İran kendisini hiçbir şekilde göz ardı edilemeyecek etkili bir bölgesel güç olarak göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Zaten İran devriminin başlangıcından bu yana aralarında gerginlik ve çekim hali yaşayan ABD başta olmak üzere Batı ülkeleriyle olası bir patlamayı öngörerek stratejik su yollarına yakın kalmak da İran'ın hedeflerinden önemli bir tanesidir.

İran'ın genel olarak Afrika'ya ve özellikle Afrika Boynuzu bölgesine yaklaşımı, İran dış politikasının hedeflerinde bir değişiklik bağlamında ortaya çıktığı şeklinde açıklanabilmektedir. Bölgedeki Amerikan ile İran potansiyeli arasındaki büyük farkı bilerek, mümkün olan maksimum İran çıkarlarını elde etmek ve meydanın İsraillilere ve Amerikan hegemonyasına bırakılmasını önlemek için çevredeki bölgesel iklimden yararlanma girişimi bu değişikliğin sonucunda oluşmuş bir İran politikasıdır (Ayman, 2005: 3).

Tüm bunların yanında, "*devrimi ihraç etme*" konusu İran vizyonuna göre, İran etkisini güçlendirmek ve artırmak amacıyla Şii düşüncesini bölgeye yaymaya çalışan İran kurumları veya kültür merkezleri aracılığıyla göz ardı edilemezdir. Sudan, faaliyetlerini ardında yatan kültürel merkezler açarak Şia doktrini yaymanın temel amacı bu girişimin açık bir örneğidir; ancak Sudan, İran merkezlerini Sudan topraklarında kapattıktan sonra bu hareketin kapısını kapatmıştır. Bu bağlamda, her ne kadar bazı İranlı yazarlar İran'ın politikası ile Şiizm veya Şii yoğunluğu olan bölgeler üzerindeki etkisinin genişlemesi arasındaki ilişkiyi reddetse de, gerçek tam tersidir (Mirmohammad Sadeghi, 2019: 221).

Aynı çerçevede, güvenlik konuları doğal olarak İran'ın bir yandan Batı güçleriyle yüzleşmesinde ve diğer taraftan İran ile Arap Körfez ülkeleri (*Suudi Arabistan, BAE*) arasında anlaşmazlığın ciddiyeti hakkında farklı görüşlere bakılmaksızın arasındaki tutarsızlık durumunda Doğu Afrika'nın şu ya da bu şekilde önemli stratejik istasyonlardan biri olmasını istediği görülebilmektedir.

Gerçekten de İran'ın Afrika Boynuzu'na odaklanması, İran'a gerekirse ekonomik ve muhtemelen askerî görevler üstlenmesini sağlayan bir odak noktası vermektedir. İran ve Eritre arasındaki ilişkiler göz önüne alındığında, bunun İran'ın bu ülkede Cibuti ülkesi ile birlikte farklı bir stratejik askerî bir konum bulmaya çalıştığı söylenebilmektedir. Her halükârda İran, Afrika Boynuzu ülkeleriyle ilişkiler kurmaya ve ilişkilerini sürdürmeye büyük önem vermektedir (Ariel, May 9, 2010).

Ekonomik çerçeveye gelince, İran zaten Afrika Boynuzu ve genel olarak Doğu Afrika'da birçok ekonomik çıkarlara sahiptir ve Sudan, İslami hareketin Sudan'da iktidara gelmesinden bu yana İran'ın nüfuzu için fırlatma rampası olmuştur. Birçok ekonomik, teknik, bilimsel ve kültürel alanda zaten iş birliği vardır (Osama, 2014: 200). Öte yandan, Afrika'nın uluslararası ve bölgesel güçlerle ortaklık kurma konusunda açık bir arzusu var ve İran'ın bundan dışlanması söz konusu değildir.

3.4. İsrail

İsrail, tüm bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerin bildiği bölgenin önemi nedeniyle Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki yaşam sahnesinde hep var olmuştur. İsrail'in Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki varlığı ise iki taraftan görülebilmektedir: İlk olarak tarihî yönüdür; burada İsrail'in Ortadoğu, Doğu Afrika ve Afrika Boynuz bölgesinde varlığını kurmaya çalıştığı bu sürecin bir parçası olarak, özellikle Afrikalı Falaşa Yahudileri tarafından temsil edilen Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki Yahudi varlığıyla ilgilidir (Steven, 1993: 654). İkinci ise, Arap-İsrail çatışmasıyla ilgili bir güvenlik politikasıdır. Bu, İsrail'in bölgede bir bütün olarak başarmayı amaçladığı hedeflerden görülebilmektedir. İsrail'in hedeflerinin İsrail'in ulusal güvenliği ile yakından bağlantılı olduğu açıktır, İsrail'in Filistin meselesi nedeniyle bölgedeki birçok ülke tarafından dayatılan bölgesel izolasyondan kurtulma girişimi olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu nedenle İsrail, bölgedeki Ortodoks Hıristiyan akımına öncülük eden Etiyopya ile bir ilişki kurarak Afrika Boynuzu bölgesine odaklanmaktadır (Woodward, 2002: 12). Böylece, Etiyopya ile İsrail arasındaki bağlar bölgedeki diğer ülkelere kıyasla güçlüdür; ancak İsrail çıkarlarına hizmet eden şeye göre tüm iplerde oynamaktadır. Örneğin, Etiyopya ordusu tarafından 1960- 1974 yılları arasında İmparator Haile Selassie'ye karşı düzenlenen darbede, İsrail imparator tarafında saf tuttu ve ona isyanı ortadan kaldırılmasına, darbenin engellenmesine yardımcı olan istihbarat bilgileri ile destek olmuştur (Benjamin, 1987: 52). Daha sonra, Etiyopya-İsrail ilişkileri 1977'de General Mengistu yönetimi sırasında İsrail'in rakiplerine verdiği destek nedeniyle gerilmiştir (Haggai, 1983: 103-04); ancak İsrail stratejik önemi nedeniyle Etiyopya ile ilişkilerini her zaman korumaya çalışmaktadır. 1991 yılında ise Mengistu rejiminin düşmesinden sonra bile durum değişmemiştir. Diğer tarafta, Eritre-Etiyopya çatışması ortamında, İsrail, 1993'te bağımsızlığını kazanan Etiyopya'dan ayrılmak için savaşan Eritrelilerin yanında durup ve bu yeni ülke ile hemen bağ kurabilmiştir (Hamdi, 2015: 79). Özetle, İsrail'in Kızıldeniz ve Afrika Boynuzun'daki çıkarlarını garanti altına almak için hem Etiyopya hem de Eritre ile ilişkilerini yeniden kurabildiği söylenebilmektedir. İsrail bölge ülkelerine yakın durmaya ve ardından Afrika Boynuzu'nun tüm ülkelerini kapsayacak şekilde ilişkilerini genişletmeye çalışmaktadır.

Genel olarak, İsrail'in Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki varlığı, İsrail'in bölgesel ortamı, özellikle Arap ülkeleri tarafından dayatılan izolasyonu kırma girişimi yoluyla görülebilecek birkaç hedefe ulaşmayı amaçlamaktadır (Ehud, 1982: 28-40). İsrail aynı zamanda Afrika ülkelerinden Arap-İsrail çatışmasında siyasî desteğini kazanmaya çalışıyor ve İsrail'i Uganda ile Güney Sudan gibi Hristiyan çoğunluğa sahip ülkelere yanısıra Etiyopya ve Kenya gibi Yahudi azınlıklara sahip olan ülkeler için "Seçilmiş Halk" inancına göre onları örnek bir ülke olarak sunmak amacıyla temsil edilen ideolojigk hedeflerine ulaşmaya çalışmaktadır. Örneğin, Etiyopya krallarının soyunun Kral Davut'tan geldiğini iddia eden Etiyopya'daki "*Kebra Nagast*" kitabı gibi bazı Afrika halklarının Yahudiliğini kanıtlamaya çalışan tarihî kökenlerine dayanmaktadır (Hamdi, 2015: 68). Aslında asıl amaç İsrail'in, güvenliğe sahip olmak için Arap ülkelerine bakan Kızıldeniz ve Babülmendep Boğazı ile ilgili ulusal güvenliğinin gerekliliklerini ciddi şekilde yerine getirmeye çalıştığı aşikardır (Hamdi, 2015: 79). Her halükârda, Afrika Boynuzu bölgesi İsrail'in ulusal güvenliğini tüm yönleriyle sağlamak için çalışmaya çalıştığı en uygun yer olabilmektedir.

Sonuç

Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki uluslararası ve bölgesel rekabet unsurlarını inceledikten sonra bu çalışmanın bulgularını şu şekilde özetleyebiliriz.

Uluslararası güçler arasındaki rekabet konusu, artıları ve eksileri ne olursa olsun uluslararası siyasetin gerçekçi bir parçası haline geldiği söylenebilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Afrika Boynuzu gibi stratejik öneme sahip olan bölgeler uluslararası güçlerin gözünde hedef haline gelebilmektedir. Bu nedenle Afrika Boynuzu bölgesi, uluslararası güçlerin gözünde özellikle 21. yüzyılın başından itibaren en önemli bölgelerden biri olmuştur ve bu bölgedeki Amerikalıların, Çinlilerin, Fransızların ve diğerlerinin varlığı açık bir örnektir. Sonunda söylenmesi gereken şey, Afrika Boynuzu bölgedeki uluslararası ve bölgesel rekabet unsurlarının farklı amaçlarına rağmen bu bölgenin ülkeleri, bölgesel güçlerin yanı sıra uluslararası güçlerin aralarındaki yaşanan rekabetten şu ya da bu şekilde etkilenmişlerdir. Bu gerçekliğe dayanarak, Afrika Boynuzu'nun stratejik önemi göz önüne alındığında bu bölge ülkelerinin geleceği şüphesiz ki uluslararası sistemin kaderine ve bu uluslararası sistemde önümüzdeki süreçte gerçekleşmesi muhtemel dönüşümlere bağlı olacağı düşünülebilmektedir.

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The Third Coming of the Fulani and its Security Implications for Southwest Nigeria

Fulani'nin Üçüncü Gelişi ve Güneybatı Nijerya için Güvenlik Etkileri

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Abstract: The modern Southwest region of Nigeria, particularly during the presidency of Muhammadu Buhari, was formerly a playground for bandit Fulanis and killer Fulani herdsmen, who are notorious for their insatiable thirst for violence. This study, however, applied a historical lens to explain why Fulanis of dubious character are drawn to the present-day Southwest region of Nigeria. This work adheres to the argument of Ikime (2018), who argued that a thorough understanding of the past is necessary for mastering the present. In light of this context, this study took a historical perspective on the Third Coming of the Fulanis to the Yoruba region of Nigeria. Fulani and Yoruba people coexisted in Ilorin, Kwara State, until Nigeria's official establishment in 1960. This research indicates that the Fulani people moved to the southwestern part of Nigeria on three consecutive occasions. The First Coming was characterized by nomadic people who were less concerned with Islamic values; the Second Coming embodied rigid Islamic values comparable to those of Uthman Dan Fodio; and the Third Coming is characterised by a disregard for human lives in host communities, endangering the Yoruba/Fulani identity in the Southwest as the host community has developed a fear of the Yoruba-Fulani as a result of the bandit Fulanis' questionable conduct. In this study, analytical methods like critical thinking and descriptive-analytical analysis were employed within the premise of primordialism and instrumentalism theories of ethnic conflicts. The majority of the information was obtained from internet sources such as peer-reviewed academic journals, news websites, and study reports. The research revealed that identifying and recognising Yoruba-Fulanis in the Southwest will help minimise ethnic stereotyping and aid in tracking down the troublesome alien Fulani who are a threat to the region's stability. If the Yoruba-Fulani were to be forcibly expelled from the Yoruba region of Nigeria, the lives of a significant number of Yorubas living in Fulani communities in the northern region would be radically impacted.

Keywords: First Coming, Second Coming, Third Coming, Yoruba/Fulani, Insecurity

Öz: Nijerya'nın modern Güneybatı bölgesi, vahşi davranışlarıyla tanınan haydut Fulani'ler ve Fulani çobanlar tarafından sıkıntıya sokulmuştur. Ancak bu çalışma, günümüz Nijerya'nın Güneybatı bölgesine şüpheli karakterli Fulani'lerin niye çekildiğini açıklamak için tarihsel bir perspektif benimsemektedir. Bu şekilde, tarihçiler, Fulani ve Yoruba halklarının, Nijerya'nın resmi olarak 1960 yılında kurulmadan önce bile Ilorin Kwara eyaletinde yan yana yaşadıklarını öğrendiler. Bu araştırma, Fulani halkının Nijerya'nın güneybatı bölgesine üç ayrı göç yaptığını öne sürmektedir. İlk Geliş, İslami değerlere daha az önem veren göçebe insanlar olarak tasnif edilmiştir; İkinci Geliş, Uthman Dan Fodio'nun değerlerine benzer sert İslami değerlerle karakterize edilmiştir; ve Üçüncü Geliş, misafir topluluklarda insan hayatına olan saygısızlıkla karakterize edilirken, Güneybatı'da Yoruba/Fulani kimliğini tehlikeye atmıştır çünkü misafir topluluk, haydut Fulani'lerin davranışları nedeniyle Yoruba/Fulani'den korkmaya başlamıştır. Bu araştırmada eleştirel düşünme ve açıklayıcı-analitik analiz gibi analitik teknikler kullanılmıştır. Bilgilerin çoğu, değerlendirilmiş bilimsel dergiler, haber siteleri ve çalışma raporları gibi çevrimiçi kaynaklardan elde edilmiştir. Araştırma, Güneybatı'da Yoruba/Fulani'leri tespit etmenin etnik klişeleştirmeyi önlemeye ve bölgedeki istikrarı tehdit eden sorunlu Fulani'leri takip etmeye yardımcı olacağını bulmuştur. Nijerya'nın güneybatı bölgesinin dışında yaşayan birçok Yoruba, Fulani yerleşimlerinde yaşamakta ve Fulani'ler Yoruba bölgesinden zorla çıkarılırsa yaşamları büyük ölçüde etkilenebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birinci Geliş, İkinci Geliş, Üçüncü Geliş, Yoruba-Fulani, Güvensizlik

Introduction

Among the greatest dangers to the security of the Nigerian state in the twenty-first century are terrorism, banditry, and secessionism. While Nigerian society has endured numerous political storms in the past, such as terrorism, banditry, and secessionism, the country has never experienced simultaneous security challenges. Unfortunately, all six geopolitical zones in Nigeria are vulnerable to at least one of the aforementioned security threats. For example, terrorists and seasoned bandits tend to gather in the north. Numerous kidnappers and armed Fulani herders have infiltrated the northwest, southwest, southeast, and southern districts.

In response to attacks by armed Fulani herders, the Biafrans in the southeast and the descendants of Oduduwa in the southwest adopted separatist tendencies. Fulani herder incursions into places outside of northern Nigeria have sparked rumours that the Federal Government of Nigeria is aiding the Islamification and Fulanisation of the nation. This study will distinguish between Fulanisation and Islamisation for the sake of clarity and to avoid misunderstandings surrounding the terms.

Terrorism and banditry, on the other hand, have spread over northern Nigeria and its northern neighbours, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, all of which are in the Lake Chad basin. All four countries in the Lake Chad Basin contain a permanent Fulani population, albeit as a minority that is nonetheless rather sizeable, particularly Nigeria, where Hausa and Fulani identities have merged despite their diverse beginnings.

Sangare (2019) estimates that there are 16,800,000 Fulani in Nigeria, or 7.6 percent of the total population; 2,900,000 Fulani in Cameroon, or 22 percent of the total population; 1,600,000 Fulani in Niger, or 6.3 percent of the total population; and 580,000 Fulani in Chad, or less than 4 percent of the total population. Even though Nigeria is home to the largest Fulani population in the Lake Chad region, Fulani makes up less than 6% of the country's population (Statista, 2021).

The historical accounts of Islamic Fulani conquests have left an indelible mark on the societies of Mali and Nigeria, especially in the north and a small territory in southwest Nigeria. This study will therefore establish a connection between the present and the past to demonstrate how Fulani ethnic expansionism was successful in its first and second comings but encountered resistance from the host community in what was thought to be its Third Coming, particularly in the Yoruba-dominated Southwestern region of Nigeria.

This study aims to shed light on the causes and effects of insecurity, strategic efforts to halt the invasion, a cry for regionalism (self-determination), and secessionist aspirations in the Yoruba region of Nigeria since the Fulani attempted to enter the contemporary age. In no way does this imply that the Fulani people adhere to an Islamist ideology. Their second arrival to Ilorin in "modern-day Kwara State" was distinguished by Islamic influences that have continued to the present day (Omoiya, 2014). The article examines the Fulanis' First, Second, and Third Comings in Nigeria's Southwest Region, as well as a brief evaluation of the First and Second Comings and how they have influenced the emergence of Yoruba-Fulani identity in Ilorin and Yoruba-Fulani migration to the interiors of Southwest Nigeria. The Third Coming would be described in detail, with an emphasis on how it precipitated a humanitarian crisis in the region in question. Finally, the host region's reactions to the mythical Third Coming will be analysed to discover if there is a plan to Fulanise and Islamise Nigeria. Similarly, the Yoruba/Fulani identity that emerged because of the Fulani influx in Nigeria's south-west region and its ramifications for security in the region under examination would be emphasised.

The conceptualisation of the Fulanis' First, Second, and Third Comings in the Southwest

First Coming: In this study, the term "the First Coming of the Fulani" refers to the migration of Fulani herders and pastoralists to Ilorin, as described by Abdulwahab (2007:67). According to Abdulwahab, the first Fulani arrived in Ilorin, with Al-Fard as the pioneer. In addition, the Fulani cattle herders are nomads who frequently relocate, especially during times of drought. Due to their antiquated worldview, the Fulani hold a neutral attitude toward Islam. In contrast to the severe treatment, they suffered from Hausa landowners and farmers elsewhere in Nigeria, Abdulwahab reports that Ilorin's beautiful vegetation and absence of taxes drew the Fulani herders to the city. The Fulani people also moved their herds to the market city of Ilorin. There was evidence of cattle and milk trading for textiles, salts, and other products. Ilorin, the capital of the present Nigerian state of Kwara, was the site of an ancient Fulani village that had no Islamic law or philosophy.

Second Coming: The Fulani's Second Coming refers to the second major meeting between the south-west (Ilorin), slave soldiers (jamma), and the Fulani, when Aare Afonja of Ilorin invited Fulani Muslim cleric "Sheu Alimi or Al-Salih" to fight the Oyo Empire for the establishment of an independent Ilorin, free from the hegemony of the Oyo Empire (Abulwahab, 2007; Omoiya, 2014).

Islam had a definite influence on the Fulanis' Second Coming to Ilorin. In his evaluations of the Fulanis of the town, Abdulwahab categorised Sheu Alimi as a Fulani and a conservative Muslim cleric. Abdulwahab (2007) and Omoiya (2014) shared an identical perspective regarding Sheu Alimi's Islamic ancestry. Sheu Alimi was said to have avoided politics despite being a devout Islamic cleric; based on this premise, the Second Coming of the Fulani featured a rigorous Islamic civilisation component, but not necessarily Jihadism (Danmole, Hermon-Hodge, & Johnson cited in Abdulwahab, 2007:76; Omoiya, 2014).

Atanda, as described in Abdulwahab (2007), gave a cynical but critical view of Sheu Alimi's role in Ilorin, which he labelled "Jihadism." Scholars who exonerated Sheu Alimi of jihadist accusations and those who labelled him a jihadist agree on one point: Sheu Alimi was the pioneer of Islam in Ilorin. Similarly, Fulani's Second Coming in Ilorin signified the subjugation of the host community's political culture and the formation of an emirate.

Sheu Alimi's accounts in Ilorin, as recorded by Atanda in Abdulwahab (2007), reflect Nwambara's (1963) remarks about Sheik Uthman Dan Fodio's Fulani conquest of Hausa territorial enclaves.

In contrast to Johnson, Danmole, and Hermon-Hodge's portrayals of Sheu Alimi, Nwambara and Atanda's accounts of Sheu Alimi may be considered as bleak. The Second Coming of the Fulani was characterised by a fusion of Islamic values and conquest, which has impliedly been a source of discontent for some Yorubas up to this point.

Third Coming of the Fulani: The sporadic and organised incursions of killer Fulani herdsmen from outside Nigeria into the modern-day southwest region of Nigeria have prompted speculations of the Third Coming of Fulani herders and robbers. However, this cannot be attributed to Jihad, but rather to political or economic objectives. Although renowned people such as Wole Shoyinka, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, the late Dr. Obadiah Mailafia, Afenifere, and others have cautioned the public that there is a plan to Islamise and Fulanise Nigeria, however, there is no scientific evidence to support these claims (Gbadamosi, 2021; Olawoyin, 2021; Akhaine et al., 2019). According to the Federal Government of Nigeria and a number of scholars, it is an exaggeration and propaganda fanned by some elites. Numerous instances have demonstrated, though, that criminal Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria kidnap and demand ransom from commuters. The confessions of some criminals, most of whom are from the Fulani axis, have prompted widespread racial profiling. Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah, on the other hand, cautioned against ethnic profiling, arguing that it contributed to the Biafran conflict (Abdulaziz, 2019; Antonio, 2019). Farmers are attacked and kidnapped on their farms or from their homes, as was the case in the southwest of Nigeria, where Pa Fasoranti's daughter, "Mrs Funke Olakunrin," was attacked and murdered by suspected armed Fulani herdsmen on the Ondo highway.

Pa Fasoranti, the Yoruba elder whose daughter was murdered by suspected Fulani bandits, asserted that the state was reluctant to properly investigate the homicide, most likely because the culprits were Fulani. Some Yoruba believed Fulani herdsmen were responsible for the murder of an innocent woman, while the Bola Ahmed Tinubu axis rejected such charges as premature and based on ethnic profiling (Akingboye et al., 2019). In fact, President Buhari issued an order mandating that any herdsman armed with a firearm would be executed by the Nigerian military or paramilitary (Ugbodaga, 2021). This edict demonstrates the government's awareness of the danger presented by the murderous Fulani herdsmen.

On the other hand, the Third Coming of the Fulani to Southwest Nigeria is characterised by blatant banditry. Indeed, it was reported that on October 22, 2021, Fulani bandits assaulted the Oyo State jail facility and freed the leader of the Fulani bandits, "Wakili," as well as other convicted convicts. The violent release of the captured Fulani bandit leader prompted numerous journalists to conclude that the bandits were foreign mercenaries (Bodunrin, 2021).

Primordialism and Instrumentalism Theories

Primordialism is based on the primacy of consanguinity, which is the major basis of social or group cohesion. This idea asserts that ethnic identity is inherited from birth and is immutable. Therefore, members of an ethnic group enjoy hospitality, mutual recognition, loyalty, security, and cooperation. Members of the same group are greeted with respect and acceptance (Harowitz, Smith, Hammond, and Axelrod, cited in Che, 2016). Whereas groups alien to or external to a local group are met with historical odium, prejudice, mutual fear, expulsion, and slurs (Geertz, cited in Che, 2016).

Primordialist theory is predicated on the premise that dissimilarity in ethnic identities is a possible source of rivalry; thus, sporadic conflicts are inevitable in an ethnically diversified society or geographical territory (Vanhanen, cited in Che, 2016). Primordialism is relevant to the examination of the rivalry that occurred between the Yorubas and Fulani during the First and Second Comings because it suggests "we against them." Contrary to the notion of primordialism, instrumentalism asserts that cultural variation within each society is not the major cause of conflict, but rather the manipulation or politicisation of primordial loyalties. In the context of resource allocation, government acts of commission and omission is the primary cause of conflict, not ethnic differences. Cederman et al. (2011) have shown that horizontal inequalities between politically significant groups are the key driver of ethnic conflicts, hence validating the theory of instrumentalism's assertion that cultural heterogeneity is not the fundamental driver of ethnic conflicts. For instance, the Yorubas were alarmed by the Federal Government of Nigeria's refusal to curb the excesses of the cattle-Fulani, given that President Buhari himself is of Fulani ethnicity. The adoption of primordialism and instrumentalism theories will aid a detailed analysis of the insecurity ravaging

The emergence of Yoruba/Fulani identity in contemporary Nigeria has a historical context.

Yoruba/Fulani identity is not innate, but rather the result of migration and Aare Afonja's invitation of Sheu Alimi, which brought Fulani livestock and city dwellers to Ilorin (Abdulwahab, 2007). Omoiya describes the political issues that led to Afonja inviting Fulani mercenaries to Ilorin, Afonja's downfall, the Fulanis' takeover of the Ilorin monarchy, the Fulanis' attempt to take over Oyo through expansion, and Oyo's three consecutive defeats at the hands of the Fulanis, who then asked the Sultan of Sokoto for assistance against Oyo (2014).

After declaring independence from the Oyo Empire, Aare Afonja invited the Fulani preacher Sheu Alimi for spiritual protection against the Oyos. This indicates that Oyo dominated the region prior to the Fulani's conquest of Ilorin and its various city-states. As a vassal state prior to the Fulani takeover, Ilorin was obligated to pay taxes to Oyo. Based on the treaty binding on the empire and its units, the Alaafin descends ruthlessly upon any province or vassal of the Oyo empire that defaults on payment, known as ishakole. Aare Afonja enlisted Sheu Alimi's spiritual and military support out of fear of the Alaafin's anger; nevertheless, Sheu Alimi's objectives greatly transcended those of Afonja. According to Omoiya (2014:79), Danmole believes that the animosity between Aare Afonja and Alaafin Aole derives from their common history. In the end, the rivalry led to Alaafin Aole's demise, and Afonja became the supreme monarch of Ilorin with the assistance of Sheu Alimi, whom Sholagberu introduced to him. The loss of Alaafin Aole marked the beginning of the Oyo Empire's decline. The advent of the Ilorin Emirate gave birth to the continued presence of the Yoruba-Fulani identity in the South-west region of Nigeria.

Replacement of Afonja's Monarchy by the Emirate.

In fulfillment of its geographical obligation, Alaafin Ojigi attempted to protect the Igbomina Yoruba from the Nupes, who had built a slave camp in the area. Due to this, the Oyo empire exerted tremendous influence over Ilorin; hence, it is not surprising that Alaafin Ojigi founded the city (I. Mustain, cited in Omoiya 2014:79). Oyo appointed a direct agent to lead Ilorin, who was succeeded by his prince Pasin and his son Alugbin, the father of Aare Afonja. During the reign of Aare Afonja, the Yoruba lost sovereignty to the Fulanis in Ilorin, and the land has remained an emirate to the present day.

Atanda, cited in Omoiya (2014), objectively stated that Afonja encouraged Sheu Alimi to relocate from Kuwo, a sub-city of Ilorin, to the metropolis of Ilorin, he also claimed that Afonja established Ilorin as a safe haven for slave troops fleeing from their Hausa owners in the north. Afonja encouraged Sheu Alimi to settle in Ilorin after he travelled to Oshogbo and Oyo Ile with his Islamic evangelistic mission. The army's habit of recruiting fugitive slaves precipitated the fall of Afonja. The slaves had no ties to Oyo, so it seemed reasonable that Afonja would want to prevent suspicions of treason or betrayal. Based on this notion, he utilised mercenaries extensively. Unfortunately, the well-fed slave troops abused their authority, turned on their leader, Afonja, murdered him, and publicly burned his body. Who among Aare Afonja and Sheu Alimi died first appears to be debatable. According to Johnson and Alesinloye, cited in Omoiya (2014:79), both Afonja and Sheu Alimi died in 1817. In contrast to Omoiya (2014), Abdulwahab (2007:74) stated that Sheu Alimi died in early 1823 and that this had the apparent effect of diminishing Afonja's political influence.

However, the deaths of Sheu Alimi and Afonja altered the political landscape of Ilorin as AbdulSalami, Sheu Alimi's son, and Bako from the Seriki Gambari lineage competed for the role of Imam. With the help of Sholagberu and other Yoruba leaders in Ilorin, Abdulsalami was able to win the election (Danmole, cited in Omoiya 2014:79).

According to the historical epistles of Omoiya (2014), the Second Coming of Fulani to the Southwest Region of Nigeria revealed that there was neither an incursion nor Jihadism. However, what might be termed "incursion" resulted from Aare Afonja's failed policies and his machinations against the Jama. As put by Abdulwahab (2007:74), the tide turned against Afonja after Sheu Alimi's death because he separated himself from the Muslim community and failed to crown a successor, Imam. All of these factors contributed to Afonja's obscurity when Abdulsalami and his slave warriors murdered him. According to Omoiya (2014:82), Emir Shitta of Ilorin employed Jihad to combat the threat posed by Alaafin Oluewu and his Bariba warrior ally from the Oyo Empire, known as Eleduwe or Waru Kura. These factors unquestionably contributed to the foundation of an emirate in Ilorin, and they also explain the Fulani flight into the interior of Yorubaland. In addition, the construction of an emirate in Ilorin and the development of a Yoruba-Fulani identity are both consequences of the first and second coming of the Fulanis.

The foundation of an emirate in Ilorin, however, led to a fierce power struggle between the Islamic Emir of Ilorin and the Oyo Empire, prompting Emir Shitta to ask the Sokoto emirate for assistance in destroying the Oyo-Ibariba coalition. The foregoing historical accounts establish that the Fulani in Southwest Nigeria existed prior to the establishment of Nigeria and recognise the Fulanis' First and Second Comings. The operations of identifiable bandits and livestock Fulanis continue to jeopardise the security of the Southwest area of Nigeria, which the Third Coming of the Fulani has invoked.

The Fulani Third Coming to Contemporary Nigeria's Southwest and the Escalation of Insecurity

Unfortunately, modern-day Southwest Nigeria has become a breeding ground for kidnappers, ritual murderers, cult rivals, Fulani bandits, and devastating cattle Fulani horror shows (Usman & Akinrefon, 2017; Oluwafemi, 2021; Ojo, 2020; Akinrefon, 2021; Raheem, 2017; Umoru, 2021; The Nation, 2021). Insecurity has spurred widespread unease among both locals and visitors. Unfortunately, ethnic stereotyping has become more common due to the horrible atrocities committed by Fulani bandits and killer herders. The roadways, farms, and woodlands in contemporary Southwest Nigeria have regrettably become death or kidnapping traps due to the operations of alleged Fulani bandits, armed Fulani livestock raids on farmers' property, and kidnappers from other ethnic groups.

Regular Fulani armed bandit attacks and Fulani attacks on the locals' cattle have prompted the locals' desire to expel the Fulani from the Southwest's geographic boundaries. This is evident in Igangan, Oyo State, and other locations. Indeed, the actions of a handful of misguided Fulanis have sparked widespread outrage and justified the use of ethnic profiling. According to Atanda, cited in

Abdulwahab (2007), Fulanis commit retaliatory violence by nature. Similarly, historical records indicate that an attack against the Fulani is typically met with Fulani reprisal aggression. This was proved in Igangan, where Fulani invaders murdered 15 people and destroyed property.

In Oyo State, intruders stormed into a jail where a prominent Fulani bandit commander was being kept. Inmates were released and the detained Wakili could not be located after the incident. The identity of the attackers remains unknown; however, Fulani bandits have been the subject of conjecture. As seen by the assassination of Aare Afonja in precolonial Nigeria by Fulani and slave warriors, the Fulanis have a well-earned reputation for retaliatory attacks. In reprisal, Fulani attacks were launched against the states of Benue, Plateau, and Kaduna. The current governor of Kaduna State avowedly stated that the Fulani people will always resort to violent retaliation (Vincent, 2021; Sahara Reporter, 2021; Sahara Reporter, 2021; Reporters, 2021; Ibrahim, 2020; Dada, 2021; Daily Trust, 2021). According to Atanda, cited in Abdulwahab (2007), the Fulani habitually fight in one other's defence; hence, it is valid to attribute this mindset to the Fulani people. However, he did not specify whether or whether they seek retribution when cheated upon, but he noted that they believe in retaliation.

Case Studies of Yoruba/Fulani Identity, Bandit Fulani Attacks, and Culture of Reprisals and its Implications on Security

Attacks by Fulani herders in Igangan, Oyo State, and the Eviction of Yoruba/Fulanis

Farmers in the Ibarapa-Igangan axis of Nigeria's Oyo State claim that Yoruba-Fulanis and Fulani herdsmen abducted, demanded ransom, and murdered their children. Consequently, the Yorubas threatened to expel the Yoruba/Fulani people who had resided in the area for decades, compelling them to leave (Sahara Reporters, 2021; Akintun, 2021). Ethnic tensions and violent retaliation occurred because of Fulani herder attacks on members of host communities. The Yorubas' retaliatory attacks led to numerous Yoruba-Fulani absconding to an unknown location. A widely distributed clip captured the aftermath of the Fulani assault in the Igangan axis. According to accounts, Fulani herders attacked the Igangan community on June 6, 2021, killing twenty people and torching the king's palace and a gas station in the host town (PM News, 2021; Ajayi, 2021). As proof of the Fulanis and Yorubas' battle, victims, property damage, and eyewitness reports were recorded (Kilarigbo Live, 2021; SaharaTV, 2021).

A counter-story, to the claim that Fulani Assassinated Dr. Fatai Aborode

The eviction of Yoruba and Fulani from Igangan and the ensuing retaliatory attacks by Fulani herders are complex problems. This is because fresh evidence has emerged identifying the root cause of the issue. According to Oyetimi and

Alimi (2021), the assassination of Dr. Fatai Aborode, a leader of the People Democratic Party and a former candidate for the House of Representatives, who was allegedly killed by two Fulani herders, was the primary cause of the conflict between Fulani and Yoruba in Ibarapa, Oyo State.

Crimes such as murder, rape, and kidnapping are attributed to groups of Fulani herders in these reports. All of these problems led to the decision to force out the Yoruba/Fulani and Bororo/Fulani who had lived in the area for decades. Citizens of Ibarapa took matters into their own hands after realising that the Nigerian security agencies, especially the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), were doing little to help. On a live show broadcast by the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS) in February, the current governor of Oyo State declared that new intelligence proves the late Dr Fatai Aborode was not slain by Fulani herdsmen (Politics Today, 2021). In the opinion of Governor Seyi Makinde:

I spent two days in Ibarapa and I interacted with the people. I spoke with the father. I asked him what happened. They told me that, Dr. Aborode was not the one that drove himself to the farm. He was carried on the motorcycle when they were going. He sat at the back. But when they were coming, it was another person. I asked where the person is that drove the motorcycle, they said that he came to the house to seek help. They told me that some people who saw them during the interaction said that those people are not Fulani. They were speaking Yoruba. The father told me that the death was political. And I called the Commissioner of Police (Daily News24, 2021).

This does not suggest, however, that Fulani herders and bandits have not penetrated and exploited Southwest Nigeria. The appalling and horrible conduct of the criminal Fulani herders have prompted a nationwide discussion about whether there is an effort to Fulanise or Islamise Nigeria. The comments of Noble Laurette Wole Soyinka, Chief Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo, "the former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria," the Afenifere, the late Dr. Obadiya Meilafia, and Cardinal Okogie, among others, all claimed shared a similar view regarding the assumed Fulanisation and Islamisation agenda (Awa & Nwachukwu, 2019; Ige, 2019; Oluwole, 2019; Gbadamosi, 2021; Eyoboka, 2019; Akinterinwa, 2021). The invasion of the Bororo-Fulani, who are frequently encouraged by the Yoruba-Fulani, has sparked ethnic and religious consciousness, as seen by the leaders' worries that powerful Nigerians intend to Fulanise and Islamise the nation.

Fulanisation (pastoralism and politics), Islamisation (jihadism), and their Snowball Effect on Security in Southwest Nigeria

The bandit Fulanis and murderous cattle Fulanis have sparked a chorus of unfavorable assumptions throughout Nigeria's southwestern region; this has inadvertently morphed into a widespread belief that secessionism guarantees security because it will protect their region from the incursion of unwanted and unwelcome Fulani herdsmen aggressors. On the other hand, patriotic Nigerians insist on a unified Nigeria and urge the Federal Government of Nigeria to act vigorously. Principal proponents of the Fulanisation and Islamisation hypotheses are mostly secessionists and opposition leaders such as the late Dr Obadiah Mailafia, Lt. Gen. Theophilus Danjuma, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, Professor Wole Soyinka, and the incumbent Governor of Benue State (This Day, 2022).

Separatists in the Yoruba region of Nigeria are of the assumption that a balkanised Nigeria will protect their homeland from the homicidal cattle-Fulanis. The Fulani are widely believed by academics, politicians, and businesspersons to be committed to Islamising and Fulanising Nigeria in the same way that Uthman dan Fodio did in the country's north prior to the establishment of Nigeria (Campbell & Quinn, 2021). One historical fact that seems to unsettle the average Yoruba's perspective of the Fulanis to this day is the story of Abdulsalami, the son of Sheu Alimi, who transformed the Yoruba monarchy into an emirate in Ilorin.

The government's initiative to construct grazing routes for the Fulanis, the Miyetti- Allah's statements, and the militant Bororo-Fulani's are all realities that contributed to the growing suspicion of Fulanis in the Yoruba region. On the other hand, pundits like Imam Sulaimon Antonio and the FGN assert that the pretensions that there is Fulanisation and Islamisation agenda are fabrications meant to drive a wedge amongst Nigerians (Punch Nigeria, 2019; TVC News Nigeria, 2019). However, South-westerners remain sceptical that the Fulanisation and Islamisation agendas are unreal. For the record, it is ethical to admit that Fulani herdsmen and farmer clashes are not new to Nigeria, as they have occurred on a sporadic and recurring basis since the country's first republic.

Some scholars argue that confrontations between Fulani herders and farmers were fueled by multiple variables, such as climate change-induced drought (Popoola et al., 2020), while others claim Fulanis are culturally Jihadist and expansionist (Hiskett, 1963). The latter position is commonly attributed to Uthman dan Fodio's past accomplishments in Sokoto and the events that transpired in Ilorin under the reigns of Afonja and his associate Sheu Alimi. The viewpoints are consistent with the assertions of fulanisation and Islamisation, yet there is insufficient proof that there is an effort to pursue such a costly aspiration. However, this sentiment is the result of precolonial Fulani practices, the actions of contemporary Boro-Fulani, and the government's desire to urge non-Fulani populations to welcome Fulani pastoralists' grazing traditions.

The Boro-Fulani incursion into southwest Nigeria is not the source of fear, but historical memories and random acts of violence perpetrated by alien Fulanis who have shown disregard for host communities. In addition, the reluctance of the Federal Government to clamp down on the excesses of the bellicose Fulani herdsmen in the Southwest region equally spurred the assumption that there is a Fulaniization and Islamisation agenda.

Conclusion

In conclusion, The Third Coming of the Fulani describes the advent of a distinct Fulani people in the southwestern region of Nigeria, specifically because their entrance constituted a security threat to Nigerians in general. However, this does not indicate that all Fulanis in Nigeria have questionable morals; the actions of a few Fulanis from other countries have tragically tarnished the reputation of Fulanis in general. Although historical narratives do not favour the Fulanis, neither those in the north nor those on the northern border of Yorubaland, which is "Ilorin." The second arrival of the Fulani to Yorubaland was chaotic, and this, combined with Uthman Dan Fodio Jihad in the North during the pre-European era, had a detrimental effect on the Yorubas' perception of the Fulanis in contemporary Nigeria. This only suggests that the Fulanis had received odium prior to the establishment of Nigeria because of their Jihad in the north and Second Coming in the Yoruba region. Following the Fulani Jihad in the pre-European Northern region and the Second Coming in the pre-European Yoruba region, the Yorubas' perception of the Yoruba-Fulani majority-settled in Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria, has been badly damaged. As a result of historical prejudice, the Yoruba have been reluctant to embrace the Yoruba-Fulani identity; instead, the Fulani are viewed as pure Fulani despite living among the Yoruba for more than a century.

The outcome of the Yoruba's refusal to accept the Yoruba-Fulani identity has placed the Yoruba-Fulani in a position where "we neither belong here nor there." However, the Yoruba-Fulani appear to be attached to their primordial source, as events have demonstrated that they routinely seek the support or protection of the Northern and alien Fulanis during times of crisis. Abdulsalam, the son of Sheu Alimi, sought the assistance of the Sokoto Emirate when the Oyo Empire revolted against Ilorin. Similarly, Yoruba-Fulanis in the contemporary Yoruba region has been observed employing Fulani mercenaries against the Yorubas, as was the case in Igangan, Oyo State, to counteract repression. The evident historical fact regarding how the Fulanis migrated to the Yoruba region during the First and Second Comings strengthened the Yorubas' belief that the Yoruba-Fulanis are outsiders, even though they are encapsulated in an ancient Yoruba metropolis to this day and even hold the monarchy.

The threat posed by the rejection of Yoruba-Fulani identity is that it provides the Bororo-Fulani and bandit Fulanis, who are frequently housed by Yoruba-Fulanis, with a covert path. Not only are the alien Fulanis a menace to the Nigerian people in the Southwest region, but they also pose a challenge to the Nigerian government since many of them are undocumented nomads.

In the southwest region of Nigeria, the security threat is a reality due to the poor state of the economy, climatic, political, cultural, and historical factors, as well as human vices. The response of the federal government to the region's instability has been the subject of unsubstantiated rumours, resulting in severe criticism and separatist ardour.

The Federal Government's proposal of a cattle ranch, incapacity to control the violent herders, and the blatant assertions of the Miyetti Allah all contributed to the region's separatist consciousness.

Peace and reconciliation initiatives with an emphasis on cultural competence for Yorubas, Yoruba/Fulanis, and Fulanis. To reduce incursions into farmers' plantations, the association of cow herders should be encouraged to seek a new and more contemporary alternative to primitive grazing. A cultural reconciliation between the Yorubas and Fulanis in Ilorin, to promote the acceptance of the Yoruba-Fulani identity, is one possible path ahead. The second setting is at the institutional level, where the National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be tasked with enlightening both Yorubas and Yoruba-Fulanis on the need to accept one another as patriotic Nigerians.

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The Analysis of Tax Buoyancy and Determinant in Sierra Leone

Analyse de la Pression Fiscale et de ses Déterminants en Sierra Leone (Titre en français)

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Abstract: Tax revenue in Sierra Leone has been low throughout the study period (1988 to 2018). The ARDL bound testing co-integration estimation technique was employed. A log level multiple regression model that comprises buoyancy of total tax revenue as a dependent variable and percentage share of service value added, import, industry, money supply and agricultural sector were used as an independent variable. The result from the bound test confirms the existence of co-integration relation, which validates the estimation of long run and short run model. The long run empirical result suggests that agricultural sector, industry and service value added as a percentage share of GDP had a positive and statistically significant effect on the buoyancy of total tax revenue. Also, the results establish that import and money supply were insignificant at the conventional level in the long run. However, the short run result reveal that all the variables are statistically significant in the study period. Specifically, the short run results confirm a positive relationship between agricultural sector, money supply and the responsiveness of tax revenue. As the findings of the present study revealed, tax revenue there is a need for enhancing the efficiency of revenue administration in bring new customers in to the tax net.

Keywords: Tax revenue, Sierra Leone, multiple regression, agricultural.

Résumé: Les recettes fiscales en Sierra Leone ont été faibles tout au long de la période étudiée (1988 à 2018). La technique d'estimation de la co-intégration par test ARDL a été utilisée. Un modèle de régression multiple au niveau du logarithme qui comprend le dynamisme des recettes fiscales totales en tant que variable dépendante et la part en pourcentage de la valeur ajoutée des services, des importations, de l'industrie, de la masse monétaire et du secteur agricole ont été utilisés en tant que variables indépendantes. Le résultat du test de liaison confirme l'existence d'une relation de co-intégration, ce qui valide l'estimation des modèles à long terme et à court terme. Les résultats empiriques à long terme suggèrent que la valeur ajoutée du secteur agricole, de l'industrie et des services en pourcentage du PIB a un effet positif et statistiquement significatif sur la croissance des recettes fiscales totales. Les résultats établissent également que les importations et la masse monétaire ne sont pas significatives au niveau conventionnel à long terme. Cependant, les résultats à court terme révèlent que toutes les variables sont statistiquement significatives au cours de la période étudiée. Plus précisément, les résultats à court terme confirment une relation positive entre le secteur agricole, la masse monétaire et la réactivité des recettes fiscales. Comme le montrent les résultats de la présente étude, il est nécessaire d'améliorer l'efficacité de l'administration des recettes afin d'attirer de nouveaux clients dans le filet fiscal.

Mot-clés: Recettes fiscales, Sierra Leone, régression multiple, agriculture.

Introduction

Tax revenue of a country has become one of the critical determinant for the development of the economy due to the responsiveness of tax that changes in the economic activity. The base (Buoyancy) of a tax system change due to the % change in the tax revenue. Tax buoyancy is an indicator to measure efficiency and responsiveness of revenue mobilization in response to growth in the GDP or national income. A tax is said to be buoyant if the tax revenue increase more than proportionately in response to a rise in national income or output. It is quite important to know the tax based, if the tax buoyancy exceeding one would result in tax revenue rising by then the increase in GDP. Many development partners and some international organization, such as World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, strongly emphasis that the economy of Sierra Leone should be focus on the generation of domestic revenue.

According to the budget information for citizens,2014, In Sierra Leone the bulk of government source of revenue is primarily base on tax. According to the research in 2014, 80% of government revenue was generated through tax, which is refers to as domestic revenue. Relatively, the importance foreign grant from the development partner has contributed greatly the economy budget. (Budget information for citizen, 2014). The overall economic performance of Sierra Leone, measured by growth in real GDP between 2008/2009 to 2012/2013 shows a mean growth rate of 11.5%. the structure of Sierra Leone tax system can be emphasis on certain area, personal income tax (PIT) and nominal GDP, Consumer income tax (CIT) to nominal GDP by showing the trend on the Sierra Leone economy.



Figure 1 PIT to nominal GDP

From the chart above it can clearly been seen that the nominal GDP has been increasing due to the PIT from 2004 to 2020. It is also important to consider the CIT to the nominal GDP. The tax based is wages and salaries, the pay as you earn system (PAYE) were used to develop the PIT. When there is an increasing in the wages and salaries it automatically increased the tax based which will affect the nominal GDP positively.



Figure 2 shows the impact of CIT to the nominal GDP.

The tax base of CIT is business profitability or operating surplus, the business profitability has a direct relationship to the investment. When there is a boom in the investment level, the business profitability would increase and these would lead to a rise in the CIT and the nominal GDP. The research also shows that the following sectors contributed greatly to the government revenue mobilization, value added of agricultural, industries and fisheries were 3.6% and 2.7% in 2010 & 2011, 15.0% and 14.1% respectively. In the implementation of various taxes in different ways by different level of government overly complicates the system and makes it more difficult to assess the competitive impact of specific taxes. For instance, there is an economic impact to the nation that has large proportion of agricultural sectors could generate higher tax revenue as compared to the industrial sectors. Sierra Leone actually faces such situation in which there is large share of agriculture in total output and employment, large informal sectors and occupations.

Therefore, understanding the nexus between this tax buoyancy and it determinant will help policy maker implement the much-needed sectors that are geared towards the attainment of buoyancy of total tax revenue in Sierra Leone.

The possible question that will emanate this study will be; is there any impact of service value to the tax buoyancy in Sierra Leone? Why the tax buoyancy is not being effective in contributing to the GDP of Sierra Leone? Is there any economic correlation between the tax buoyancy and the import, money supply and the agricultural sector, both in the short run and long run? The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the empirical findings of previous researches. Section 3 focuses on the methodology including the model specification and estimation techniques. Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis, and chapter 5 present conclusion to the research and providing possible policy recommendation to enhance tax buoyancy and it determinant in Sierra LEONE.

2. Literature Review

The empirical literature on the analysis of tax buoyancy and it determinant in Sierra Leone is abounding. Many researchers across the global have carried out empirical works with conflicting outcomes. Chris analysed the structural shift of government revenue in Sierra Leone from 1961 to 1982 that connect the economic development to that of the tax revenue directly through the use of gross domestic product as a proxy. From the sample collected by Chris (1961, 1971 and 1971 to 1982) was used to set up the two regression from the sample period. At the first test of the variables there was a positive relationship that exist between the variables from the first regression. From the finding of the second regression, it states that about 81% to 82% of the economic growth are highly financed by the external fund that serves as a fund for government revenue.

The study also found that economic development has a significant impact on direct government revenue.

The period of 1960 to 1979 was another research that was conducted by Fala, his aim was to see how the result of Chris can be proven by taking the same sample period.

The economy of Sierra Leone has been depending on the sector that is part of the mining sector, the research from the previous literature has seriously embarking on the methodology of co-integration together with ETC by looking into the economic growth effect. The period of 1987 to 2012 was used by the researcher, and they were able to identify some of the revenue that are not directly coming from the mining sector like taxes from the personal income, tax from the company income, VAT and also taxes collected from road.

The above analysis of the empirical literature fails to address some of the important tax revenue area and how the economic growth of Sierra Leone is affected. The study of these research was able to identify some of the major tax revenue source of the government within the annual period of 1987 to 2017 analysis.

Other researcher also focuses on the administrative tax system and how Sierra Leone gross domestic product are affected through the generation of revenue. Even though the generation of tax revenue was paramount, so many determinants were used to measure it.

According to Dasgupta 2005, the tax from the personal income which was collected from the annual observation period from 1966 to 2005 as their secondary data, it shows that the individual burden on tax decline is as a result of the decrease in the rate of tax, which is the primary focus for the achievement of policy implementation.

There were other research that was done in 41 countries in Africa, where the researcher directly related it to Nigeria by taking into consideration of OLS as estimation technique for testing the buoyancy of the different economy in the various countries for the period 1991 to 2000, (Oriakhi, 2005).

According to some field researcher of macroeconomic Kargbo and Egwaikhide 2012, they analysis the elasticity of tax in Sierra Leone within the period 1977 to 2009 by using the method of dummy variables. The study reveal that the country estimation of the buoyancy of the system of tax were much greater than that of elasticity of tax, and the LR tax elasticity were more than the SR. Moreover, it was proven that by increasing an additional revenue through tax would be much more effective in Sierra Leone in the measure of tax discretionary which shows an inelastic result of the same period.

Analysis the tax buoyancy has become the topic of discussion today by various researcher which Mawia and Nzomoi 2013 embark on the study in Kenya by examining the tax system for the period of 1999 to 2011, they used different estimation techniques which is method of logarithmic regression. The study shows that 2.58 value, that the total tax revenue was buoyant and it was not buoyant in the case of individual tax while the excise duties is buoyant.

Another study was undertaken in 34 OECD members' country with the observation period 1965 to 2012, using the estimation techniques PARDL. From the study it prevails that there is no significant different within those members' county in both the buoyancy in the SR the sum total of tax revenue, the LR shows that the buoyancy is greater by one and a half, (Mooij, and Norregaard 2014).

The productivity of tax system was analysis by Wolde 2016 of the reforms of post-tax system in Ethiopia of the year 1991 to 2014, by using two different estimation techniques of autoregressive distributed lag co-integration and the method of proportional adjustment approach. The rationale behind the study was to determine whether the economic growth was elastic or inelastic in nature. It shows the coefficient of buoyancy of 0.95 and 2.12 as elastic, which implies that the aggregate tax is elastic, this actually confirm the economic growth.

The research of Osoro 1993 in Tanzania, by examine the productivity of tax revenue through the Tanzania tax reforms system of the period 1969 to 1990, reveals that both the taxes of individual and total tax has low elasticity.

In similar study by Ole 1975, primarily examine the Kenya tax structure of the elasticity of income for the period 1962 to 1972 which was regressed and the unusual observation was not adjusted. It was proven that 0.81 of the index as the structure of tax was inelastic income.

3. Methodology

These chapter try to explain the research methodology. It also entails the model specification and estimation procedures and techniques as well as the data type.

The research of the methodology tries to explain the independent variables in the form of straight line equation that are express as %, such variables are; services value, import, annual growth of money supply, industry value added and annual growth of the agricultural sector contribution to the tax revenue.

The above point is a brief justification of the variables used in the below equation.

$BTTR_t = (SGDP_t, IMGDP_t, MSGDP_t, INDGDP_t, AGRGDP_t)$ 1

$BTTR_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SGDP_t + \beta_2 IMGDP_t + \beta_3 MSGDP_t + \beta_4 INDGDP_t + \beta_5 AGRGDP_t + \varepsilon^t$ 2

This equation 2 will explain the significant of each independent variable to that of dependent variable both in the long run and short run.

By establishing and analysing the long-run relationship between the determinants of tax buoyancy and the buoyancy of total tax revenue (GDP).

The ARDL model for the long-run of BTTR (GDP) of Sierra Leone can thus be specified as;

$\Delta GDP_t = \alpha_0 + \Sigma^n_{i=1} \alpha 1i \Delta GDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1} \alpha 2i \Delta SGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1} \alpha 3i \Delta IMGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1} \alpha 4i \Delta MSGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1} \alpha 5i INGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1} \alpha 6i AGRGDP_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$...................... 3

The essence of employing this estimation technique was because it deals with a small data sample size. Also, since the lag are being identify it is very easy to employ the OLS estimation techniques, whereas it is impossible for the case multivariate variables. Actually; this makes the ARDL procedure relatively easier.

The Autoregressive Distributed Lag co-integration test, which was established by Pesaran et al 2001, study the relationship within the independent variables within the model given as a series. Stationarity can be confirm if the first difference of the series is I(0) it is said to be stationary and I(1) is non stationary, this actually happen when there are more series of variables.

This research therefore applies ARDL co-integration to the system of the five variables in the buoyancy of total tax revenue function by looking into it, either to check if there is correlation between the variables in the LR. Let us consider this hypothesis;

$H_0 = \beta_1 = \beta_2 = \beta_3 = \beta_4 = \beta_5 = \beta_6 = 0$

$H_1 \neq \beta_1 \neq \beta_2 \neq \beta_3 \neq \beta_4 \neq \beta_5 \neq \beta_6 \neq 0$

The hypothesis can become null if the critical value is below the F-Statistics, it implies that there is no LR relationship and must be rejected and the reverse hold.

The inconclusive case of the hypothesis can be determined when the F-Statistics lies between the more significant and the lower critical value.

The 2nd reason why we conduct A.R.D.L. was to test the speed at which it runs in the S.R. The speed adjustment here refers to the error correction model (ETC).

This ECT try to explore the behaviour of those variables in the economy from the S.R. to L.R. Considering this equation of ETC below;

$$\Delta GDP_t = \alpha_o + \Sigma^n_{i=1}\alpha 1i\Delta GDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1}\alpha 2i\Delta SGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1}\alpha 3i\Delta IMGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1}\alpha 4i\Delta MSGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1}\alpha 5i\Delta INGDP_{t-1} + \Sigma^n_{i=1}\alpha 6i\Delta AGRGDP_{t-1} + {}_{\lambda}ECT_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \ldots. 4$$

Where ECT_{t-1} is the Error Correction Term. λ This is being referred to as the adjustment speed and is attain when there is an economic shock, and it is term as coefficient of ECT.

For the appropriate model selection of the long-run underlying equation, the study applied the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Final Prediction Error (FPE) and Hannah Quinn information criterion (HQIC) to choose the optimal lag length of each of the underlying variables in the model, with the standard with the lowest value of information been selected.

The estimators of model with lagged dependent variables are sensitive to the auto correlation of the error terms. To determine the lag length which implies the elimination of auto correlation of the error terms, the lags are added until the error term of white noise, the Durbin Watson test was used to test for auto correlation.

For the diagnostic checking, the research will test the presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in error and normality of error as well. Finally, by also using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, this paper will also be able to check the stability of the parameter of the model. The study further presents the results of both adjusted and R-Square test by knowing the rate at which dependent variable can be explain by the differences of independent variables.

4.1 Unit Root Test Results

In the case of the unit root it is not necessary for any pretesting of variables and therefore it essential for us to test the variables, by actually confirming if those variables not integrated by an order greater unity. By freeing our result from the outcome spurious regression it is important for us to abstained of the occurrence of I(2) variables, this is the reason why conducting the unit root test for the purpose of Stationarity. By establishing the Stationarity of the various, the study conducts a unit root test in order to ascertain whether the variables are stationary in level or non-stationary, there is all tendency to employ the ARDL. By establishing the order of integration the rules of Philips Perron and Augmented Dickey Fuller test must be considered.

Table 1: Unit-Root Test Results

VARIABLE	Augmented Dickey-Fuller		Philips-Peron		Order of integration
	Level	First difference	Level	First difference	
BTTR	-2.550869	-4.701409	-2.963972	-4.724295	I(1)
AGRGDP	-1.982421	-3.568088	-1.626640	-3.937701	I(1)
IMGDP	-2.345050	-6.727108	-2.345050	-6.854438	I(1)
INGDP	-1.384517	-4.738147	-1.384517	-4.709312	I(1)
MSGDP	-0.953302	-3.522037	-1.034592	-4.992521	I(1)
SGDP	-1.935324	-4.849748	-2.024725	-4.846074	I(1)

Critical values at 5% = 2.963972
Source: EViews 11 output

From the unit root test result in Table 3, it is clearly shown that all the results are I (1) variables, it implies that they are stationary at first difference. Both the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Philips Perron test (PP) unit root test results are in line with each other. The study has shown that there is no I(2) variables, and therefore the estimation techniques of ARDL must be applied.

4.2 Bound Test Co-integration Result

Given that the primary aim was to determine tax buoyancy of the total tax revenue, therefore the relationship in the LR of these variables must be test for co-integration.

As result of the table 2 given a result of lag length (1) it is necessary for us to use time series analysis of data.

The dependent variable is BTTRGDP is regressed on the other variables to ascertain the co-integration relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. For us to actually know if it is indeed there is a long-run relationship within the various variables it is necessary for us to employ F-Test.

Table 2: ARDL F-Bounds Test Results

Test statistic	Value	Signif.	I(0)	I(1)
Asymptotic: n=1000				
f-statistic	5.606409	10%	2.26	3.35
k	5	5%		2.62
3.79				
		2.5%		2.96
4.18				
		1%		3.41
4.68				

From the result in Table 2 above, it is clearly shown that the calculated F-Statistic when Buoyancy of total tax revenue of the GDP (BTTRGDP) is 5.606409, these is greater than 5% significant value as a upper critical value (3.79). The result shows that we should reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level and therefore no need for co-integration relationship within the tax buoyancy of GDP and its determinants.

Ideally, the study concludes that the co-integration within the various variables in buoyancy of total tax revenue equation shows that it exists, hence we proceed with the estimation of the long – run model.

4.3 Long Run Model Result

Since it has been found out that there is an existence of co-integration from the bound test result, wherein LBTTRGDP is the dependent variable, it is good for us now to estimate the long-run model for the long-run coefficient. Below is the long-run result in Table 3.

Table 3: Long Run ARDL Estimates

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-statistic	Prob
AGRGDP	1.073503	0.840869	1.276659	0.02163
IMGDP	0.047191	0.147660	0.319594	0.75261
INDGDP	1.247582	1.016935	1.226805	0.02341
MSGDP	-0.072740	0.544939	-0.133482	0.89511
SGDP	1.225136	0.967407	1.266412	0.01199

Source: EViews 11 output

From the result in Table 3 above it shows that the Agricultural sector as the percentage of the GDP (AGRGDP) and the Industry value added as a percentage of GDP (INGDP) and the Service value added as a percentage of GDP (SGDP) are the most significant variables that affect the buoyancy of total tax revenue of the GDP in the long-run. Ideally, the result establishes a favourable relationship between Agricultural sector and the responsiveness of tax revenue, and the variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, a percentage increase in the Agricultural sector will increase the buoyancy of total tax revenue by 1.073503 percentage point at the conventional level of significance. Therefore, the finding is consistence with the priori expectation. Theory also affirm that there is positive relationship between the Agricultural sector and the buoyancy of total tax revenue.

Similarly, both the industry and service value added as a percentage of the GDP are positively related to the degree of responsiveness of tax revenue and its variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, a percentage increase in each of the sector would automatically lead to an increase in the buoyancy of total tax revenue by 1.247582 and 1.225136 percentage point at a conventional level of significance respectively.

Basically, the coefficient of import value and Money supply (Broad money) have the expected a priori signs, the variables are however insignificance at the conventional level in the long-run.

Short Run Ardl Estimates

Table 4: Error Correction Model Representation For Selected ARDL Model-ARDL (1, 2, 1, 0, 2, 2, 2, 1)

Variable	Coefficient	Std.error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-33.31522	9.683776	-3.440313	0.0026
D(AGRGDP)	0.182272	0.132397	1.376711	0.1838
D(IMGDP)	-0.044529	0.034736	-1.281947	0.2145
D(MSGDP)	0.450491	0.182316	2.470935	0.0226
ECT(-1)*	-0.343105	0.098848	-3.471033	0.0024

R-squared	0.428109	Mean dependent var	0.236929
Adjusted R-squared	0.336607	S.D. dependent var	1.893220
S.E. of regression	1.542009	Akaike info criterion	3.855060
Sum squared resid	59.44476	Schwarz criterion	4.088593
Log likelihood	-52.82591	Hannan-Quinn criter.	3.929770
F-statistic	4.678658	Durbin-Watson stat	1.475482
Prob(F-statistic)	0.005879		

Source: EViews 11 output

Estimation results in Table 4 reveals that there is a positive relationship between the responsiveness of tax revenue and the Agricultural sector in the short-run, there is 5% significant level. The coefficient of the Agricultural sector reveals that there is a positive relationship in the short-run. Hence, an improvement in the Agricultural sector will lead to an increase in the buoyancy of total tax revenue.

From the Table 4 above you can also notice that Import has a negative relationship with the responsiveness gross tax revenue in the short-run. Hence, it is significance at 5 percent level.

The coefficient of Money supply shows a positive relationship that exist between the money supply and the buoyancy of total tax revenue. This actually remains to be significance at 5 percent level but only in the short-run.

The short-run estimates also show that the Error Correction Term (ECT (-1)*) is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent level. The implication of this is that, the convergence process to long-run equilibrium is at an adjustment speed of 34.3%. That is, the error in the current year will be corrected in the coming years at a speed of 34.3%, which simple means that, in a very slow speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium.

In a nutshell, the value of the R-Squared is 0.428109, implying that approximately 43% of the variation in the buoyancy of total tax revenue (BTTR) model is explained by the independent variables which is an indication of a good fit. The overall model is statistically significant as shown by the probability value of the F-Statistic (0.005879).

4.4 Stability Test

The stability of the regression coefficients is evaluated using the Cumulative Sum of (CUSUM) and the Cumulative Sum of Squares (CUSUMSQ) test for structural stability (Brown et al, 1975). The test results on both the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test reveal that the regression equation appears to be stable, as the test statistic lies within the 5 percent critical bound as shown in figure 1 and in figure 2 below.



Figure 1: Plot Of Cusum Test Result



Figure 2: Plot Of Cusumq Test Result

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The general objectives of this research are to investigate the analysis of tax buoyancy and its determinant in Sierra Leone. The study also seeks to identify some of the determinants of tax buoyancy in Sierra Leone. For the achievement of these objectives, the study uses time series Data from World Development

Indicators (WDI), International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO), for the period 1988 to 2018 within the framework of the ARDL estimations techniques. In analysing the tax buoyancy my specific focus was actually based on the determinant of tax buoyancy and how it has relationship with the buoyancy of total tax revenue. Services and Industry value added, Import, Broad money (M2) and Agricultural sector value added as a percentage of the nominal GDP.

The unit root test was carried out by employing Philips Perron and Augmented Dickey Fuller test. The test results reveal that all the results are I (1) variables, which implies that they are not stationary at level but become stationary at first difference.

The study employed the lag length criteria in selecting the optimal number of lags and each of the five (5) criteria selected an optimal lag length of one.

The ARDL co-integration test actually revealed that included, there exist6s a long-run equilibrium. The conclusion was reached as a result of the F – Statistics, which is greater than I (0) and I (1) bound at the conventional level of significance. The long-run results reveal that Agricultural sector, industry value added and the service value added as the percentage share of the GDP are the most significant variables that shows the buoyancy of total tax revenue of the GDP during the period of the study.

Specifically, there is a positive relationship between those variables and the buoyancy of total tax revenue. Both variables were significant at the conventional level. Although, the other variables had the expected a priori signs, they were found to be statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.

The short-run results show that all the variables were found to be statistically significance at the 5% level, with the expected a priori sign. Specifically, Agricultural sector and Money supply (M2) had a positive effect on the responsiveness of tax revenue. The Error Correction Term (ECT) had the expected negative sign with a slow speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium. Thus, 34.3% of any previous disequilibrium in buoyancy of total tax revenue (GDP) is corrected in the current year. The result further shows that about 43% differences in BTTRGDP was shown by the independent variables.

The study shows that both the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ have a perfect stability.

Based on the findings from the study, I would like to give a recommendation to that. The import value shows a negative relationship to the economic growth, therefore implementing a stable fiscal policy that would encourage a balance of trade to be positive. Also, by expanding the base of tax and creating employment opportunities by imposing the income tax on them since they are within the tax bracket. (that is the sectors that should pay tax), eliminating tax exemption, this would actually lead to a favourable economic environment and rises the entire revenue generation and decline the total budget deficit which are used for fiscal policy implementation.

As I earlier stated that corona various (COVID-19) would hinder my research, but this doesn't affect me alone but if the economy at large. Due to the hit of the world pandemic (COVID-19) which actually affect the economic activity, in that note the government should use a policy of automatic stabilizer in maintaining the tax system in the different sector like industry, agriculture and import of goods and services.

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Gouvernance de l'eau en Afrique: Analyse des Paradoxes de Gestion d'une Ressource «Ultra Fragile»

Water Governance in Africa: Analysis of the Paradoxes of Managing an "Ultra Fragile" Resource

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Résumé: L'eau quelle qu'en soit sa finalité d'utilisation: consommation, irrigation agricole ou hydroélectricité est hautement convoitée et représente aujourd'hui un défi de gestion important pour l'homme. Cependant, la pérennité de cette ressource est soumise à de vulnérabilités qui imposent une gestion attentive de celle-ci. La situation de défaillance d'accès à l'eau en Afrique au moment où la démographie explose, nous pousse à nous interroger sur la qualité de gestion de cette ressource par les organes en charge. Selon de nombreux experts, le fait que les pays africains soient affectés par de graves problèmes de carence en eau, n'est pas uniquement lié à la faible présence de celle-ci sur le territoire, mais sur les choix politiques qui encadrent cette ressource. Aborder la gouvernance de l'eau en Afrique revient alors à analyser le cadre politique, juridique et institutionnel qui organise sa gestion. Cette étude soulève et pose particulièrement la question de savoir, l'accès à l'eau en Afrique outre les problèmes d'ordre climatique ne serait-il pas surtout un problème de gouvernance ? Pourtant, l'Etat semble être convaincu dans ses discours qu'un accès raisonnable à l'eau est primordial pour assurer le développement et atténuer les effets de la pauvreté à tous les niveaux. A l'ère des reformes sur la gouvernance de l'eau, on se demande pourquoi les Etats africains se trouvent dans l'incapacité de répondre valablement à cette question. L'étude se propose de mettre en lumière l'enjeu de gouvernance de l'eau dans l'action publique nationale et locale. Dans cette optique, une analyse sur les choix de politique en matière de gestion et les logiques qui organisent cette ressource seront établies. L'exemple des expériences du Cameroun et de l'Afrique sera tour à tour évoqué dans cette recherche.

Mots-clés: Gouvernance, ressource en eau, Etat, gestion intégrée, Afrique

Abstract: Water, whatever its purpose of use: consumption, agricultural irrigation or hydroelectricity, is highly coveted and today represents a major management challenge for humanity. However, the sustainability of this resource is subject to vulnerabilities that require careful management. The situation of lack of access to water in Africa at a time when demography is exploding, prompts us to question the quality of management of this resource by the bodies in charge. According to many experts, the fact that African countries are affected by serious problems of water deficiency is not only linked to the low presence of the latter on the territory, but to the political choices that frame this resource. Addressing water governance in Africa therefore amounts to analyzing the political, legal and institutional framework that organizes its management. This study particularly raises the question of whether access to water in Africa, in addition to climate-related problems, would it not be above all a problem of governance? However, the State seems to be convinced in its speeches that reasonable access to water is essential to ensure development and mitigate the effects of poverty at all levels. In the era of water governance reforms, one wonders why African states are unable to answer this question validly. The study aims to highlight the issue of water governance in national and local public action. With this in mind, an analysis of the policy choices in terms of management and the logics that organize this resource will be established. The example of the experiences of Cameroon and Africa will be mentioned in turn in this research.

Keywords: Governance, water resources, State, integrated management, Africa

Introduction

Depuis toujours les activités anthropiques ont été conditionnées par la présence ou non de la ressource en eau sur le territoire. En outre, la quasi-totalité des activités économiques dépendent grandement de l'existence de l'eau ; sans l'eau rien ne pousse, sans l'eau la vie n'est pratiquement pas possible (Dupriez et Leener, 1990 :02). Pour cette raison, les hommes se déplacent et vivent en fonction de la disponibilité de l'eau dans leur environnement. L'eau qu'elle soit pour la consommation humaine, pour l'irrigation ou pour l'hydroélectricité est hautement convoitée et représente aujourd'hui un défi important pour l'homme tant cette ressource est soumise à de vulnérabilités qui menacent sa pérennité. Qu'en est-il de la situation de gestion de cette ressource dans les pays africains dont les besoins en tout genre vont crescendo ?

En Afrique, l'état des infrastructures dans le secteur de l'eau est actuellement vétuste avec une capacité de stockage d'eau de moins de 50 m3 par habitant, alors qu'en Europe il est de 3000 m3 et une capacité de 5000 m3 dans le cas des Etats-Unis (Mazvimav et al. 2013). On constate que, les pays africains en voie de développement dont l'usage de la ressource en eau est fondamental, à la fois pour assurer l'essor économique et pour réduire les inégalités d'accès à l'eau, se heurtent à des difficultés de gouvernance de cette ressource. La gouvernance comme le fait remarquer Patrick Le Galès, est une entreprise qui concerne « les formes de coordination, de pilotage et de direction des secteurs des groupes et de la société, au-delà des organes classiques de gouvernement. » (Le Galès, 2014 : 299). L'Afrique est-elle le continent en désertification avancée comme le fait-on savoir ? En réalité, il est fort intéressant de constater que l'eau est plus qu'abondante sur le continent. En Afrique, on récence dix-sept grands fleuves et environ une centaine de lacs auxquels s'ajoutent de nombreuses nappes phréatiques (Aquastat, 2005). Dès lors, la mauvaise répartition de cette denrée sur l'ensemble du continent et la qualité de sa gestion font que la pénurie d'eau se fait ressentir plus en Afrique qu'ailleurs dans le monde. Selon de nombreux experts le fait que les pays africains soient affectés par de graves problèmes de carence en eau, n'est pas lié à la faible présence d'eau sur le territoire, mais à la qualité de gestion de cette ressource (Fourneaux, 2009). Cette analyse se penche donc sur ce paradoxe qui est celui d'un continent qui subit des inondations à certaines périodes et qui « meurt de soif » à d'autres. Dès lors si l'on prend l'exemple de l'Afrique Centrale, aux vues des données météorologiques disponibles annuellement l'on observe que l'apport pluviométrique en eau excéderait amplement les besoins globaux de cette région (Njikam, 2021 :16).

Dès lors, compte tenu des enjeux multidimensionnels de l'eau, sa gestion tend à se concentrer non seulement sur les aspects techniques ou climatiques de la maîtrise de cette ressource, mais aussi et surtout, sur les aspects de gouvernance. Comme indiqué, une préoccupation management qui renvoie à la fois à des considérations institutionnelles et structurelles. Par conséquent, la gouvernance de l'eau tente de surmonter les problèmes spécifiques et les risques de conflit afin de trouver la formule appropriée, en évitant la fragmentation institutionnelle et les politiques sectorielles non coordonnées (Graziele, 2017 : 34). De ce fait, cette étude se donne pour ambition de faire une analyse croisée des méthodes de gestion de l'eau dans deux pays africains aux réalités géographiques, historiques, politiques et économiques bien distinctes. Bien que tous les deux ont connu la colonisation occidentale, les trajectoires politico-institutionnelles au fils des années n'ont pas été les mêmes, particulièrement dans la politique de gestion de la ressource en eau.

L'accès à l'eau en Afrique outre les problèmes d'ordre climatique ne serait-il pas surtout un problème de gouvernance de la ressource ? Ainsi, s'intéresser aux enjeux de l'eau, c'est automatiquement s'intéresser aux enjeux institutionnels et aux défis de gestion (Roche, 2003). L'intérêt que représente cette question de gestion de l'eau répond précisément au paradoxe qui est celui de l'abondance de l'eau, sa pénurie et la qualité de sa gestion qui est mitigée car on constate comme le dirait Le Galès une sorte d' « incapacité des gouvernement à répondre aux problèmes qui leur sont soumis (Le Galès, 2014). Aujourd'hui, la plupart des pays africains ne disposent pas clairement de politiques nationales de gestion de l'eau (BAD, 2000), ce qui en soi est un inconvénient majeur car c'est la politique qui soutient la mise en place d'une réglementation et d'une planification en matière de gestion de l'eau. En plus, très souvent, même s'il existe un cadre institutionnel et réglementaire de la gestion de l'eau, sa fonctionnalité est soit approximative soit inexistante.

L'intérêt que représente cette contribution est lié spécifiquement aux différents modèles de gestion de l'eau en Afrique globalement et particulièrement au Cameroun et en Afrique du Sud. En effet, l'étude de la qualité de gestion de cette ressource épuisable soulève de nombreuses interrogations et ses modes de gestion dans le cas des pays africains restent extrêmement mitigés. Quel est le processus de l'évolution de la gestion de l'eau dans nos pays d'étude ? Comment satisfaire à la fois les exigences de développement économique et pallier aux clivages sociaux d'accès à l'eau ? Quels outils de gestion efficace peuvent allier, les intérêts des acteurs et des usagers ? Un compromis entre développement durable et gestion efficace de l'eau est-il possible ?

1. Etat des lieux : l'eau en Afrique, entre carence et abondance ?

Perçu comme un continent confronté à une sécheresse avancée, l'Afrique dispose en réalité d'une capacité hydrique très importante. Cependant, la ressource en eau est géographiquement mal repartie. Du Nord au Sud on trouve des zones géographiques qui souffrent de la pénurie d'eau et des zones dont l'eau se trouve en excès, comme c'est le cas en Afrique Centrale (Brunel, 2004). En Afrique de manière générale, le paradoxe est tel que l'on passe des inondations extrêmes à une grave carence en eau (FAO et al. 2021). Selon la FAO, la région du Centre de l'Afrique est la dotée de 48% des ressources du continent. Le Golfe de Guinée possède 24% de la capacité hydrique du continent. Par contre, la zone de l'Afrique du Nord est la plus défavorisée avec une moyenne de 1% environ des ressources renouvelables (Dieng, 2011). Cependant, le fort taux de croissance démographique en Afrique subsaharienne continue de croître de l'ordre de 2,7% par an (Guengant et Maga 2020), une situation qui accentue la demande en eau. La gouvernance de l'eau en Afrique est globalement confrontée à plusieurs facteurs dont l'insuffisance du financement alloué à ce secteur, la vétusté des infrastructures, le rôle marginal des acteurs privés et de la société civile, la paupérisation des populations qui exacerbe la bonne gestion de l'eau (Njikam, 2021 :15). Cependant, qu'en est-il de la situation de disponibilité et de gestion hydrique dans nos pays d'étude ?

Au Cameroun, on note, une multitude présence de réseaux hydrographiques et une pluviométrie élevée dans 80 % de son territoire. Une situation géographique qui témoigne sans doute de la richesse en eau à travers le pays (Njikam 2021). Exception faite des régions du Nord et de l'Extrême-Nord du pays dont le climat est sahélien avec des précipitations limitées, le Cameroun présente une situation hydro climatique au-dessus de la moyenne. De ce fait, logiquement, les difficultés d'accès à l'eau ne devraient pas se manifester dans ce pays, vue la disponibilité conséquente de la ressource sur son territoire soit 21000 m3 par habitant par an (Ako Ako et al., 2010) contre 6500 m3 par habitants et par an à l'échelle mondiale (Deliège, 2020). Cependant, l'accès à ressource en eau par tous est de plus en plus problématique et devient un enjeu de nombreux défis. Un déficit d'accès à l'eau qui, contrairement aux pays secs et arides semble être un paradoxe qui pousse à la réflexion.

Par ailleurs, l'Afrique du Sud quant à elle, est dans sa grande majorité un pays aride, avec une partie de ses régions occidentales qui sont semi-désertiques. La ressource en eau reste très limitée et le pays dépend majoritairement des précipitations, qui avec les sécheresses tendent à diminuer (Yves Richard et al. 2005). Selon certaines études – Blanchon (2006), Lascoume (2020), l'eau est une ressource très peu suffisante en Afrique du Sud. Une situation qui engendre des périodes de stress hydrique qui de surcroit est exacerbé par une gestion contrastée par un accès inégalitaire de l'eau pour tous (Blanc, 2006 :04). Dans ce pays, la gouvernance de l'eau, relève d'un partage de pouvoir entre différents maillons de la chaine nationale et locale. On observe ainsi, un élargissement et une superposition d'acteurs rendant complexe la gouvernance de cette ressource (Lascoume, 2020). Dans ce contexte, l'Afrique du Sud entreprend alors une réforme qui a pour objectif de rendre plus souple les processus de gestion de l'eau en mettant en place de nouvelles stratégies en matière de gouvernance de l'eau.

2. Enjeu de gestion politico-institutionnel: la place des politiques publiques

L'eau qu'elle soit pour la consommation humaine, pour l'irrigation ou pour le développement économique est hautement convoitée et représente aujourd'hui un défi de gestion à la fois politique et institutionnel pour les Etats, car cette ressource est soumise à de vulnérabilités qui menacent sa pérennité. Gérer l'eau deviens alors un enjeu majeur de politiques publiques nationales, sinon un défi à l'échelle mondiale. De plus, les projections à l'horizon 2050 avec une population mondiale estimée à 9.7 milliards de personnes verra la demande globale en eau augmenter jusqu'à 55 % (Akhmouch et Clavreul, 2017).

La gouvernance de l'eau devient dès lors incontournable pour le politique afin d'anticiper les crises d'usage qui risqueront de se poser à l'avenir. François Anctil affirmait en 2017 que, «la crise de l'eau est une crise de la gouvernance qui trouve son origine notamment dans l'atomisation territoriale, fragmentation institutionnelle, l'insuffisance des collectivités territoriales, la médiocrité des cadres institutionnels et règlementaires » (Anctil, 2017). Comment l'Afrique du Sud et le Cameroun arrivent-ils à induire des changements au niveau politique et institutionnel en matière de gestion de l'eau.

La définition classique des politiques publiques telle qu'acceptée par Muller (2005) délimite ce domaine à un programme d'action du gouvernement dans un domaine et un espace géographique bien déterminé. De l'autorité Etatique découle alors un projet politique en vue d'initier une transformation dans un secteur donné. Ainsi, ce concept désigne, « les interventions d'une autorité investie de puissance publique et de légitimité gouvernementale sur un domaine spécifique de la société ou du territoire » (Thoenig in Boussagnet, et al., 2006 :326). C'est un modèle rationnel qui se tourne vers la résolution d'un problème social bien précis (Albarello et al. 2016). Cependant, si le concept de l'action publique est une disposition concrète qui vise à régir un secteur d'activité donné, peut-on alors quantifier les transformations induites par les politiques publiques au niveau de la gestion du secteur de l'eau dans les pays en voie de développement ?

Quelle est la pertinence d'une démarche des politiques publiques dans la gestion de l'eau ? Cette approche permet dans un premier temps de tracer la genèse des « problèmes publics » et leur institutionnalisation (Andy Smith, in Boussagnet, et al.2014 : 409) ; mais montre aussi que la démultiplication des problèmes de gestion est davantage liée à un échec des stratégies d'action publique d'autrefois. Une phase de « crise de gestion » qui pousses l'autorité publique à se renouveler dans son ensemble. Aujourd'hui, l'action publique se focalise principalement sur des questions plus précises telles que le souligne Thoenig (2014) : quel secteur d'intervention ? À quel moment ? Vers quelle cible ? Une série d'interrogations qui présage la mise en place d'une intervention plus ciblée par le pouvoir public. De ce fait, les politiques publiques cherchent donc à analyser ses actes concrets au quotidien afin de transformer les situations qui perturbent la société.

Vu les enjeux multidimensionnels de l'eau, sa gestion ne concerne pas que les aspects techniques et/ou climatiques pour contrôler cette ressource, mais a tendance à se focaliser sur les termes de sa gouvernance. Un intérêt de gestion comme on l'a remarqué, fait référence à des considérations à la fois institutionnelles et structurelles. La nouvelle tendance de gestion de la ressource en eau se fait de manière à la fois holistique et participative. Dès lors, à partir des années 1990 suite à la Déclaration de Dublin (1992), de l'Agenda 21 de Rio

(1992) et de l'initiative de plusieurs institutions internationales (Global Water Partnership ou encore Conseil Mondial de l'Eau), un nouveau modèle de gestion appelé : « Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau (GIRE) » tend à être diffuser. La définition que donne le Global Water Partnership en 2000 est que la GIRE désigne « un processus qui favorise le développement et la gestion coordonnée de l'eau, des terres et des ressources connexes en vue de maximiser, de manière équitable, le bien-être économique et social en résultant, sans compromettre la pérennité d'écosystèmes vitaux » (GWP, 2000 :24). Dans le contexte de la gestion de l'eau, ce modèle se pose à l'échelle mondiale comme un outil dominant de gestion pour promouvoir une gestion partagée de l'eau, en prenant en compte les intérêts particuliers (économiques et équité sociale), sans mettre en périls l'environnement (Molle, 2009). Dès lors, quel est la dynamique de gestion de l'eau dans nos pays d'étude ?

3. Dynamique croisée de la gestion l'eau au Cameroun et en Afrique du Sud

L'eau bien qu'ayant fait l'objet de plusieurs sommets à l'échelle mondiale et africaine concernant sa gouvernance, on n'y trouve pas de méthode efficace instantanément transposable pour tous les États, ni de solution miracle pour améliorer la gouvernance de l'eau dans l'immédiat. Cependant, au lieu d'une gestion globale prônée autrefois, il est plutôt récemment démontré des tendances en faveur des solutions basées sur une gestion territoriale, intégrée et plus à l'écoute de la « société civile » (Barone, et Mayaux, 2019) ; une logique prenant en considération les différences géographique, climatique ou démographique de chaque territoire. Aujourd'hui, bien loin des clivages de pays riches et pays pauvres, la question de gestion de l'eau relève surtout des politiques publiques et des stratégies de gestion donc chaque Etat consacre à ce secteur. De ce fait, on s'interroge les expériences et les pratiques de gouvernance développées par certains pays africains en vue d'assoir des politiques de l'eau adéquates, efficaces et durables.

L'accès à l'eau dans les villes Camerounaises et Sud-africaines se caractérise à peu près par les mêmes difficultés que dans d'autres pays africains à savoir : des approvisionnements intermittents, des pannes fréquentes, des opérations inefficaces, un mauvais entretien des infrastructures et un financement affaibli du réseau (Cross et Morel, 2003 : 52).

En Afrique du Sud, la gestion de l'eau a historiquement connu deux phases importantes (Blanchon, 2006). A partir des années 1950 marquant la phase de construction de grands systèmes de transfert d'eau initiée par le régime d'apartheid que Blanchon considère comme la « vitrine » du régime ; la deuxième phase est celle qui semble être la plus délicate est celle allant de 1992 jusqu'à nos jours, marquée notamment par la conférence de Dublin sur le climat dont le quatrième principe aborde clairement la gestion de l'eau. Dès lors, l'eau a créé une stigmatisation politique importante en Afrique du Sud, avec une opposition manifeste entre le parti politique de Nelson Mandela et les choix autrefois effectué par le régime d'apartheid (Blanchon, 2006). Brièvement, il faut rappeler que le régime d'apartheid «blanc» utilisait la ressource en eau à grande échelle et principalement pour des intentions purement économiques. La construction des barrages a donc été perçu comme facteurs de développement inégalitaire car ne profitant pas à tous. Les oppositions liées à l'eau ont conduit à des reformes sur l'aspect politique de la gestion de l'eau à travers ce qui est appelé Livre Blanc sur l'eau. Une initiative nationale qui tend à réorganiser le secteur de l'eau. Le premier Livre de 1994 est rédigé par l'ANC, anti apartheid, où il est clairement précisé que « l'eau était essentiellement utilisée par un groupe dominant qui avait un accès privilégié à la terre et au pouvoir économique » et que « la victoire de la démocratie demandait que la politique nationale sur l'utilisation de l'eau et que la loi sur l'eau soit revue » (voir Livre Blanc Afrique du Sud, 1994).

En 1998, un deuxième Livre Blanc a été consigné par les services du Department of Water Affairs and Forestry . Dans celui-ci, 21 propositions principales qui définissent l'accès à l'eau de manière égale et équitable pour tous, changeant ainsi totalement l'usage de l'eau tel que géré par le régime d'avant. L'Afrique du Sud à travers ses politiques de réformes vise ainsi à s'inscrire dans une logique de développement durable, une perspective de protection d'environnementale, de développement économique et sociale tel que recommandé par la conférence de Dublin de 1992. De ce fait, on constate que, le changement de régime politique conduit également à une nouvelle manière de gestion de l'eau qui ne se focalise plus sur l'augmentation permanente de l'offre, mais sur la gestion de la demande en eau qui va ainsi permettre une meilleure prestation de la ressource en eau. Ce nouveau modèle de politique de gestion de l'eau est exposé comme étant tout le contraire de la politique du régime d'apartheid (Blanchon, 2006). L'engagement vers une nouvelle donne en matière de politique de l'eau se pose comme une révolution visant à rééquilibrer l'accès à l'eau pour tous mais aussi à satisfaire les exigences d'une utilisation parcimonieuse de la ressource en accord avec la protection de l'environnement.

Contrairement à l'Afrique du Sud qui est un pays semi-aride et désertique comme susmentionné, le Cameroun est un pays tropical bénéficiant d'une pluviométrie plus que raisonnable. Selon le Rapport du Ministère camerounais de l'Eau et de l'Energie, le besoin en eau potable de la population, correspond uniquement à 4% des ressources souterraines d'eau douce disponible (voir rapport MINEE, 2009); cela exprime à quel point la capacité hydrique du pays est sous-exploitée. Ce volume hydrique en plus d'être géographiquement mal repartie sur l'ensemble de son territoire, très souvent fait face des vulnérabilités croissantes à savoir le défaut d'assainissement et de pollution grandissante

(Njikam, 2021). Cela dit, aujourd'hui, les défis de gouvernance en matière de l'eau dans ce pays sont multiples. La gouvernance de l'eau qui dans son principe vise à surmonter certains risques de rivalités d'accès à l'eau, afin de trouver une formule appropriée et éviter les fragmentations institutionnelles et les multiples politiques sectorielles non coordonnées (Graziele, 2017 : 34). La gouvernance de l'eau dans ce pays, reste très mitigée et fait face à une gestion dispersée avec un éparpillement d'acteurs tant au niveau central qu'au niveau local. Une défaillance quant au degré de coordination et de définition des rôles impartis et des implications des différents acteurs.

Historiquement, la politique de l'eau au Cameroun a connu un processus évolutif assez linéaire contrairement à l'Afrique du Sud, allant de la période coloniale, une phase où le pays était plutôt une colonie sous protectorat de la France et de l'Angleterre. Pendant cette période de colonisation, les politiques de l'eau étaient à ses prémices, marquées par la construction de grands projets et une structuration du réseau de distribution d'eau. Ensuite vient la période postcoloniale après les indépendances de 1960 au cours de laquelle le nouvel Etat devenu indépendant expérimente l'auto-gouvernance de son territoire. Cette seconde phase est surtout une continuité de la première où les jeunes Etats africains majoritairement « libres » sont en chantier dans tous les secteurs. Ici, on observe la multiplication des projets de viabilisation de la ressource hydrique de ces pays. La troisième phase qui semble être la plus délicate est celle allant de 1992 jusqu'à nos jours où plusieurs méthodes de gestion de la ressource en eau ont été expérimenté sans grand succès. En dépit de ses potentialités hydriques très importantes, on observe que la qualité de gestion de l'eau reste une préoccupation majeure des instances publiques tant l'accès à l'eau est difficile dans la plupart des régions.

Depuis son accession à l'indépendance en 1960, le Cameroun ne dispose pas clairement d'une politique de l'eau proprement dite (Kenmogne, 2013), comme c'est le cas en Afrique du Sud avec les Livres Blanc. Nonobstant, le Cameroun a pris part à plusieurs conventions, traités ou accords internationaux ces dernières décennies, dans le but de mieux appréhender et organiser son potentiel hydrographique. Des conventions qui en quelque sorte ont donné une nouvelle direction sur les activités internationales relevant du domaine de l'eau. Le Cameroun a ainsi signé et ratifié tous les accords relatifs à la préservation de la ressource en eau à la fois avec ses voisins mais aussi en vue de créer une nouvelle synergie dans la gouvernance de cette ressource. (Global Water Partenership, 2009).

La conférence de Dublin sur l'eau et l'environnement de 1992 a constitué, le point de départ d'une vision panoramique de la gestion participative et concertée de la ressource en eau à travers le principe de la Gestion Intégrée de la Ressource en Eau. Lors de cette conférence, les principes fondateurs de la

GIRE ont été validés et presque tous les pays se sont engagés à appliquer cette nouvelle manière de gouverner l'eau. Plus tard, en 2002, il a été recommandé aux Etats de mettre en place des plans d'actions de gestion intégrée de ressource en eau (PANGIRE) pendant le Sommet Mondial sur le développement Durable (Njikam, 2021). Une initiative que le Cameroun a validée en adoptant son Plan d'Action National de la gestion intégrée de Ressource en Eau (PANGIRE).

En matière de gouvernance de la ressource en eau, en s'inspirant des conventions internationales, on peut dire que le Cameroun s'est doté d'un arsenal juridique conséquent et une multiplicité d'acteurs en charge de l'eau, sans toutefois définir une ligne directrice qui servira de gouvernail à tout cet ensemble. L'éparpillement d'institutions en charge de la gestion de l'eau n'est-il pas le problème institutionnel qui paralyse le système de gouvernance de l'eau au Cameroun ?

On recense plusieurs organes ministériels qui interviennent chacun à son tour dans ce concert de gestion de l'eau. Le Ministère de l'Eau et de l'Energie, selon le Décret N°2012/501 du 07 novembre 2012, est l'institution principale responsable de la gestion de l'eau au Cameroun ; il est chargé de l'élaboration de la politique nationale en matière de l'eau. En plus de ce ministère clé, le Ministère de l'Economie, de la Planification et l'Aménagement du Territoire, le Ministère de de l'Elevage, des Pêches et des Industries Animales, le Ministère de la Santé Publique, le Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural, le Ministère de l'Industrie des Mines et du Développement Technologique, Le Ministère de l'Environnement, de la Protection de la Nature et du développement Durable ; tous ces ministères selon les lois et les décrets les concernant se trouve être directement impliqué dans la gestion de l'eau au Cameroun (voir, 1984 Loi n° 084/013 portant régime de l'eau ; 2005 Décret n°2005/493 fixant les modalités de la délégation des services publics de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement liquide en milieu urbain et périurbain et Décret, etc.).

A ces Ministères, viennent s'ajouter les sociétés parapublique et privée de gestion de la distribution de l'eau qui sont : la Camerounaise des Eaux (CDE) et la Cameroon Water Utilities Corporation (CAMWATER) ; car l'Etat du Cameroun s'est engagé pour un partenariat public/privé en vue de la réforme du secteur de l'eau en milieu urbain et périphérique. Cette réforme avait pour objectif la résolution de la mauvaise desserte en eau potable sur l'ensemble du territoire (Njikam, 2021).

Par ailleurs, pour ne rien faciliter, depuis 2010 le Cameroun est engagé dans une politique de décentralisation, ce qui rajoute un nouvel acteur de l'eau dans cet arsenal institutionnel déjà bien chargé. Par le Décret N°2010/0239/PM, l'Etat a officiellement transféré aux collectivités territoriales décentralisées certaines compétences en matière de systèmes d'approvisionnement en eau potable simplifié notamment la réalisation des forages. Dès lors, les collectivités territoriales dont les régions et les communes se trouvent directement être doté des compétences en matière de gestion de ressource en eau dans leurs localités. Un foisonnement d'acteurs qui n'ont pas encore jusqu'à présent fait l'objet d'une définition claire des stratégies et rôles impartis. En outre, l'émiettement des acteurs en charge de l'eau conduit à une fragmentation de ce secteur, une superposition d'institutions gouvernementales et un manque de synergie globale.

4. La place de la GIRE dans le concert de gestion l'eau en Afrique

Ces dernières décennies, la qualité de gestion de cette ressource tarissable en Afrique reste extrêmement mitigée. Comme le dit Le Galès on fait face à une sorte d'« incapacité des gouvernements à répondre aux problèmes qui leurs sont soumis (Le Galès, 2014). Aujourd'hui, le constat est que, la plupart des pays africains ne disposent pas clairement de politiques nationales de gestion de l'eau (BAD, 2000), ce qui en soi est un inconvénient majeur car c'est la politique qui soutient la mise en place d'une réglementation et d'une planification en matière de gestion de l'eau. En plus, très souvent, même s'il existe un cadre institutionnel et réglementaire de la gestion de l'eau, sa fonctionnalité est soit approximative soit inexistante.

Aujourd'hui, parmi les concepts clés de gestion de la ressource en eau pouvant être qualifiés de néo-institutionnaliste, la gestion intégrée se positionne comme étant un modèle de référence. Ce concept est pertinent d'un point de vue institutionnel, sociologique et politique en ce sens qu'il vise à bien cerner la nature moderne des fondements de la gestion territoriale de l'eau, dans les pays en voie de développement dont les politiques en la matière restent très peu évoluées. Cela dit, s'intéresser à la problématique de l'eau, signifie s'intéresser automatiquement aux enjeux institutionnels et aux enjeux de gestion (Roche, 2003). La Gestion Intégrée de la Ressource en Eau (GIRE) est une approche dorénavant reconnue à l'échelle internationale comme étant la solution durable et efficace pour répondre aux problèmes d'eau (Fourneaux, 2009). Cette démarche consiste spécifiquement à comprendre comment le principe de la GIRE contribue à solutionner les défaillances institutionnelles au sein des pays en voie de développement tel que le Cameroun.

En effet, la GIRE s'inscrit dans une logique de « bonne gouvernance » de l'eau, une approche qui interroge directement les manières traditionnelles de gestion. Le concept met en exergue le caractère pluriel des acteurs et milite pour des niveaux de gestion démultipliés notamment sur la ressource en eau. C'est en quelque sorte une nouvelle définition de l'occupation territoriale par les politiques publiques. Ainsi, l'État « suprême » ne sera plus le seul acteur responsable de l'élaboration et de la mise en œuvre des stratégies de gestion de la ressource (Fourneaux, 2009). Afin de pallier aux nombreuses faiblesses institutionnelles et structurelles ; cette méthode consiste à intégrer de nouveaux acteurs à la structure institutionnelle de l'Etat et établit de nouveaux moyens de management de la ressource en eau de façon rationnelle. La défaillance des politiques d'autrefois fait qu'aujourd'hui la GIRE entant que système participatif est jugée comme essentielle à une gestion saine de l'eau (Milot et al. 2003).

Cependant, alors que la GIRE figure en pole position dans les programmes de gestion de l'eau notamment au Cameroun avec le Plan d'Action Nation de la Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau (PANGIRE, 2009) ; il faut s'interroger si ce concept développé dans les pays riches européens connues pour leur surconsomme d'eau est pertinent dans le cadre africain ? Pour Bouquet (2012), c'est un modèle difficilement transposable en Afrique, d'abord du fait que ce mode n'a pas été élaboré dans le but de résoudre les problèmes de sous-développement, c'est un modèle qui émane des pays occidentaux riches ayant pris conscience du caractère non durable de l'eau ; ensuite, du fait de la considération par ce modèle de l'eau comme un bien économique, ce que Blanchon appelle le marché de l'eau, comparable à celui d'autres matières premières. Dans le cas africain, cette dynamique peut conduire à une concurrence entre les usagers de l'eau. De ce fait, il peut notamment subsister des conflits d'usage et de partage de l'eau. Pour Bouquet, loin de l'idée de rejeter le paradigme GIRE, il estime qu'il faut davantage réfléchir à une meilleure articulation entre les acteurs, les différents échelons de prise décision, afin d'octroyer à la démocratie de proximité son rôle dans le processus participatif de gestion de l'eau (Bouquet, 2012).

5. L'eau un bien économique fondamental mal gouverné ?

L'économie des pays africains en voie de développement aussi bien pour l'irrigation agricole que pour les industries ou l'électricité, est tributaire d'un approvisionnement régulier en eau et un système législatif et administratif efficace (Blanchon, 2006). L'Afrique du Sud tel que nous l'avons remarqué est un pays qui a toujours fait de l'eau un atout économique d'envergure. Le régime d'apartheid exploitait l'eau majoritairement pour des besoins agricoles, nous ne reviendrons pas sur les contradictions dont il a fait l'objet ; alors qu'au Cameroun l'agriculture par irrigation n'est quasiment pas développée et reste dépendante de la pluviométrie (Njikam, 2006 : 27). Les régions du Nord du Cameroun en général fort d'une population de plus de 10 millions d'habitants ne pratique l'agriculture qu'en saison pluvieuse, soit 4 à 5 mois sur 12 mois. Rappelons que le Nord et l'Extrême-Nord du pays subissent des inondations dévastatrices en saison de pluies, ceci pour signifier la quantité d'eau reçue et qui ensuite se perd inutilement par évaporation et/ou infiltration dans le sol.

Pour être bien administré, le secteur de l'eau se doit d'avoir des repères sur lesquels se baser. Or, la gestion de l'eau en Afrique globalement fait face à de multiples difficultés qui en entravant ce secteur, limite aussi considérablement le développement économique tout entier. L'usage de l'eau notamment en matière d'irrigation nous semble l'exemple à prendre vu l'impact de celui-ci sur le développement car les pays africains s'orientent de plus en plus vers une agriculture extensive. Selon les pays, l'irrigation est considérée comme un moyen essentiel sans lequel l'agricole serait quasiment impraticable vu le caractère aride de ces pays. C'est l'exemple du Tchad, du Niger ou la partie Nord du Cameroun qui tous dépendent de l'irrigation agricole aux abords du bassin du Lac Tchad (Ibrahimou, 2022). L'irrigation en plus d'augmenter la capacité de production agricole, elle permet également de favoriser une grande diversité des cultures dans les territoires qui pratiquent cette technique (Global Water Initiative, 2017). Dans les régions du Cameroun frontières au Lac Tchad, on observe que, pendant la saison pluvieuse la culture des céréales est privilégiée (mil, maïs, riz, sorgo etc.), alors que la pendant la saison sèche, on y cultive généralement des légumes verts au moyen de l'irrigation. Cependant, cette agriculture irriguée est une pratique de résilience aux changements climatique et est faite à une échelle extrêmement réduite, ne permettant pas l'exportation.

L'Afrique du Sud quant à elle, à travers son héritage historique se place comme la première puissance du continent africain en matière agricole. Le pays pratique une agriculture tournée vers la commercialisation et l'exportation (Rapport U.A, 2020). En dépit de son potentiel hydrique très faible, le gouvernement a lancé une politique de réforme agraire à partir de 1994, à la fois pour mettre un terme à la domination des « blancs » dans le domaine, mais a aussi a pour but de favoriser l'insertion communauté « noires » et d'abroger les inégalités issues de l'apartheid.

Dès lors, on conclut qu'un accès raisonnable à l'eau est primordial pour assurer le développement de la production agricole et atténuer les effets de la sécheresse sur l'agriculture en Afrique. Cela est d'autant plus important lorsqu'on sait que le stress hydrique, l'insécurité alimentaire et la croissance démographique vont crescendo. Aujourd'hui, l'insuffisance d'accès à la ressource en eau en quantités et en qualité se dresse comme une contrainte sérieuse au développement des pays africains. D'ailleurs, l'Union Africaine fait de l'eau une priorité dans l'objectif déployé pour réduire la pauvreté (U.A, 2020).

Aujourd'hui, parmi les freins les plus répandus qui inhibent l'accès aux ressource en eau, on peut insister notamment sur des facteurs tels que : L'émiettement des acteurs en charge de l'eau et leur diversification dont la coordination reste très limitée ; le manque manifeste de politique nationale claire, définissant les objectifs et les stratégies à adopter en vue de corriger les défaillances actuelles ; un cadre juridique et législatif imprécis alors même que c'est celui-ci qui est supposé donner une orientation générale à la gestion du secteur de l'eau en énumérant les droits et les devoirs qui s'y attachent. Ainsi, la nécessité de capitalisation de la ressource en eau dans les pays africains se pose et se place comme un défi permanent dont les gouvernements peinent malheureusement à apporter une réponse satisfaisante à ce jour.

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Ethio-Türkiye's Relation from the Past to the Future: Ethiopia's Potential Areas in Focus

Geçmişten Geleceğe Türkiye-Etiyopya İlişkisi: Etiyopya'nın Potansiyel Odak Noktaları

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Abstract: Ethio-Türkiye relation being one of the longest relations between African country and Türkiye; it has gone through different historical moments from historical people to people and religious ties to trade relation through Red sea. The long-existing Ethio-Türkiye relation boosted in the end of 19th century when King Menelik and Sultan Abdülhamid II took the throne in Ethiopia and Türkiye respectively; and, after the establishment of the Modern Türkiye in 1923 it consistently grown in multi-dimensional facets. Even though Ethiopia and Türkiye had long history of relation the formal one started in 1912 when the latter opened its first African Consulate and later its Embassy in 1926 just three years after the inauguration of Republic of Türkiye. Given the fact that the two countries have rich history; it's one of the list researched area. Ethiopia is the second most populous African nation while Türkiye has more than eighty million total population located in a very strategic geopolitical area between Europe and Asia. In international relations, there are different interests and policy priorities based on the uniqueness of every nation. In the same fashion, both Ethiopia and Türkiye have had their policy priorities and interests in different periods of time. Here, the policy crafts and relevant sources related with the topic are consulted and data from embassies and pertinent organs are used to analyze the historical, social, economic and other theme of the same. The paper gives an insight on the area by examining the historic Ethio-Türkiye relation vis-à-vis the potentials of the two mainly paying special attention to the current foreign policy orientation, strategic geopolitical setup and the fast-growing economies of both; and, pinpointing the unexplored historic and natural resources of Ethiopia which can benefit both given the fact that they entrenched exemplary legal and institutional frameworks to cooperate. Hence, Ethio-Türkiye relation can be excelled to a higher level through investors, tourists and even scholars who can benefit out of and study about it.

Keywords: Ethiopia, Türkiye, Ottomans, Potential, Areas of interaction

Öz: Afrika ülkesi ile Türkiye arasındaki en eski ilişkilerden biri olan Etiyopya-Türkiye ilişkisi; Kızıldeniz üzerinden tarihi insanlardan halka, dini bağlardan ticari ilişkilere kadar farklı tarihsel anlardan geçmiştir. Uzun süredir devam eden Etiyopya-Türkiye ilişkisi, 19. yüzyılın sonlarında Etiyopya'da Kral Menelik'in, Türkiye'de ise Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in tahta geçmesiyle güçlenmiştir; 1923'te Modern Türkiye'nin kurulmasından sonra da sürekli olarak çok boyutlu olarak büyümüştür. Etiyopya ve Türkiye'nin uzun bir ilişki geçmişi olmasına rağmen, resmi ilişki 1912'de Türkiye'nin ilk Afrika Konsolosluğunu ve daha sonra Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin açılışından sadece üç yıl sonra 1926'da Büyükelçiliğini açmasıyla başlamıştır. İki ülkenin zengin bir tarihe sahip olduğu göz önüne alındığında; bu araştırma alanı listelerinden biridir. Etiyopya en kalabalık ikinci Afrika ülkesi iken Türkiye, Avrupa ile Asya arasında çok stratejik bir jeopolitik bölgede yer alan seksen milyondan fazla toplam nüfusa sahiptir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde, her ulusun benzersizliğine dayanan farklı çıkarlar ve politika öncelikleri vardır. Aynı şekilde, hem Etiyopya'nın hem de Türkiye'nin farklı dönemlerde politika öncelikleri ve çıkarları olmuştur. Burada konuyla ilgili politika zanaatkarlarına ve ilgili kaynaklara başvurulmakta ve büyükelçiliklerden ve ilgili organlardan elde edilen verilerden yararlanılarak konunun tarihsel, sosyal, ekonomik ve diğer temaları analiz edilmektedir. Bu makale, her ikisinin de mevcut dış politika yönelimi, stratejik jeopolitik yapısı ve hızla büyüyen ekonomilerine özel bir önem vererek, tarihi Etiyopya-Türkiye ilişkisini ikisinin potansiyelleri karşısında inceleyerek alan hakkında bir fikir veriyor; ve Etiyopya'nın keşfedilmemiş tarihi ve doğal kaynaklarının tam olarak belirlenmesi ve işbirliği için örnek teşkil eden yasal ve kurumsal çerçeveler oluşturdukları gerçeği göz önüne alındığında her ikisine de fayda sağlayabilir. Dolayısıyla Etiyopya-Türkiye ilişkisi, yatırımcılar, turistler ve hatta faydalanabilecek ve bu konuda araştırma yapabilecek akademisyenler aracılığıyla daha yüksek bir düzeye çıkarılabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etiyopya, Türkiye, Osmanlılar, Potansiyel, Etkileşim alanları

Introduction

The relation between Ethiopia and Türkiye remained for centuries in a strong bondage. Even though the ties between the two countries is growing; it can be improved further given the immense foreign policy orientation, historic, geopolitical, and economic potentials of the two countries.

The Ethio-Turkish relation stretches back to the Ottoman Empire in 16th century. The Ottomans' expansion and control of Egypt in 1517 was a turning point in the history of Africa-Türkiye relation that paved the way for Ottomans to contact with Africa in general and the Northern part in particular.

The beginning of the Ethio-Türkiye relation emanated from religious and economic aspects as Ottomans raised as a protectorate of Muslims in the world and were keen also to control the trade in the Red sea of the time. Ethiopia being one of the important countries in the history of Islamic religion by protecting followers of Prophet Mohammed who fled to it escaping persecution in the first Heijira in 615 and located in the Horn of Africa as a crossroad to the Middle East and Red sea enabled it to became one of the interest areas for Ottomans in their rival with the Portuguese.

Ethiopia is the only African country which has never been colonized as it defeated the invading Italian power at the famous battle of Adwa in 1896 after which Ethiopia got wide global recognition so that many countries begun their ties.

Türkiye opened its first African Consulate in Ethiopia a city called Harar which is considered the fourth holiest Islamic city in 1912 and its Embassy in Addis Ababa in 1926 the first in Sub-Saharan Africa. The relation was very pacific at the end of the 19th century because of the reason that Menelik II and Sultan Abdülhamid II became the leaders of Ethiopia and Ottoman Empire respectively. The controversy about the possessive right of the Monastery of Deir Sultan in Jerusalem was resolved by the latter which enabled the ties to boost. They also maintained their relation after the establishment of the present-day Turkey Republic. The two countries relation is growing nowadays due mainly to the foreign policy adopted by the two in general and that of Türkiye's paradigm shift approach towards Africa in particular. After Türkiye embraced 'opening to Africa' in 2005 lots of efforts are exerted which have of course paid off.

In this writing, it is tried to elucidate the relation from the very historic point of view to other aspects of it. Unite one is devoted to narrate the historical relationship between the two in a brief chronological order while unite two discusses the relatively detailed diplomatic relation to economic and other spheres of interaction. Unite three gives special focus to the potentials of the two countries paying special attention to Ethiopia's unexplored resources that can enhance the relation to an apex in the future. Finally, it concludes by giving remarks about ways forward.

1. Ethio-Türkiye Relations: historical perspective

1.1 Ethio-Türkiye relation: from the beginning to 1923

One of the most influential empires and civilizations in the world history was Ottoman Turkey. It expanded in various regions and controlled very important military and economic strategic places (Barnes-Brown, 2019). Its expansion to North-Africa and controlling Egypt in 1517 had been a turning point in the Ottoman's expansion to Africa (Starford Sow, 1976). Egypt's strategic location was a big advantage for Ottoman Turkey to extend its territorial control in the Horn of Africa such as the current Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan to effectively supervise the security of the trade routes and to instill its influences on others (Hazar, 2000; Abir, 2013). Ethio-Türkiye's relation dates back to that time of the 16th century.

The Portuguese and Ottoman power-rivalry in the international trade and political arena from 15th to 17th century and the Muslim and Christian Kingdoms internal contestation in Ethiopia combined made the former ones to involve in Ethiopia when Ottomans began to support the Muslim Kingdom of Adal while Portuguese were on the side of the Christian Kingdom. Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Gragn Ahmed) who was the ruler of Adal Sultanate achieved big successes in the battles and controlled large territories in Ethiopia (Abir, 1980; Marcus, 1994). After the huge battle success of Imam Ahmed such as at the battle of Shimbira Kure in 1529, finally defeated at the battle of Woyna Daga in 1543 (Haggai, 1995; Muhumed, 2015).

The relation after the Gragn war was relatively stable though there was a continued chase for the dominance of the Red sea trade between Ethiopia, Portuguese and Ottomans (Yimer, Chekol, 2022) which lasted till 1855 where all struggling to control the route. One of the most important concerns of the Ethiopian foreign relations during Tewodros II and Yohanse IV regimes were access to the sea outlets. The Ethiopian sea outlets such as Massawa and Asab were under the control and influence of Ottoman Turkey, Egypt, and Italy in several years. As a result, the Ethiopian relation with Ottoman Turkey was conflictual and tried to form alliance with Europeans such as with Britain and France to have an access for the sea outlets (Marcus, 1994; Rubenson, 1976; Rubenson, 2021). However, the formal relations between the two states started during Emperor Menelik II period (Bahru, 2002).

Ethio-Ottoman relation turned pacific and friendly in the end of the 19th century where Menelik II and Sultan Abdülhamid II became the leaders of Ethiopia and Ottoman Empire respectively especially after the famous battle of Adwa in 1896 (Bahru, 2002; Abota, 2002). One of the historic moments of the two parties' relation was the controversy in the Deir Al Sultan monastery. Emperor Menelik II through the delegations requested the protection of Ethiopian monastery i.e. the Monastery of Deir Sultan nowadays situated in Jerusalem. Reciprocally, the Ottoman Turkey regime or Sultan Abdulhamid II replied to the concern Ethiopia in Jerusalem and promised to solve the problems related to Monastery of Deir Sultan and other properties (Marcus, 1994).

King Menelik II of Ethiopia sent Ato Josef and Kont de Leonitif to Istanbul with a letter of good will which also affirmed Muslims in Ethiopia can worship freely; and with gifts among which lion and gold buckler which pleased the Ottoman Sultan. In response, the latter send a delegation to Ethiopia with a letter mentioning the long historic relation of Muslims with Abyssinia and gifts including pistol, telescope, horses…etc. The welfare of Ethiopians and the possession of Deir Sultan monastery was assured by the Ottomans leader Abdulhamid II who permitted a church to be build and separate door to be done for Ethiopian Christians while Emperor Menelik confirmed that Muslims in his country can worship freely. Sultan Abdülhamid II expressed that he was against Italy's invasion of Ethiopia (Yimer, Chekol, 2022, YILDIZ, 2021). This period marked a turning point in laying the basis for the inauguration of official relation between the two.

The first Ottoman Turkey Consulate opened in Harar, Ethiopia, in 1912 which was the first in Africa (Keller, 1987; Bahiru, 2002). During Liji Iyasu's regime (1913-1916) who succeeded Menelik II (1913-1916) Ethiopia continued to establish and show the strong ties of Ethiopia and Ottoman Turkey (Tepedelen, n.d; Marcus, 1994; Nagayo, 2015; Sebsebe, 2015; Yıldız, 2021). Due to Necib Hac Efendi's passing away Mazhar Bey became the first consul who managed to strengthen the relation between the parties by convincing the Emperor to move the consulate from Harar to Addis Ababa and requesting his Empire to help Ethiopia through financial and material support including the request for the provision of two aero planes (Yıldız, 2021).

1.2 From 1923 to 1991

In post-Liji Iyasu period, from 1916-1930 the foreign relation was dominated by Ras Tafari's role who was the regent of Empress Zewditu. He engaged in diplomatic struggle to make Ethiopia as the member of League of Nations and achieved in 1923. He had also visited many European countries to consolidate the diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and to get lessons and strengthen relations including Turkey. The regime attempted to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia when Italy occupied Ethiopia. For instance, the regime mainly committed to the principle of collective security which was the basic principle of League of Nations to defend member states (Spencer, 1984).

In 1923, Ottoman Turkey completely collapsed and the modern Republic of Turkey was established. Following the collapse of Ottoman Turkey, the modern Turkey accepted the western modernization as the best way to ensure productivity and development and to compete in international market (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014; Negesso, 2021). The foreign relation of Turkey established itself based on the principle of sovereign equality and reciprocity. In the decolonization process, for instance, it immediately recognized the newly independent African states; and established diplomatic and economic relations (Hazar, 2000; Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014). Turkey opened its embassy in Ethiopia in 1926. The evidences showed that it was the first Turkey's embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, in 1933 Ethiopia opened an embassy in Ankara, Turkey. Moreover, Turkey was one of the countries which participated in the coronation of Emperor Hailesillasie in 1931 (Nagayo, 2015). In 1923 Ethiopia became member of the League of Nations that was founded to preserve the international peace and security (Spencer, 1984; Bahiru, 2001; Marcus, 1983; Marcus, 1994). Similarly, in 1932 Turkey became member for this organization (MoFA Turkey, 2019).

However, this relation was slightly interrupted in early 1930's as a result of Italian aggression against Ethiopia and the Tukey's smooth diplomatic relation with Italy. The Ethio-Turkey relation was hindered due to the following reasons. Turkey like other member states ignored the complaint when Ethiopia explained the aggression acts of Italy before the League of Nations because its focus was the Mediterranean area. In other words, the responses of the League of Nations and its member states were not satisfactory. In April 1935, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece agreed a Joint Mediterranean agreement or alliance with Italy (Barles, 2004; Negesso, 2021**)**.

Later on, the relation between Turkey and Italy faced difficulty. As a result, following the aggression acts of Italy against Turkey, Turkey promoted its consulate in Ethiopia to the ambassadorial level in 1935. The Atatürk government diplomatically stood together with Ethiopia against the Italian aggression. For instance, Turkey government insisted Britain or great powers support Ethiopia to reverse the aggression and to avoid extra disasters in international peace and security and international politics because the Atatürk government perceived that aggression was a turning point. The Ethiopian regime liked this decision and reflected its interest for the development of diplomatic ties between the two states. Thereafter, the Turkish government and its institutions such as media tried to support the diplomatic struggle of Ethiopia for its independence and sovereignty. In addition, some volunteer Turkish soldiers, for instance Mehmet Vehip Pasha, Faruk Pasha, and Tarik Pasha, participated on the side of Ethiopia (Spencer, 1983; Negesso, 2021**)**.

At the time of Second World War (WWII), Ethiopia used the strategy of one power against the other. The regime cooperated with Britain to fight against

Italy and to ensure the independence of Ethiopia. However, after liberation, the domination of Britain over the affairs of Ethiopia continued until 1948. As a result, the Hailesillassie's government shifted its relation to United States of America which had a policy of anti-colonization unlike the European powers **(**Spencer, 1984)**.** The relations resumed until the fall of the regime in 1974. During this period, Turkey also applied pro-western policy (Bahiru, 2002). After the liberation of Ethiopia, the friendly relations between the two countries continued particularly from 1950s until the downfall of imperial regime (Henze, 2000; Negesso, 2021). Turkey believed that the Western principle and practice of development is the best way to ensure strong economy (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014). Turkey was pro-decolonization process in Africa. As a result, it immediately recognized the newly independent African countries and established diplomatic relations. In this regard, besides its relation with Ethiopia, it worked to develop its relations with newly independent African countries (Kavas, 2015; Hazar, 2000).

The relations between the two countries reached its peak during the Hailesillassie I regime of Ethiopia. At the period of cold war, the two countries had nearly similar ideological line which had a pro-western stance. After World War II, the two countries were founding member states of the United Nations in 1945. They also engaged in international peace keeping missions under United Nations for instance in 1952 Korean War. The emperor also visited Turkey twice. Moreover, in 1952 Turkey became member for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Spencer, 1984; Marcus, 1976; Kavas, 2015).

The Turkey government re-opened an embassy in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, in 1957 and reciprocally the Ethiopian regime opened an embassy in Turkey, Anakara, in 1959 (Henze, 2000; Negesso, 2021). Emperor Hailesillassie visited Turkey in 1967 and 1971 so as to strengthen the diplomatic relations of the two countries. These diplomatic relations, however, were interrupted by regime change in Ethiopia in 1974 and the ideological shift of the newly coming socialist Derg government because the Turkey government remained attached to capitalism. In addition, the Ethiopian government closed the embassy at Ankara in 1984 (Negesso, 2021). The post-1974 ideological shift in Ethiopia, to socialism, disappointed western countries and their allies such as Turkey. Ethiopia had consolidated its ties with the socialist countries such as Soviet Russia, Cuba, and South Yemen (Bahıru, 2002). The Ethio-Turkey diplomatic ties had immediately declined (Abota, 2002).

1.3 Post 1991

In the post 1991, following the regime change, the Ethiopian foreign policy was more or less designed in accordance with the idea of liberalism. The foreign policy document explains that democratization and globalization as international determinant factors and suggests how Ethiopia's national interests can be defended. Under the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) administration the foreign policy in principle focuses on supporting the democratization process and combating abject poverty by addressing the economic problems through aid and trade negotiations and by creating wide opportunities for the foreign direct investment (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 2002). As a result, in this period large opportunities were created for the foreign investments thereby to boost the economy of the state despite the presence of ups and downs. In this regard, Ethiopia tried to diversify its trade relations with Western and the Eastern world including the newly emerging powers i.e. China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Malaysia, and the Gulf states. Regardless of the state's ideological stance, the foreign policy promotes economic relations which may contribute for the economic development of Ethiopia. This foreign policy orientation opened door for Ethiopia to conduct trade relations and attract investments. For instance, Turkey's investors engaged in several investment areas such as agriculture, construction, textiles, technology, and so on. Moreover, the trade relations between the two states have been growing even though the trade deficit from Ethiopia side (Zaman, 2011; Tekle, 2021).

Ethiopia had not an embassy in Turkey for long years and the cooperation was very weak particularly from 1984-1991. However, in post 1991 the diplomatic ties between these states have been growing. Turkey has given big emphasis for Africa as potential place of large market, natural resource, and bargaining power (Kavas, 2015). The relations had more enhanced when Turkey opened the Turkish International Coordination Agency's (TIKA) first office in Africa in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa in 2005 and when Ethiopia reopened its embassy in Turkey, Ankara, in 2006. Moreover, the Turkish Police Academy has started providing training opportunities at least for 5 Ethiopians (Shinn, 2012). The foreign policy of Turkey has aim of consolidating diplomatic relations, and helping the good governance and economic aspects (Ozkan, 2008; Shin, 2012). For instance, there are various economic cooperation agreements to develop the trade and investment relations between the two countries. Turkey is one of the countries which largely invests in Ethiopia in many areas and addresses the Ethiopian market. This investment and trade relations brought technologies, skills, and job opportunities to Ethiopia (Muhumed, 2015; Ozkan, 2008; Shin, 2012). However, Ethiopia has faced trade deficits in these trade relations because it usually exports raw materials which are cheap in international market and imports processed goods and sometimes raw material (ibid).

The current Tukey's president or former Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was the first Turkish Prime Minister to visit Sub-Saharan countries. He visited Ethiopia and South Africa in 2015 which helped for the advancement of its relation with Africans in general and Ethiopia in particular (Kavas, 2015). In January 2015, the Turkey President visited Ethiopia and met with Hailemariam Desalegn the late Prime minister of Ethiopia. In the meeting, the president confirmed that Turkey has special place for Ethiopia since ancient time. In addition, he noted that his government has strong interest to provide crucial technologies which will help to properly utilizing natural resources and contributing for the development of the state (Tewekel, 2015).

Ethio-Turkish Relations in Post-2018

Following the political transition in Ethiopia in 2018, many countries portrayed their interests towards the change and other aspects. The government has established friendly relations with many states including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. At the time of Arabian Peninsula crisis, it undertook a kind of neutral position to accommodate interests though some of parties disliked the position (Mosley, 2020). Due to its location and capability; and its position in regional institutions, many powers need the cooperation of Ethiopia regarding the issues of Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea. The tension between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile River is another issue which attracted the attention of different powers.

As it is discussed, Ethiopia attracted the attention of many powers due to its location, resources, and demography. In post-2018 the new coming government bolstered the foreign relations to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Turkey. The Ethiopian government was in dilemma during Gulf crisis which undertook neutral position. Though some consequences, it tried to friendly handle the parties in the crisis and tried to defend the national interest of the state. In this regard, following the 2018 political transition, the relation between Ethiopia and Turkey has further increased (Cafiero & Çok, 2020). In August 2021, summit diplomacy was conducted between Turkey and Ethiopia that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed met with Tayyip Erdoğan. During the meeting, they discussed on the areas of cooperation such as technology, military, economic, and social issues between the states and regional and international situations like international security (Tekle, 2021).

Moreover, in February 2022, the Turkish Ambassador, Amb Yaprak Alp, in Ethiopia in the interview with the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) noted that the two states have strong relations which cannot be broken even at the time of difficulties. The two countries cooperated in several political, economic, business, and other areas. For instance, the Turkey government has been providing development assistance for Ethiopia and many Turkish government and non-government organizations have been engaging in building water projects, and agricultural supports such as seeds in the northern and southern Ethiopia. Moreover, the ambassador mentioned that Ethiopia and Türkiye have signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the areas of water resource development, military financial cooperation, and implementation protocol on financial assistance in 2021 when Prime Minister Abiy visited Turkey (ENA, 2022). Turkey also had an interest to mediate the boundary conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan since 2020 (Tekle, 2021).

The Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia organized a trade and investment forum in Ankara in March 2022. The forum aimed at promoting investment and trade between Ethiopia and Turkey; and attracting investors in different areas in mining, energy, technology, tourism, health areas, textiles, and agro-processing. On this forum the Ethiopian Ambassador in Turkey, Ambassador Adem Mohamed noted that Ethiopia and Turkey have strong diplomatic ties. As to him, Turkish investors are second largest investors in Ethiopia and created large job opportunities for many peoples. Furthermore, the ambassador described the commitment of the Ethiopian government to host foreign investors or expand foreign direct investment (Walta, 2022).

Like the economy, Ethiopia and Turkey has established cultural and social relations. For instance, in 2000 the two countries agreed to cooperate on the social aspects particularly on the health sector related to medicine, professional development, and health institutions. They, moreover, agreed to cooperate on education, cultural aspects, tourism, and science (Mehreteab, 2019).

2. Examining areas of interactions: in a nutshell

2.1 Diplomatic relation

The Ethio-Turkish diplomatic relationship dates back to the Ottoman Empire in 16th century. As discussed above, the Ottomans and Ethiopian (the then Abyssinian) kingdoms had established a close relationship with regards to trade and military collaborations from which the diplomatic ties emanate. The Ottomans came to Africa with a non-colonization mentality (Stanford Shaw, 1976).

There are two stances towards the Ethio-Ottomans relations of the 16th century as the first being of suspicion and distrust due mainly to the power rivalry of the two with Portuguese over the Red sea and the strong stand of the Ethiopian Highland Princes to keep its political status quo (Yimer, Chekol, 2022); while the second can be considered as positive from the fact that the Ottomans raised themselves as leaders of Muslims in the world in the 16th century which can be witnessed in Ethiopia where the former had great place for the latter as Ethiopians welcomed the followers of Prophet Mohammed in 615 A.D (YILDIZ, 2021).

The Ottoman Sultan Suleyman the magnificent was helping the Muslim kingdom after which he decided to build administrative system in Abyssinia by appointing, Ozdemir Pasha, who was a successful grand ruler in Yemen, as a senior to Abyssinia on 5 July 1555 to dominate the east trade and for the Muslims in Abyssinia reasons (Yusuf, 2001; YILDIZ, 2021). In the following decades, the Ottoman Empire continued to expand territorially in Ethiopian region particularly the Red Sea. Huseyin Pasha was assigned by the Ottoman Sultan to Habesistan Eyaleti the administration of the Abyssinia as a ruler (ibid). But, the Ethiopians resisted against any expansion with any kind of impossibility (Yusuf, 2001). In the 17th century Ethiopia was having internal problem called time of princes (zemene mesafint) where lords were governing themselves while Ottoman was having internal and external problems in18th centuries due mainly to which both had no significant interest to each other.

Till the end of the 19th century, the diplomatic relation remained without significant progress. But, the end of the 19th century marked a turning point in the two countries' diplomatic relation. Türkiye opened its first African Consulate in Ethiopia in a city called Harar which is considered the fourth holiest Islamic city in 1912 and its Embassy in Addis Ababa in 1926 the first in Sub-Saharan Africa. The relation was very pacific at the end of the 19th century because of the reason that Menelik II and Sultan Abdülhamid II became the leaders of Ethiopia and Ottoman Empire respectively. The controversy about the possessive right of the Monastery of Deir Sultan in Jerusalem was resolved by the latter which enabled the ties to boost. They also maintained their relation after the establishment of the present-day Turkey Republic.

Turkey opened its embassy in Ethiopia in 1926. The evidences showed that it was the first Turkey's embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, in 1933 Ethiopia opened an embassy in Ankara, Turkey. Moreover, Turkey was one of the countries which participated in the coronation of Emperor Hailesillasie in 1931 (Nagayo, 2015). In 1923 Ethiopia became member for the League of Nations that was founded to preserve the international peace and security (Spencer, 1984; Bahru, 2001; Marcus, 1983; Marcus, 1994). Similarly, in 1932 Turkey became member for this organization (MoFA Turkey, 2019).

The relations between the two countries reached at its peak during the Hailesillassie I regime of Ethiopia. At the period of cold war, the two countries had nearly similar ideological line which had pro-western stance. After World War II, the two countries were founding member states of the United Nations in 1945. They also engaged in international peace keeping missions under United Nations for instance in 1952 Korean War. The emperor also visited Turkey twice. Moreover, in 1952 Turkey became member for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Spencer, 1984; Marcus, 1976; Kavas, 2015).

In 2015, the Turkey President visited Ethiopia and confirmed that Turkey has special place for Ethiopia since ancient time. In addition, he noted that his government has interest to strengthen the ties; and, the current Ethiopian

Prime minister Abiy Ahmed visited Türkiye to discuss cooperation matters on technology, military, economic, and social issues between the states and regional and international security (Tewekel, 2015; Tekle, 2021).

2.2 Economic relations and its basis

The economic relation between Ethiopia and Turkey is as old as the relation of the two; mainly based itself on coffee and slaves (Dagmawit Ayele, 2019; Abir M. 2013). But, it boosted after the 'Action Plan for opening up to Africa' was prepared in 1998 which was followed by the Strategy on the Development of the Economic Relations by Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade in 2003 after AKP (Adalet ve KalkInma) party came to power (Elem Tepecikliogu,2017).

Turkey's investments in Ethiopia is around $2.5 billion as the second-largest investor in Ethiopia after China. The bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Ethiopia amounted to 398,8 million USD in 2019 (exports were 378,3 million USD and imports were 27,5 million USD), and to 272 million USD in 2020 (exports were 231 million and imports were 41 million USD) (Anadolu Agency, 2021; ENA, 2021)

Turkey is one of the strategic partners of Ethiopia along with China and India. At this time, many Tukey investors have invested in Ethiopia i.e. about 200 Turkish companies are working in Ethiopia. They have created job opportunities for more than 20,000 Ethiopians and their investment amount is over $2 billion. Turkey companies mainly invest on textile industries. Moreover, the current trade volume is more than $400 million (Türkiye MoFA, 2021; Tekle, 2021).

The economic relationship has been based on legal and institutional frameworks. To mention some:

A Cooperation Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and Trade signed in 1993 depending on which Memorandum of Agreement was entered that gives the two countries the responsibility to create a conducive environment to enhance bilateral trade partnership. (TGE Proclamation no. 77/93; Dagmawi A. Tilahun, 2019)

A treaty agreement about the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment was ratified by the Ethiopian Parliament in 2003 is the second treaty in the area of investment and trade which has the objective of promoting greater economic. The agreement mainly consists of the obligation and/or rights of each party to: -

- Promote investors by creating favorable conditions;
- Protect and accord fair and equitable treatment in its territory; treatment no less favorable than that accorded in similar situations to investments of its investors or to investments of investors of any third country, whichever is the most favorable;

- Not to expropriate, nationalize or take measures of similar effects except for a public purpose upon payment of prompt compensation accordance with due process of law;
- Allow all transfers related to an investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory;
- Recognize any subrogation of the insurer which stems from the terms of the insurance agreement if the investment of an investor of one Party is insured against non-commercial risks under a system established by law;
- Seek in good faith and cooperation a rapid and equitable solution to any dispute between them; (FDRE, 2003: Proclamation No. 323/2003; UNCTAD, 2001)

Türkiye and Ethiopia have embraced the legal setup for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income which will positively impact bilateral investment (FDRE, 2008: Proclamation No. 562/2008); on the field of Tourism (FDRE, 2008: Proclamation No. 577/2008); in the Military and defense Industry cooperation, development of the commercial and economic relations between the two countries through cooperation in maritime fields (FDRE: Proclamation No. 453/2005; Proclamation No. 888/2008 and Proclamation No. 969/2016) and also cooperation agreements and legal frameworks concerning cultural and educational cooperation (FDRE, 2005: Proclamation No. 462/2005); in the field of Agricultural (FDRE, 2005: Proclamation No. 462/2005).

Moreover, the establishment of the Ethiopia-Turkey Trade and Investment Forum realized the institutionalization of the relations between Turkey and Ethiopia upon which officials and businesspersons from the two countries can discuss challenges and prospects in bilateral investment and trade. In the same fashion, the Joint Commission on Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation (JEC) is a strong regular institutional basis established on agreement for the two countries economic relation discussing trade, technical and finance cooperation on focus. (Nagayo, 2015; MoFA, 2014). It has been successful in examining the progress of agreements entered.

The other worth-mentioning is TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey) which is a non-governmental organization business federation which organizes international trade summits. These summits not only brought Africa to the attention of Turkey but, most importantly, created a venue for both to know each other and explore possibilities (Özkan and Akgün, 2010). TUSKON has an office in Addis Ababa has managed to draw attention of Türkiye's companies to Ethiopia (Nagayo, 2015).

Turkish office of Commercial Counselor or attaché: The Turkish office of Commercial Counselor is the extension of the Ministry of Economy of Turkey which has an objective is to guide Turkish businesspersons on commercial economic activities and giving information about the investment environment in Ethiopia (Dagmawit A., 2019).

The trade relation between the two countries though growing faster has been limited to some items compared to the potentials of the countries. Regarding Ethiopia it was exporting oil seed, pulse, textile and coffee whereas Türkiye exports Plastic, machineries, iron and steel and rubber (Dagmawit A. T, 2019).

2.3 Other spheres of interactions- TiKA and Maarif foundation

The Maarif foundation has participated in building and carrying out educational activities within three cities including the one in Addis Ababa (TMF, 2021).

The countries have signed legal cooperation agreements. To mention two of them a bilateral Extradition agreement and Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal matters which will strengthen crime prevention and enhance criminals not to hide in the respective signing parties (ENA, 2022)

In addition, some volunteer Turkish soldiers, for instance Mehmet Vehip Pasha, Faruk Pasha, and Tarik Pasha, participated on the side of Ethiopia. Especially, Vehip Pasha was appointed as the general staff of the Sothern front proving his military skill built the stiffest defense called 'Hidenburg Wall' against Italians (Spencer, 1983; Negesso, 2021**).**

Worth to mention here is that there are societal and educational trips between the citizens of the two countries' nationalities including Ethiopians visiting Türkiye for medical reasons.

3. Potentials of Ethio-Türkiye relations: Ethiopia in focus

The two countries relationship can be further enhanced based their conducive political, geopolitical and economic factors among others. Here under are some illustrations of the two countries' potentials based on which they can emerge as one of models of international relation in their respective regions.

Both Türkiye and Ethiopia have embraced a very welcoming foreign policy towards others. Ethiopia has crafted its foreign policy to base itself on national interest and economic diplomacy whereby mutual benefit can be secured (FDRE Constitution, 1995; MoFA, 2002). The same is true with Türkiye which came up with a paradigm shift measure towards Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular after it declared the policy of 'Opening to Africa' that emphasizes mutual benefit and complementation (Özkan and Akgün, 2010).

Historic moments in their past has a very crucial role in the betterment of their interaction. Their historic past stretches back to the Ottoman Empire in

16th century. Moreover, beginning from 1896 to the opening of the first Turkish Embassy in Africa in the Ethiopian capital has laid a visible milestone added with the rich history of the two countries will boost the existing good relationship. In his visit to Ethiopia, H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mentioned that Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilizations of the world and home of co-existence among which the Abyssinian King Nejashi has such a meaningful and special place in the Muslim world considered by Prophet Muhammed as a secured place (MoFA, 2015). The two countries have a strong friendly relation from past to present. In addition to this the success story of Türkiye in the field of Tourism can be a good example for Ethiopia which is the oldest African nation with 9 UNESCO registered world heritages (UNESCO, 2022; Nagayo, 2015)

The geo-political setup of the two countries is the other most important factor that can positively influence their interaction. Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa crossroads to the Red sea, Middle east and Asia; seat of African Union (AU), UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) and UNDP (United Nations Development Program). Whereas, Türkiye is member to NATO, bordering Asia and Europe and closer to the Middle East.

Worth to mention is that they have large population. Ethiopia is the second largest market in Africa with a total population of 120 million whereas Türkiye has 86 million populations (Worldometer, 2023). Moreover, Ethiopia is 1.1 million square kilometers wide out of which 52.1 percent is suitable for agriculture (arable) with potentials to grow coffee, oil seeds, leather as the first African concentration for livestock with estimated 75 million heads (Francis Amoako, 2022).

Economic and legal reforms in the recent years in Ethiopia is another major reason to invest in and deal with Ethiopia. Ethiopia as one of the fastest growing economy in the world with 9.5 percent average per year as per World Bank; the government has introduced privatization of sectors which were reserved only for Ethiopian nationals and legal frameworks including the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and revised commercial code are positive measures taken (EIC, 2023; FDRE, Proclamation No. 1237/2021; Proclamation No. 1242/2021). Its membership to Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) with 400 million populations and African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) which is very beneficial for investors in terms of trade activities within African continent which will have significant impact in bringing investment to the country (EIC, 2023).

Ethio-Türkiye relationship has been growing from its `beginning though this doesn't mean that there is no room for improvement. Given the potentials and positive achievements of the two countries the relation will emerge high in the near future if they combine their advantages in an innovative manner.

Concluding Remarks

Ethio-Türkiye relation began in the 16th century at the time of Ottoman Empire and reached its peak in the end of the 19th century and in the middle of 20th century. The historic relation has multi-faceted dimensions including religion and geopolitics in their respective regions. Given the fact that Türkiye embraced a policy that opened itself to Africa has benefited Ethiopia and Türkiye in return also by drawing so many social and economic interactions in the past twenty and more years. However, the countries relation can further be enhanced as they have so many potentials in multiple spheres of interaction. Hence, given the most suitable policy orientation; economic, social and historic potential of the two and the advantage they have due to their geopolitical setup they can shine as one of the best international relation models in the coming years if they implement and utilize their advantages in an innovative way.

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The Issue Of Insufficient Capital Accumulation In Developing Countries

Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerdeki Yetersiz Sermaye Birikiminin Sorunu

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Abstract: This research aims generally to analyse the issue of insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries. To develop the research and reach its objective, firstly, an analysis on the reason why there is insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries was made and, posteriorly, an efficient alternative to accumulate sufficient capital for economic development in these countries was presented. An analysis was also made of the social and economic situation of the countries taking into account their per capita income and human development index in order to classify economically and socially them at an international level. To understand the research topic, a general literature review was carried out on the concepts and theories that describe capital accumulation in general and particularly in the context of economic growth and development of countries. To collect data, data acquisition methods were used, based up on the secondary data acquisition technique, which consists of acquiring data from publications by public and/or private institutions. Therefore, the data used were obtained from the electronic databases of the World Bank Group and other private institutions. It was concluded that the issue of insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries is related to insufficient savings that arises because most of these countries have low and lower-middle incomes economies. The way to accumulate sufficient capital in developing countries is to consistently make foreign capital investments in these countries.

Keywords: Capital Accumulation, Economic Growth, Development, Developing Countries.

Öz: Bu çalışmada genel olarak gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki yetersiz sermaye birikiminin sorununu incelemek amaçlanmaktadır. Araştırmayı geliştirmek ve amacına ulaşmak amacıyla öncelikle gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki sermaye birikiminin neden yetersiz olduğu üzerine bir analiz yapılıp ardından bu ülkelerdeki ekonomik kalkınma için yeterli sermaye birikiminin etkin bir alternatifi sunulmuştur. Uluslararası düzeydeki ekonomik ve sosyal olarak ülkeleri sınıflandırmak amacıyla ülkelerin kişi başına düşen gelirleri ve insani gelişmişlik endeksleri dikkate alınarak sosyal ve ekonomik durumlarının da analizi yapılmıştır. Araştırma konusunu anlamak amacıyla genel olarak ve özel olarak da ülkelerin ekonomik büyüme ve kalkınması bağlamında sermaye birikimini tanımlayan kavram ve teoriler üzerine genel bir literatür taraması yapılmıştır. Veri toplamak amacıyla kamu ve/veya özel kurumların yayınlarından veri elde etmeyi içeren ikincil veri toplama tekniğine dayalı veri toplama yöntemleri kullanılmıştır. Dolayısıyla, incelenen veriler Dünya Bankası Grubu ve diğer özel kuruluşların elektronik veri tabanlarından elde edilmiştir. Gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki yetersiz sermaye birikiminin sorununun, bu ülkelerin çoğunun düşük ve alt-orta gelirli ekonomilere sahip olması nedeniyle ortaya çıkan yetersiz tasarruflarla ilgili olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki yeterli sermaye biriktirmenin yolu, bu ülkelerdeki sürekli olarak yabancı sermaye yatırımları yapmaktan geçmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sermaye Birikimi, Ekonomik Büyüme, Kalkınma, Gelişmekte Olan Ülkeler.

Introduction

In debates on economic growth in developing countries, the importance assigned to the issue of capital accumulation to generate and/or increase national wealth is emphasized. It is observed on a large scale in developing countries the insufficiency of capital accumulation that can lead their economies to growth and sustainable development. In these countries, the process that capital has to go through in order to reproduce itself brings with itself contradictions that make it to be unsuccessful. The accumulation of national capital is not a simple and quick result that can be obtained. It is a long-run process that requires the efficient and continuous application of collective efforts. In order to reproduce itself, capital continuously needs to wade through and restart a process comprised of a successive condition that integrate with each other. If, for whatever reason, one of these conditions is precluded, the entire process of accumulation will be precluded too. Accumulation only occurs, therefore, if all the necessary conditions for the whole process of capital accumulation are in perfect harmony.

It is the responsibility of the national government to create all necessary conditions that promote the national capital accumulation process, since the successful capital accumulation process leads the national economy to the status of financial independence. Therefore, capital accumulation is a necessary condition for effective economic growth in developing countries. By definition, capital accumulation is an act of accumulating assets of value for a group, promoting the increase of wealth through the concentration of capital. Capital accumulation is a process that consists in reuniting valuable assets, investing them in order to generate and/or increase wealth by obtaining the highest profit. Therefore, it stands clear that capital accumulation is fundamental in order to build national wealth for the nation's future, even if it is a long-run ongoing process.

It is intended to carry out this scientific article to show how important the process of capital accumulation is to generate and/or increase the national wealth in a given country, specifically in a given developing country. The research, in this way, aims generally to analyse the issue of insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries. It is desired to establish two main points of analysis based on the general objective of the research. In the first point, the aim is to determine the reason why there is insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries. In the second point, in turn, the aim is to present an efficient alternative to accumulate capital for economic development in developing countries.

Understanding the Concept of Capital Accumulation

In economics, capital is any asset able to generate a flow of income over time through its application in production. This concept is therefore used to refer to both money and other assets, for example, financial investments, stocks and goods that can be applied to generate wealth (Maria, 2022, p.6). In other words, capital is any economic good that can be used to produce other goods and/or services. The concept of capital, according to Yalçıner, Aksoy (2011, p.9) and Eğilmez (2021, p.48), represents assets such as machinery, equipment, installations and buildings that will produce goods and services for more than one year.

Capital accumulation is an act of accumulating valuable assets for a given group, promoting the increase of wealth by means of capital concentration. Capital accumulation also refers to any method of increasing the amount of capital owned or any method of utilizing or mobilizing capital resources for investment purposes. Along with labour and technical progress, capital accumulation is one of the production factors necessary for economic growth and development. It is a very important economic growth factor that contributes to achieving sustained economic growth in a given country.

Being a great factor for economic growth and development of nations, capital accumulation is an important topic on the world agenda due to its positive effects on economic growth. According to Soares (2010, pp.65-66), the process of acquiring capital is called investment. Gross fixed capital formation is a factor that circumvents the limit of production possibilities on the right by provoking positive effects on economic growth. The concept of economic growth translates into the quantitative aspect of an economy, whatever it may be, the company or the country, and which corresponds to the increase in total production during a certain period. Thus, corporate investments have an extremely significant impact on gross domestic product. If companies invest, they grow by buying more tools, machines, equipment, factories, hardware, etc., expanding their operations, hiring more workers and thus positively moving the local economy.

The aforementioned investment that will cause capital accumulation, translates into the application of savings in the gross formation of fixed capital. According to Murteira (2004, p.60), investment, in the so-called fixed capital, is the acquisition or construction of things such as machinery, equipment, transport material, buildings, etc.

The most important factor in ensuring economic growth is capital. In the analysis of economic growth, physical factors like tools, machines, equipment, factories and equipment, etc., which lead to an increase in production, are taken into account as capital factors. In traditional economic growth approaches, it is accepted that investment increases for physical capital accumulation increase labor productivity by increasing capital stock and the amount of capital per workforce, and an environment that facilitates capital accumulation is required to increase the amount of capital gradually in order to increase the production of goods and services. In these approaches, it is stated that the lack of capital is an important factor limiting economic growth and development in developing countries[1].

Within the scope of business economics, capital accumulation is a cyclical and continuous process that aims to accumulate wealth with the aim of maximizing business profit and reducing business costs. This cyclical and continuous process, according to Marx (2009, p.657), consists, in the first place, of converting a sum of money that performs the function of capital into means of production and labour force. This conversion takes place in the market, in the sphere of circulation. Secondly, the production process consists of transforming the means of production into merchandise whose value exceeds the value of its component elements, which therefore contain the capital that has been disbursed, plus a surplus value. Then these commodities in their turn must be thrown into the sphere of circulation. It is important to sell them, realize their value in money and convert that money back into capital, continually repeating the same operations. Each of these stages that make up the capital accumulation process requires that certain specific conditions are met in space and time in adequate quantity and

1 Dikkaya and Özyakışır, 2013, pp.538-539

quality. If, for any reason, one of the conditions that determine the process of capital accumulation is not fulfilled, the whole process of capital accumulation is compromised. In this sense, capitalism is characterized by a permanent effort to overcome barriers, translated into the continuous improvement of the means of production and labour force.

In the macroeconomic scope that encompasses the national economy, capital accumulation in the so-called national capital, consists of accumulating valuable assets with the aim of creating national wealth. In this sense, national wealth is the sum total of all assets with economic value owned by agents, public and private, present in the economy in question. National wealth is a stock variable, that is, it is calculated as the monetary value of goods and resources available to a society in a given period. However, in order to accumulate capital with the aim of generating national wealth, it is necessary to create the necessary conditions that can facilitate and make viable the process of capital accumulation itself. National wealth does not automatically and equally accumulate across countries, regions, sectors and local communities. In order for a country to accumulate as much wealth as possible for its economic growth and development, the local government must create a healthy, favourable and supportive environment for the development of activities in all available economic sectors. The government, being the main author responsible for the creation of national wealth that will be able to provide the social, economic and financial well-being of the nation, must create and adopt strategic macroeconomic policies that are adapted to the local economic system and that meet the needs of the sectors of economic activity. If, for whatever reason, the macroeconomic policies to be adopted do not favour the local economy, the process of national capital accumulation as a whole becomes impossible.

The Reason why there is Insufficient Capital Accumulation in Developing Countries

Countries with low per capita income are called economically developing countries. A developing country is understood to be any country that has macroeconomic indicators that are insufficiently able to provide social, economic and financial well-being to all the citizens equally and that aims to achieve development by using all necessary efforts to grow and/or develop its economy. The aim of all developing countries is to increase the per capita income and to become a developed country. The reason for this is that the higher the per capita income, the more goods and services people can consume and, consequently, the more people's well-being can increase. The more an individual participates in production with natural resources and capital, the more his/her productivity increases and the more he/she produces, the greater his/her income. Since natural resources within the borders of a country can be accepted as a data, the way to increase per capita income is to increase capital per capita. However, saving is necessary to raise capital and per capita income needs to be high to save because individuals cannot find the opportunity to save if they can only maintain their wealth with their income. It means that per capita income in developing countries is low. Per capita income, because it is low, per capita savings is also low, per capita savings, because it is low, the possibility of increasing per capita capital is also low, the possibility of increasing per capita capital, that is, the productivity of the person because it is low, the possibility of increasing per capita income is also low. It is described in this way, the reason why there is not sufficient capital accumulation in developing countries. In certain developing countries, most individuals do not have sufficient income to allow them to purchase goods and/or services and, at the same time, make savings. There is not sufficient employment for all that can allow individuals to participate in production with natural resources and capital so that they can increase their incomes. The way to increase per capita income is to increase capital per capita that is the individual productivity of a person that can be obtained in the act of producing goods and/or services in a given organization. Per capita income corresponds to the average income of the population of a country in a given period and is calculated by dividing the Gross National Product of a country by the number of inhabitants. Per capita income is an economic indicator used to measure the socioeconomic conditions of a given country, giving an idea of the average income level of citizens in the country in question.

The lack of effective and sustainable development in these countries is justified by the fact that there are no viable ways of accumulating capital, that is, accumulating national wealth. There is a lack of capital because there is low saving capacity, there is low saving capacity because there is low income, there is low income because there is low productivity and there is low productivity because there is a lack of capital. This situation precludes a country's capacity for economic development, as stated by Bal (2001, p.7) and Karacan (1965, pp.1-3), the insufficiency of capital accumulation in developing countries hinders them to make capital investments at a significant level to carry out their economic development, because these countries concentrate their total spending on food and similar obligatory needs due to the insufficiency of their per capita income levels and can save at a low pace.

Analysing the Economic Classification and Development of Countries

It is difficult to determine whether a country is developed or not, by the fact that there is not a single internationally recognized definition of a developed country. The economic and social levels of each country that lead to development vary according to the region, natural and technological resources, administrative knowledge and local government public administration policies. This situation differentiates a country from another, causing some to have a high standard of living and others to have a middle or low standard of living.

The economy of a certain country can be classified using macroeconomic indicators such as per capita income. By definition, Gross National Income refers to the total income earned by residents of a given economy in carrying out their economic activities inside and outside the Territory. Residents are understood to be both natural persons and entities. Thus, natural persons are those who remain in a geographic area of an economy, at least for 12 months, or intend to do so in the next 12 months, regardless of their nationality. On the other hand, entities are those that normally operate in an economic space of a certain country. In order to obtain per capita income, it is divided the gross national product by the total number of inhabitants. Per capita income is one of the socioeconomic indicators that assess the degree of economic development of a certain country.

National economies are currently divided into four income groups, namely low-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income economies. Gross national income estimates are obtained from economists in World Bank country units, and population size is estimated by World Bank demographers from a variety of sources, including the United Nations Biennial World Population Prospects. In order to show national economic divisions according to per capita income, the economic classification of countries is analysed, basing on the classification criteria adopted by the World Bank. Income is measured using per capita income, in U.S. Dollar, converted from local currency using the World Bank Atlas method.

Table 1.1. Economic Classification of Countries by Per Capita Income

US$

Groups	**Per Capita Income**
Low Income Economies	1.085 or less
Lower Middle Income Economies	1.086 – 4.255
Upper Middle Income Economies	4.256 – 13.205
High Income Economies	13.205 or more

Source: The World Bank Group, 2023

According to the per capita income groups in Table 1.1, countries are divided into four groups, from low-income economies to high-income economies. Low-income economies include countries such as Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Congo Democratic Republic, Zambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Eritrea, Chad, Togo, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, North Korea, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Guinea, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Mozambique, etc., with a per capita income of US$1.085 or less. Low-middle income economies include countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Algeria, India, Kenya, Ukraine, Tunisia, Senegal, Republic of the Congo, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Principe, Côte d'Ivoire, Arab Republic of Egypt, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Cameroon, Bolivia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ghana, Pakistan, Indonesia, Lebanon, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, etc. with a per capita income between US$1.086 and US$4.255. Upper-middle-income economies with a per capita income between US$4.256 and US$13.205 include countries such as Brazil, Türkiye, China, Russian Federation, South Africa, Colombia, Cuba, Argentina, Botswana, Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Paraguay, Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Bulgaria, Libya, Albania, Moldova, Serbia, Armenia, Georgia, etc. On the other hand, high-income economies with a per capita income of US$13.205 or more include countries such as United States, Germany, France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Netherlands, Hungary, Romania, Greece, Norway, Poland, Australia, Switzerland, Israel, Uruguay, Chile, etc.

Low-income and lower-middle-income economies are mostly made up of African countries. These countries are in dire need of help to develop their economies due to their weak economic growth resulting from a lot of regional factors. High-income economies, on the other hand, are mostly made up of European countries. These countries have almost their whole economic situation solved. Their efforts are mainly directed towards making maintenance and/or improvement of their economies. Although countries are classified economically according to their per capita income, the per capita income situation does not by itself determine whether a certain country is developed or not, but it provides helpful information to find out the socioeconomic situation of a given country. For example, while Saudi Arabia, which is in the group of high-income economies, is considered a developing country, on the other hand, Bulgaria, which is in the group of upper-middle income economies, is included in the developed countries class. This situation led to the necessity of other criteria besides income level in determining the development level of countries, and in this context, an index called the Human Development Index (HDI) was started to be used by the United Nations in 1990.

The HDI values, which provide information about the socioeconomic development level of the countries, vary between 0 and 1. A certain country is considered far from development insofar as its HDI value approaches zero and, otherwise, it is considered developed to the extent that its HDI value approaches 1. The HDI values of the countries are calculated based on the parameters of life expectancy at birth, expected years of education, average years of education and per capita income in purchasing power parity. It is shown in Table 1.2 below the socioeconomic development level of certain countries according to the human development index.

Table 1.2. Socioeconomic Development Level of the Countries under Analysis

Region	Country	HDI			
		2018	2019	2020	2021
Sub-Saharan Africa	Burkina Faso	0,449	0,452	0,449	0,449
Sub-Saharan Africa	Chad	0,398	0,403	0,397	0,394
South Asia	Afghanistan	0,483	0,488	0,483	0,478
Sub-Saharan Africa	Congo Dem. Republic	0,480	0,482	0,479	0,479
Sub-Saharan Africa	Angola	0,595	0,595	0,590	0,586
Sub-Saharan Africa	Mozambique	0,451	0,456	0,453	0,446
Sub-Saharan Africa	Nigeria	0,531	0,538	0,535	0,535
Europe and Central Asia	Türkiye	0,839	0,842	0,833	0,838
East Asia and Pacific	China	0,755	0,762	0,764	0,768
Latin America and the Caribbean	Cuba	0,783	0,788	0,781	0,764
Europe and Central Asia	Bulgaria	0,809	0,810	0,802	0,795
Sub-Saharan Africa	Burundi	0,428	0,431	0,426	0,426
Sub-Saharan Africa	South Africa	0,726	0,736	0,727	0,713
Europe and Central Asia	Russian Federation	0,841	0,845	0,830	0,822
Latin America and the Caribbean	Brazil	0,764	0,766	0,758	0,754
Middle East and North Africa	Saudi Arabia	0,865	0,873	0,870	0,875
Sub-Saharan Africa	Somalia	0,356	0,361	0,361	0,361
Sub-Saharan Africa	Guinea-Bissau	0,482	0,490	0,483	0,483
Middle East and North Africa	United Arab Emirates	0,909	0,920	0,912	0,911
East Asia and Pacific	Japan	0,923	0,924	0,923	0,925
Europe and Central Asia	Portugal	0,860	0,867	0,863	0,866
North America	United States	0,927	0,930	0,920	0,921
Europe and Central Asia	France	0,901	0,905	0,898	0,903

Source: The Global Data Lab, 2023

Table 1.2 shows the socioeconomic development level of the countries in question according to the human development index. Most countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region have a human development index far from 1. According to classification criteria based on the human development index that provides information on the socioeconomic development level of a given country, a certain country is considered far from development to the extent that its HDI value approaches zero and, otherwise, it is considered developed insofar as its HDI value approaches 1. Taking into account this classification criterion, it can be said that the countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region are less developed or developing countries. Not only do a lot of these countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region have a human development index close to zero, but their economies are also in the group of low-income and lower-middle-income economies.

General Characteristics of Developing Countries

There are structural characteristics that easily identify a developing country within an economic, social and technological context that classifies a country economically and socially at the international level. Developing countries, for the most part, have low economic, social and industrial development. A developing country is each and every country, having bad economic and social indicators, aims, through administrative efforts, to improve them with a view to achieving national development. In order to determine and better understand the classification of developing countries due to the characteristically economic and social differences existing among them, the countries in question are classified into three groups, being low-stage developing countries, lower-middle-stage developing countries and upper-middle-stage developing countries. In order to differentiate them from each other, the per capita income level and the human development index of each developing country is taken as a criterion for differentiation. Low-stage developing countries are countries that are at a low-stage of the development process, having a low-income economy with a per capita income of US$1.085 or less and a human development index less than 50%. Lower-middle-stage developing countries are countries that are at a lower-middle-stage of the development process, having a lower-middle-income economy with a per capita income between US$1.086 and US$4.255 and a human development index equal to or greater than 50%. Upper-middle-stage developing countries, in turn, are countries that are at an upper-middle-stage of the development process, having an upper-middle-income economy with a per capita income between US$4.256 and US$13.205 and a human development index greater than the human development index of lower-middle-stage developing countries.

The general characteristics of developing countries refer mainly to economic, social and technological aspects. According to Berber (2006, pp.246-258), the economic aspects manifest themselves in the way of low income, inequality in income distribution, relative weight of the agricultural sector among sectors, low productivity or hidden unemployment, insufficient savings and investments, low capital accumulation and absolute poverty.

Developing countries are characteristically identified with low-income and lower-middle-income economies. These countries, for the most part, have low-income and lower-middle-income economies with per capita incomes of up to US$4.255. There is a high imbalance in the distribution of national income in developing countries. Looking at the GINI index, which is a statistic index used to measure the fair distribution of national income, it can be seen that most developing countries have a high GINI index. Taking into account the 2018 and 2020 statistics, for example, the GINI index of developing countries such as Türkiye, Mexico and Angola is respectively 0.40, 0.46 and 0.513, and the GINI index of developed countries such as Iceland, Austria and Sweden is respectively 0.26, 0.28 and 0.28. There is absolute poverty in most developing countries. Poverty is a multidimensional concept and it is generally handled with two dimensions as absolute poverty and relative poverty. While absolute poverty is expressed as the inability of people to meet even their most basic needs, relative poverty expresses the poverty of the individual according to the standards of the society in which he/she lives. In order to understand the level of poverty in each society, from 2010 onwards, the United Nations Development Program began using the Multidimensional Poverty Index, as a complementary alternative to monetary measures for measuring poverty. The Multidimensional Poverty Index is calculated including factors such as food, health, education, access to clean water, transport, housing, electricity, etc. This index ranges from 0 (absence of poverty) to 1 (extreme poverty). According to the 2019 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index, 1,2 billion people in 111 developing countries live in multidimensional poverty. According to the 2022 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index, the majority of people in multidimensional poverty, 83%, live in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions. Another important economic characteristic of developing countries is the low level of capital accumulation. In these countries, instruments such as foreign investments and foreign loans are used due to insufficient national savings. There is also in developing countries the issue of low productivity and clustering in the agricultural sector. As a result of insufficient capital accumulation, the inability to realize investments at a sufficient level leads to unemployment as a structural problem in countries in question and inefficiency, especially with the clustering of employment in the agricultural sector. The population sees agriculture as the main source of survival. In these countries, traditional agriculture predominates, the production, for the most part, is intended for self-consumption, in a subsistence economy regime.

As for the social aspects, developing countries have a young population composition resulting from high fertility and relatively low life expectancy. As a natural consequence of this, there is rapid population growth in these countries. Human Development Index, being the main indicator of a country's social development, compares the development of countries based on criteria such as education, life expectancy and income indicators. This index has a reference that varies from 0 to 1. The closer the index is to 1, the better the living conditions, education and income in the country. Otherwise, the closer the index is to 0, the worse the quality of life in the country. However, most developing countries have a low HDI, being closer to 0 and, thus, becoming countries with social fragility. Life expectancy in these countries is low. The population growth rate is high, as are the birth and death rates. Normally, these countries have difficulties in serving the population that lacks public policies directed to health, education and culture. Another important social aspect is that there is a brain drain from these countries with low quality education to developed countries.

As for the technological aspects, in addition to low productivity, technical production and technical personnel are insufficient in developing countries. The insufficiency of communication tools and the relatively primitiveness of existing technologies are among the technological characteristics of these countries. Another technology-related issue is the dependence of these countries on technologically advanced countries. This dependency imposes additional costs on countries due to issues such as licenses, patents, etc., and also creates an obstacle to a sustainable economy.

Alternatives for Accumulating Capital in Developing Countries

It is known that one of the biggest problems experienced in developing countries is the lack of capital accumulation and financial resources to solve their social, economic and financial needs. This situation hinders the process of economic growth and development in these countries. In order to find a solution to these problems, there is a need to constantly invest foreign capital in these countries. Foreign capital investment plays an extremely important role in the economic growth and development of developing countries. The investments in question are seen as an important tool to achieve sustainable development goals around the world. As stated by the OECD (2002, p.3), foreign capital investment is an integral part of an open and effective international economic system and is the greatest catalyst for development.

Foreign capital investment is the realization of investment projects through the use of capital held by foreign exchange non-residents, this capital, in addition to monetary means, also taking the form of technology and knowledge or equipment goods and others. In other words, foreign capital investment is the transfer of investable resources to another country by foreign persons and organizations. The concept of foreign capital investment is related to the concept of capital movements, which are foreign currency flows between countries, representing both short-term and long-term investments in physical assets, financial securities and lending. In a broad definition, international capital movements are the resources of finance, technology, information and services that a country can provide to those from outside sources and add to its economic strength and subsequently to national assets to pay for them. According to Eğilmez (2021, p.285), capital flows outside national borders are called international capital movements. Capital movements can be in the form of direct investments as well as indirect investments in the form of lending or portfolio investment (investment in stocks).

Foreign capital coming to a country can be short-term or long-term. Foreign capital remaining in a country for less than one year is called short-term, and foreign capital remaining for more than one year is called long-term. Short-term capital movements are generally debts arising during the balancing of the balance sheet or hot money movements seeking a safe environment and do not enter into capital movements that will enable the development of a country as is this understood. Long-term foreign capital that will enable development can enter the developing country in different ways: (1) individuals in other countries lend to individuals in the developing country (private loans or portfolio investments), (2) individuals in other countries make foreign direct investments in the developing country (direct venture investments), (3) individuals, governments or international organizations in other countries make loans to the government of the developing country, and (4) individuals, governments, or international organizations in other countries may donate to the government (or individuals) of the developing country, and may provide gratuitous aid. While the factors that cause capital movements in points (1) and (2) are economic, the reasons that determine points (3) and (4) are generally political – military – human factors. This work, in order to accumulate sufficient capital in developing countries, mainly refers to the ways of carrying out investments aforementioned in points (1) and (2). In carrying out these investments effectively, capital in the general economy or in some sectors of the economy in a country whose capital is relatively scarce becomes abundant and can become more adequate than before.

External financing is an efficient option to solve the issue of insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries, which arises both as a cause and as a result of it. External financing sources for developing countries can be classified as traditional and alternative external financing. Traditional external financing sources include international multilateral financial institution financing, interstate financing and international commercial bank loans, while alternative external financing includes foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investments and all other privately sourced financing. According to Aydın (1997, pp.6-7), foreign direct investment is defined as the establishment of a production facility in foreign countries alone or with partners, or the acquisition of existing facilities or the merger with existing facilities, by spreading its production outside the borders of the country where its head office is located. Foreign portfolio investments are investments made in capital market instruments such as foreign stocks and bonds and foreign currency market instruments. For Eğilmez (2021, pp.283-284), portfolio investments in the balance of payments include stocks and debt securities in the form of bills and bonds issued by public or private institutions and other money market instruments. In traditional external financing sources, the international official capital flows stand out, which, according to Bayrak and Polat (2020, pp.112-118), mainly consist of loans, although they consist of loans and grants. Grants are aid in the form of donations. The payment terms of official loans are more favourable than international trade loans, and they are a type of loan with longer repayment periods and generally a grace period. International official capital flows can be based on a political reason as well as an economic one. Sometimes such capital flows take place for purely humanitarian reasons.

The reason why it is important to make foreign capital investments in developing countries is related to the benefits that these investments can bring to these countries. While foreign direct investments directly affect the macroeconomic indicators such as production, balance of payments, employment, economic growth, etc. in the host country; portfolio investments affect the foreign exchange market, stock markets, and both meet the financing needs and affect the determination of interest rates and exchange rates in the country. Official capital flows, on the other hand, affect the host country's financial market, as they are predominantly comprised of loans, along with credits and grants. The benefits of foreign capital investments in host countries are real. However, these benefits do not accumulate automatically and evenly across countries, regions, sectors and local communities. In order for the host country to attract foreign capital investment and fully acquire its benefits, local governments have to create a favourable, healthy and supportive climate/environment for foreign capital investment. Also, the aim of local governments is not only to attract foreign capital investment to their countries, but also to work to retain the foreign capital investment they can attract.

Conclusion

This research generally aimed to analyse the issue of insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries. In order to develop the research and reach its objective, firstly, an analysis on the reason why there is insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries was made and, posteriorly, an efficient alternative to accumulate sufficient capital for economic development in these countries was presented. An analysis was also made of the social and economic situation of the countries taking into account their per capita income and human development index in order to classify economically and socially them at an international level. In order to understand the research topic, a general literature review was carried out on the concepts and theories that describe capital accumulation in general and particularly in the context of economic growth and development of countries. In order to collect data, data acquisition methods were used, based up on the secondary data acquisition technique, which consists of acquiring data from publications by public and/or private institutions. Therefore, the data used were obtained from the electronic databases of the World Bank Group and other private institutions.

It is concluded that the main reason why there is insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries is related to the fact that there is insufficient savings in these countries. There is insufficient savings because the economies of these countries are mostly low and lower-middle incomes. There are low and lower-middle incomes because there is insufficient capital accumulation that can increase the level of productivity, improving the level of employment and, consequently, income. Thus, the issue of insufficient capital accumulation in developing countries arises both as a cause and as a result of it. In order to accumulate sufficient capital in developing countries, an efficient option is to obtain alternative external financing by consistently making foreign capital investments in these countries. Foreign capital investments help host countries in the sustainable growth and development of their economies by increasing their social and economic welfare and providing the highest benefits in financing resources. In addition, these investments provide various benefits to the economic growth and development of a host country, such as capital accumulation, employment, new technology, new management techniques, business knowledge, integration with international markets, new access channels to world markets and the creation of a domestic competitive environment. However, the benefits of foreign capital investments do not accumulate automatically in host countries. In order for the host country to attract foreign capital investment and fully acquire its benefits, local governments have to create a favourable, healthy and supportive climate/environment for foreign capital investment. Also, the aim of local governments is not only to attract foreign capital investment to their countries, but also to work to retain the foreign capital investment they can attract. Foreign capital investment, being an efficient alternative to solve the issue related to the capital insufficiency in developing countries, is an important tool for carrying out economic growth and development goals around the world.

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Community Radio and the Audience in Uganda: A Survey on the Community Radio Performance of Community Service

Uganda'da Topluluk Radyosu ve İzleyici: Topluluk Hizmetinin Topluluk Radyosu Performansı Üzerine Bir Araştırma

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This article has been reviewed by at least two referees and scanned via a plagiarism software.

Abstract: Most of Community radio (CR) stations in Uganda are run, managed, controlled and owned by the communities for easy service delivery to the population living in those communities. Meanwhile, few radio stations are owned and controlled by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private individuals and government to monitor service delivery of these institutions to their receivers. Other radio stations under different institutions are profit making channels. Despite owners' restrictions and government censorships, CR stations give chance to communities to have "total control" over their stations by allowing people to participate in community decision making through airing their voices and views. CR stations educate masses, sensitize them on health matters, involve in crime prevention, and fight domestic violence. They also play culture and religious empowerment role and serve the interests, needs and aspirations of the communities. In different parts of Uganda, CR stations broadcast in the minimum of two languages including local and international languages to reach their targeted audiences. The understandable languages used plus public's voluntary participation in programming helps to improve performances of CR radios and to strengthen the relationship between stations' management and the audiences. This paper talked about simple back ground of radio development in Africa and Uganda in particular to have a hint on the roots of CR in Uganda. Meanwhile, it is indicated that 60 percent of CR stations target audiences only at regional level, 20 percent reach at national level, 20 percent community level and no station reached international level by the time this survey was conducted. Despite challenges, CR stations managed to be in good relationships with the masses although some stations divert from their major goal of serving communities to commercial broadcasting.

Keywords: Community Radio, Communities, Broadcasting, Audience, Uganda

Öz: Uganda'daki Topluluk radyo (CR) istasyonlarının çoğu, bu topluluklarda yaşayan nüfusa kolay hizmet sunumu için topluluklar tarafından işletilir, yönetilir, kontrol edilir ve sahiplenilir. Bu arada, az sayıda radyo istasyonu, bu kurumların alıcılarına hizmet sunumunu izlemek için sivil toplum kuruluşları (STK'lar), özel kişiler ve devlet tarafından sahip olunan ve kontrol edilen kuruluşlardır. Farklı kurumlara bağlı diğer radyo istasyonları kar amacı güden kanallardır. Sahiplerin kısıtlamalarına ve hükümet sansürlerine rağmen, CR istasyonları, insanların seslerini ve görüşlerini yayınlayarak topluluk karar alma sürecine katılmalarına izin vererek, topluluklara istasyonları üzerinde "tam kontrole" sahip olma şansı veriyor. CR istasyonları kitleleri eğitiyor, onları sağlık konularında duyarlı hale getiriyor, suçun önlenmesine dahil oluyor ve aile içi şiddetle mücadele ediyor. Ayrıca kültürel ve dini güçlendirme rolü oynarlar ve toplulukların çıkarlarına, ihtiyaçlarına ve özlemlerine hizmet ederler. Uganda'nın farklı bölgelerinde CR istasyonları, hedef kitlelerine ulaşmak için yerel ve uluslararası diller olmak üzere en az iki dilde yayın yapmaktadır. Kullanılan anlaşılır diller ve halkın programlamaya gönüllü katılımı, CR radyolarının performansını artırmaya ve istasyon yönetimi ile izleyiciler arasındaki ilişkiyi güçlendirmeye yardımcı olur. Bu makale, CR'nin Uganda'daki kökleri hakkında bir ipucuna sahip olmak için özellikle Afrika ve Uganda'daki radyo gelişiminin basit arka planından bahsetmektedir. Bu arada, anketin yapıldığı tarihte CR istasyonlarının yüzde 60'ının yalnızca bölgesel düzeyde, yüzde 20'sinin ulusal düzeyde, yüzde 20'sinin topluluk düzeyinde hedef kitleye ulaştığı ve hiçbir istasyonun uluslararası düzeye ulaşmadığı belirtilmiştir. Zorluklara rağmen, CR istasyonları kitlelerle iyi ilişkiler içinde olmayı başarmış, ancak bazı istasyonlar topluluklara hizmet etme ana hedeflerinden ticari yayıncılığa yönelmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Topluluk Radyosu, Topluluklar, Yayın, Seyirci, Uganda

Introduction

After liberalization of the economy in Uganda, government owned and private radio stations were set up in different regions of the country mainly to serve government political interests and for commercial purposes (*Daily Monitor* newspaper, 27, April, 2014). Despite of being made a political tool and turning radio into a profit making channel, the International labour organization report of 2005 on Radio for small enterprise in Uganda indicated that radio was still the dominant channel of communication in Uganda and Africa because of its informal accessibility. However, the report added that by late 1990s, people in Uganda could hardly listen to the radio due to poor signals which hindered radio massages to penetrate some geographical locations to reach to the audience. This resulted into low space coverage and some regions were not covered since majority of the stations were central based.

Additionally, unpopular languages like English and Kiswahir were mainly used and many people especially illiterates could not understand the message as a result of language barrier. These factors therefore, forced people and some communities to establish their own community radio stations to extend community services to the masses in the manner of benefiting the community as per their religions, local languages, cultural and tribes, community economic policies and behaviors. But some of these radio stations have frequently left out people's views on community developmental matters because some stations were turned into profit making sectors than serving their community interests (Tocchi, 2003).

However, Solervicens and Plaugher, (2007) found that community radio stations play a significant role in promoting peoples' decision making on various issues, opinion sharing of the masses in the society, diversifying knowledge, solving community problems and empowering development despite government control. They added many of these community-based radio are informal, providing open air broadcasts while few are registered and are provided with a broad frequency closed at a particular geographical area which limit their broadcasting services to a given particular linguistic, community or ethnicity.

Meanwhile, this paper has uncovered facts about community radio services, base decisions on objective information and has opened up discussion and background for future researchers on the topic. This paper has also analysed the performance, effects and the relationship between the audience and the Community radio stations in the environments where community radio abandoned their commonly known role of serving the community as they were turned into profit maximization by focusing more on advertisement than broadcasting views of the people and development information.

The History of Radio in Africa

Although there is advancement in technology, internet and other advanced communication channels in Africa, Myers, (2008) said that radio remained the most popular and dominant mass-medium of communication on the continent because of its widest coverage, understandable local languages and being the cheapest to access radio set compared to other media like Television, newspapers, online communication channels and other technological means of communication. Historically, the first radio broadcasts in Sub-Saharan Africa were made in the early 1920s and the earliest recording of a radio broadcast was made in 1923 in South Africa, (BBC world services, the story of Africa).

In the research on Radio development in Africa, Myers, (2008), explained that by 1927 Kenya had got its own radio station, Mozambique got its radio station in 1933, as the second country on the continent and Senegal got its first radio station in 1939. She added that radio started to plant serious roots of development on the continent during the Second World War because People were much interested to know about their relatives in battle fields who took part in the war and it was during this time that African languages and dialects were heard for the first time from the metallic radio set system. After the war, radio continued to expand in many African countries and it was used mainly by the governments to spread political propaganda and radio was state owned. Private radio stations started to appear on the continent during privatisation, democratisation and marketisation period (Myers, 2008).

Democratisation and marketisation of the African economies made it easy for the set up and operation of radio as a development tool from the grass roots of community radio, state owned radio, private commercial radio and currently the internet and international radio stations. Technology made radio more affordable to reach large audience and by 2016, people in rural Africa could access radio despite of the geographical boundaries. Although Telephones and the internet technology geared up and helped in the access of radio in the urban areas, radio sets were still commonly used deep in rural areas in both Uganda and Africa.

However, because of the improvement in the quality of the content and the use of local languages, community Radio and Private Stations have over powered government owned radio stations in some African countries with bigger listeners although radio content programing was still poor due to limited resources and funds. In 2016, people in some African countries depended much on live programs, live news and live talk shows where audience was given chances to call in and share their views. The arranged programs like drama and staged talk shows are mainly produced by separate production experts and sale them to the radio station operators.

In addition, by 2016, it was still common in Africa to find unprofessional radio journalists and presenters in the field of broadcasting. In Uganda as an example, radio workers have joined and still joining broadcast industry from music, drama and comedy industries and others from politics. This might be because these people are already popular to the public and could use their prominence to attract bigger radio audience which fascinates advertisers and results into the growth and development of broadcasting industry in long run. Using unprofessional media personnel might be happening due to weak rules and inactive penalties against violating rules governing broadcast industry.

Radio journalists and workers in Africa in particular are poorly trained, if trained at all. And there is a high turnover and brain-drain out of the profession. Faced with this scenario, the need for investment in training is continuous and vital. Meanwhile, according to Myers, (2008), African governments still violated media freedom especially when it reaches to political issues. Despite some positive examples, (e.g. South Africa), there is a clear need for more independent and more professional regulatory bodies and better legislations that favor freedom of information, diversity, pluralism and the protection of broadcasters. Community radio has special needs when it comes to legislation and regulation (Myers 2008). However, today radio stations in Africa could reach their audiences worldwide as a result of technological advancement through internet.

The History of Radio in Uganda

Story telling around the fire and other well thought-out learning places especially in the villages are well remembered as the first common traditional means of communication in Uganda. Mobilising, entertaining, educating, informing and uniting stories were told especially by the elders to the learners mostly young ones to communicate messages. People frequently communicated and transferred information by traditional means mainly before early 1990s when Ugandans jubilated to hear the first voice from the metallic machine -the first Radio.

Daily monitor newspaper of 27th April, 2014, explained that in Uganda radio stations were controlled, owned and dominated by the state until privatisation of the economy in early 1990s when the first independent radio stations licensed to operate. Green Channel Radio, airing on the frequency of 98FM was the first FM radio station in Uganda. But Green channel radio station was not popular because people were not used to communication technology not until 1993 when Sanyu FM Radio existed and dominated in the country. This was due to the increased literate masses, democratisation and economic growth among others. Sanyu FM and Capital FM are among the first and oldest radio stations in Uganda. On December 18, 1993, Radio Sanyu, went on air. Two weeks later, on December, 31, Capital Radio went on air and came out more prominently playing more music than adverts and routine announcements which was typical of Radio Uganda, (Daily Monitor, 2014).

After years of gradual media industry development, in 2016 Uganda had more than 200 radio stations. These included state owned radio stations, State-controlled public radio; privately owned commercial radio; community-controlled radio and internet-based radio stations. Some popular stations included Kaboozi FM, Islamic University in Uganda (IUIU FM), Bukedde FM, Radio Simba FM, Super FM, CBS FM and Dembe FM among others mainly broadcast on FM and few on AM. In Uganda, radio is still embracing new kind of media and integrating with other communication channels. For instance, Radio stations in Uganda integrate mobile technology in their programming to increase on audience engagement. Meanwhile, a report conducted by unwanted witness Uganda in 2014 on how community is a community radio found out that radio journalists in Uganda have little job security, poorly organized and poorly paid which consequently force them to involve in corruption and generally lower the Standard of their professionalism.

Listeners could call in and contributed their opinions about what has been aired and talked about on the radio. By 2016, people in Uganda would listen to various radio stations including community based channels on their radio sets and others could access some radio stations on their cell phones by the help of the internet.

Literature Review

Community radio is a nonprofit channel of communication managed and controlled by the community usually through a foundation, trust or association but count on and must rely on the resources of a group of people who share common characteristics and interests (Banjade, 2006).

Basing on the criteria above, a number of radio stations in Uganda, tend to describe themselves as community radios, but lacked community radio criteria. Less than ten radio stations have the character of a real community radio station (The unwanted witness Uganda, 2014). Because of technological advancement, availability of resources and willingness of the community members to own radio stations as a uniting factor for development, starting a radio station was not a very big task. Meanwhile, the usefulness and the impact of any community radio production depends on its relevance to the audience (Banjade, 2006).

According to Fraser and Restrepo, (2001), any community can start its own community radio in order to preserve and protect the cultures, languages and histories of the community as well as emphasising and empowering community developments. However, they added that a radio should not normally be seen as a priority in the community to solve problems but people should know and understand the backgrounds and causes of their problems to prevent them before waiting for the radio to solve the already existed problems. This means radio should merely help people to reach common understanding and common conclusions reason for community radio.

Community Radio and Audience Relationship

Becouse they are community based stations, Community radios are likely to have masses in the communities of their locations as their first targeted audience-listners. This makes the radio and the audience to interrelate for survival. Comunity radios are expexted to directly depend on the audience for their survival since they dont focus much on making adverts for profits. On the other hand, the audience also depend on the community based radio stations for their problem solving and development because it is through these stations that people share their views and ideas for the betterment of the communities. However, while writing about community radio in Jharkhan, Pavarala, (2003) indicates that the relationship between the two may not be linked on how they interact to each other but to see that each play its role for the other to stay successful.

According to unwanted witness Uganda's report in 2014, Community radios should primarily aim at delivering services to the masses of the communities where they operate from to help in providing social gains to the public rather than primarily looking at commercial benefits for financial or other material gains. The report added that Community radio stations should serve members of the community by allowing them to participate in the management of the services within the community which can be achieved when communities are allowed to own and be accountable for the stations.

However, when Community radio is owned by the small minority group it may not help the community because it may be hard for the radio to achieve the desires of the people, and in this situation, people may hate Community based radio stations which might terminate the good relationship between radio management and the community (Naughton, 1996). This may not only create a gap between radio and the masses but might also cause disunity, under development and inequalities in the community.

Community Radio and Censorship

Community radio is often taken to be an agent, instrument or a channel of social change that carries the responsibility of facilitating development among communities through democratic processes of communication. According to the community radio hand book of 2001 by Fraser and Estrada, community radio stations should remain free from government or any other censorship to allow them to fulfill their goals of serving the communities without interrupted. And censoring community radio limits free participation of masses in community policy making.

However, some scholars have refuted the ideology of leaving Community radio stations under community control and ownerships. Thomas. B. H, (2011) supported restricting community radio because it is the only way through which community radio stations would consider the effects of the content before they produce it to the audience which lead to better service delivery. He also added that government control of the radio stations in various communities helps to sustain productivity of the station.

In the study of 2003 titled the Promise of citizens' Media Lessons from community radio in Australia and South Africa, Jo Tocchi said the reduced number of community radios is mainly cause by media censorship. This is because the cheapest radio stations are rare in most of the countries as a result of regal restrictions attached on them mostly by the state that hinders their operations and limits freedom of speech for the people in the community.

According to Pavarala (2003), controlling radio stations by political institutions and economic powers in the societies by putting up rules, regulations, laws and norms to govern what should be aired and what should not make community radios underperforming stations. This negatively affects radios not to concentrate on serving the community desires but to fulfill the needs and desires of the controlling bodies with the desires that are probably out of the needs of the audience. Additionally, Myers (2008) suggested that media which serves the interests of the regulatory groups can create imbalances between the elites or the media regulators and the majority listeners that creates disunity among the masses by allowing the regulators to decide for the voiceless in the community. This distances people from participating in making decisions that benefit them where regulators take the role of community institutions including radio that aim to regulate the meanings of cultural facts.

These factors are argued to exert negative influences as government owned institutions can potentially constrain and regulate the content of community radio stations in which regulators try to start up the war of hegemony, ways to control decision making and profit making against the listeners (Zyl, 2003). In the study conducted on community radio social impact assessment, (Solervicens and Plaugher, (2007) found out that the dominance of mainstream players in media governance complicated by sustainability concerns of grassroots enterprises, result in legislation that impedes the potentiality of community media access and participation.

Meanwhile, in the study on the role of community radio in empowering women in India, Nirmala, (2015) indicated that community radio control and ownership are important in terms of principles of audience participation, access and ownership of the radios. She said even some people in the community may not be perfect without rules governing what they should air out to the listeners and they deserve to be controlled. However, this cannot be considered fundamental as the socio-political, economic, governmental and regulatory contents of a community radio station can dictate different approaches of community ownership and control. According to Masani (1976), community radio cannot operate in a position as an alternative form of media but must be recognised as a key factor in economic and political settings of the community and the national environment in which they are regulated.

Community Radio, Content Production and Programming

Community radio practitioners are usually influenced by ideologies and the culture of the establishments that they work for, thus suggesting the influence of regulatory, economic and political factors in the process of production (Tocchi, 2003). This shows that life aspects of the community nurture the performance of community radio and the nature of content that should be produced for the masses. Therefore, content production should be in line with beliefs, norms and cultures of the community. This is because in a research conducted on community radio as people's voice, John Van Zyl, (2003) indicated that community radio was good in promoting cultures and disseminating knowledge on community issues which helped to develop communities in various aspects and to create awareness of development issues through different programs like informational, economic, and cultural programs.

Additionally, entertainment programs should be produced and packaged carefully in order to essentially benefit masses in communities because entertainment is part of radio program through which people can relax their minds and act as leisure **to many**. Some entertainment content like music is used in background during other programs and sometimes it is a program of its own. However, since television requires full concentration and attention of viewers, it is a more effective substitute for radio during leisure hours than during working hours. Paolo, (2003) indicated that leisure programs are good for late hours like evening not during the day. Secondly, the content of the network radio program made it more vulnerable to television competition than the typical non-network program.

On community radio empowerment, Nirmala, (2015) said radio programming needs to be set free from restrictions, laws, and regulations in order to be important to the people and to allow listeners to give their views on content programing, packaging and designing as on how the program should be. This referred to as a participatory media approach of development communication which gives powers to the community to directly express their freedom of speech. And the direct inclusion of people in decision making for their communities help to solve community problems from the grassroots. Nirmala added the concept of grass root interactivity with local based forms of media as operational tools of interaction makes it possible for the acquisition of both indigenous and modern knowledge and skills that are based on local resources and provide solutions to local issues.

Locally produced programs grounded on local aspects are likely to be more effective for the masses than imposed ones from other localities and helps localizing production through community feedback which enables communities to actively participate in the production of content and programs. It is argued that this promotes professionalism by making collective community contribution towards content production where both receivers and program producers participate equally in serving the community through media (Masani, 1976).

However, research made on South African community radio in 2003 by John Van Zyl indicated that the challenge community-based radio stations face is the production of high-impact educational dramas because of the large amounts of funding and human resources needed to produce these programs. Zyl added it is also expensive to produce radio documentaries and dramas which require professionalism, technical expertise and financial support and structured frameworks of theory and methodology. As a result, the expensiveness of content production is a common practice influences production houses or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to produce these theoretically informed and strategically based educational programs, dramas and features and then distribute them to community radio stations around South Africa in Compact Disk (CD) formats (Zyl, 2003).

According to their explanations, the producers at community radio stations aspire to incorporate the feedback of listeners in the content of the subsequent programs through the recording of personal experiences and stories. Hart (2011) witnessed producers of these programs going into their communities with a microphone and tape recorder to interview members of the communities about certain issues of interest.

By 2016, most companies and organizations in the world were defined by the processes of capital. Media economies are similarly driven by the logic of capitalism or profits which focus on ownership of media production and the power that ownership and control can exercise over both the ability of individuals and groups to produce information that would like others to see, hear, receive or consume that could be relevant to their social, economic and political backgrounds (Naughton, 1996). Although media practitioners are the primary cultural intermediaries that produce representations for diverse audiences, their process of production tend to be consistent with the organizational values, logistics, ideologies and structures of organizations.

According to (Nirmala, 2015), community media channels should disseminate important information with meanings to help their listeners in the community to get solutions to different problems and to shape their identities because they listen to different information which can be discussed about through which communities are transformed.

Ownership and the Role of Community Radio

In order for community participation to be sustainable, there needs to be a presence of self-management and ownership by the community in the running of a community stations because the influence of governments, sponsors and NGOs over community radio can impede the development of the community itself by blocking members from the freedom of expressing their ideas and views and serving their needs as a community decision maker (Myers, 2008). Community radio station controlled and owned by external commercial or state enterprise may be limited in its impact in creating community-based development because the control of representation and knowledge is in the hands of professionals and not the communities themselves (Solervicens and Plaugher, 2007).

Therefore, the ownership and responsibility of a station's facilities and equipment need to be held by a board of directors or trustees consisting of community representatives such as local and traditional leaders, cultural and social organizations, and individual participants as well as local sponsors, technicians, and NGOs in the area (Fraser and Estrada, 2001). And if community radio stations management is to allow free participation of masses in production, made for the purpose of developing, empowering and entertaining community audience and not for profit making, ownership can be in the hands of any non-profit entity.

According to Solervicens and Plaugher, (2007), most community radio stations were owned either by churches, NGOs, Municipalities, cooperatives and associations or coalitions specifically formed to establish a radio station. Although these stations were owned by external entities outside of the communities, these stations effectively promoted democratic, participatory and community-based development within their communities and were sustainable. In addition to community ownership, Solervicens and Plaugher also argues that participation in community radio should not be seen as a fixed index but on a range from total ownership to different degrees of audience involvement in programming and management.

Common language should be used, according to Stuart, (1963) in *whatever happened to radio?* Locally understandable common languages viewed as verbal, textual, visual and mental systems that represented specific views of the world and can be used to communicate specific meanings and subjects of knowledge with other people in order for representations to convey meaning so that people understand them. It is argued that people need to communicate on levels of common language and shared codes so that they can draw the meanings and interpret the words and world views in similar ways. This means that communities should have powers over their radio stations to influence the use of local languages to communicate understandable information.

Fraser and Estrada, (2001) showed that the purpose of a board of trustees is to legitimize the establishment of a radio station with a formal structure of ownership and management that acts as a platform for democratic decision-making and responsibility in setting the overall purposes, objectives, policies and constitution of the radio station as well as its financial planning and operations. They however, added that although the board of trustees has the responsibility of setting overall policies, objectives and mission of a community radio station, the day-to-day operations and decisions of a community station should be the responsibility of the station manager and program manager, who should be part of the community which the station caters for.

Significantly, Community radio is a relatively new movement born out of expressed needs for 'equality for the voiceless' and is an arena where power imbalances, development and problem solving issues can be addressed (Naughton, 1996). Another role of community radio is the rejection of commercialization for non-profitable means of operation that is democratic, participatory, and local.

Zyl, (2003) describes a community radio station as a nonprofit organization that is either registered under the ownership of a community or under the ownership of a civic organization that is nonprofit -making. This means unlike commercial broadcasters, community stations are channels of communication for communities and exist without shareholders or objectives of profit-making. Masani (1976) also argues that community radio stations should have financial independence from external forces outside of its community. Therefore, this means financial control of a community radio station should rest upon a board of directors or trustees who represent the community.

In addition, Stuart (1963) said financial dependency on external organizations might establish imposing agendas seeking to entrench the objectives of their mandates instead of the interests and needs of targeted communities and if community radio stations cannot criticise the government in their reporting because they are dependent on funds from it, this will restrict the station in playing the role of society 's watchdogs. And Community radios as nonprofit stations are financially run by members of the communities but some stations owned and controlled by big corporations have to preserve and protect the cultures, languages and histories of the communities as well as acting as a facilitating and promoter of development (Hart, 2011).

Methodology

During this study, responses were gathered in a standardized way. Therefore, to provide through questions and initial information on the number of areas of particular interests, the researcher used questionnaires for data collection. Questionnaires are a useful option to consider when conducting a postal survey because they are more objective, certainly more so than personal interviewing and quicker if the sample is large and widely dispersed (Mathers *et el,* 2009). The questionnaire was later drafted in English language and a large scale study was conducted. Questionnaires were supplied to various community radio stations national wide, and from this method therefore, a set of obtained results described the nature of community radio-audience situation, as it existed at the time of the study (March-May 2016) and to explore the causes of the particular phenomena.

However, according to the response of the survey, only 8 radio stations from Eastern, Western, Northern and central regions of Uganda each represented by 10 respondents were based on. The data obtained through the survey generated a database that was analyzed with the statistical packages. After reviewing and refining the data matrix, the classic resources of descriptive statistics were used, such as summary statistics, frequency tables and graphics. Data collected was analyzed using Excel program and the results are reported in the consequent subsections.

Data Presentation and Analysis

4.1 Gender & Capacity/Department of the Participants

The study showed that 60% of the respondents were male whereas female respondents were represented by 40% respectively. Furthermore, as reflected in table 1 below, the study showed that the majority of the participants were from the news department who composed of 40%. Followed by those at managerial level totaling to 30% then production and programming workers were represented by 20% and the least participant were from marketing department with a representation of 10% only.

Table 1. Showing the Gender & Capacity/Department of the Participants

VARIABLES	ITEM	Percentage (%)
Gender	Male	60
	Female	40
Capacity/ Department	Managerial Position	30
	News/Editorial	40
	Marketing	10
	Production & Programming	20

4.2 Participating Radio stations

As revealed in graph 1, below the 8 radio stations from different regions participated in this study. 93.1 IUIU FM had the biggest representation of 20% whereas other radio stations namely 101.7 Mama FM, 89 Smart FM, 101.4 Elgon FM, Masaba Radio 89.1 FM, Voice of Africa Radio, 92.30 FM, Voice of the Nile, 106.1 FM, Radio West 91.0 FM, Pearl of Africa, 107.9 FM, all had an equal representation of 10% respectively.



Graph 1, showing the Participating Radio stations

The study showed that the major financial source for these radio stations was from adverts which had a representation of 40%. Yet other stations got finances from local and international donors as reflected by 30% of the respondents. Similarly, 20% get finances from contributions made by the local communities and last 10% of the respondents affirmed that their stations are funded by the government. However, the findings shows multiplicity of the sources of financing upon which the surveyed radio station depend on.

Therefore, the 40% support from adverts is a big financial support which might indicate that these community radio stations are not completely independent yet they should have financial independence from outside of its community because advertisers are likely to have control in radio programing and content packaging which hinders the free participation of masses in production and descission making hence low development in communities (Masani, 1976). However, the study further disclosed that no influence on programming was emanating from advertisers, business and political forces.

4.3 Location, Coverage and Ownership of the Radio Stations

More so, as shown in the table 2, the study revealed that many of the participants in this study were from Eastern Uganda who composed of 50%, these were followed by radio workers from Central Uganda totaling to 30%. Remarkably, both Western and Northern Uganda had equal representation of 10% and non from the Southern region respectively.

Nevertheless, the study revealed that 60% as the majority of the radio stations regardless of the location, they covered a whole region like Eastern region or central region of the country. Meanwhile, those covered up to national level and also at local level had equal responses of 20% respectively. However, among the participating station stations none targeted international audiences via the internet. Outstandingly, the result shows that 80% of the radio stations broadcasts for 24 hours. This implies that they serve their community both day and night nonstop. Whereas a portion of 20% they broadcast on air an average of 20 hours and none was found to be broadcasting below 18 hours.

As far as ownership, control and management of these radio stations is concerned, the study revealed that an equal sum of 30% of these stations were both owned by the community and other forms of ownership which were not specified in the responses. Equally, 20% were owned, controlled and managed by nongovernmental organizations like religious foundations. Institutions like universities and government owned stations summed up to 10% respectively.

Therefore, since most of sampled radio stations were owned by communities, institutions and non-governmental organizations, the purpose of a board of trustees might have been acting as a platform for democratic decision-making and responsibility in setting the overall purposes, objectives, policies and constitution of the radio station as well as its financial planning and operations which comforts management and media control to serve the community without being interfered into with other decision making bodies (Fraser and Estrada, 2001).

Table 2. Showing Location, Coverage and Ownership of the Participating Radio

VARIABLES	ITEM	Percentage (%)
Region Where Radio Located	Eastern	50
	Western	10
Geographical Coverage	Central	30
	Northern	10
	Sourthern	0
	Local/Community	20
	Regional	60
	National	20
Average Broadcasting Hours	International Via Internet	0
	24 Hours	80
	20 Hours	20
	Below 18 Hours	0
Radio Ownership &	Community	30
Management	Institutional	10
	Non Governamental Organization	20
	Government	10
	Others	30

4.4 Radio's Targeted Audiences and Programming

According to table 3 below, the study showed that Ugandan FM radio stations serve people of all ages. As reflected in the responses that 70% of the respondents affirmed that their programs are geared towards people of all age groups ranging from the youths to the adults. However, the study also showed that 20% of the respondents confirmed that their radio stations target youth's audience aged between 16 and 35. Centrally, 10% of the respondents were found to be targeting audiences of 36 to 50 years. Nevertheless, no radio station targeted specifically neither children aged between 5 and 15 nor adults aged between 51 to 56 years of age. This finding however, shows fairness in programming and closeness of the radio stations to their target audiences as no audience is not catered for in their programming.

Outstandingly, the study further showed that 80% of the radio programs are packaged for the general community from different walks of life. Equally, 10% of the radio stations targeted religious community, women and the children as the two variable had equal responses. Yet no radio station was found to be targeting specifically farmers as a group despite their populace in the country.

In as far as radio programming is concerned; the study further exposed interesting findings that 70% of the radio's programming is influenced by the listener/ general community. This is however, is in support of the above findings that 80% of the radio programs are packaged for the general audience. Meanwhile, the radio station management influenced 20% of the radio programming likewise social and religious groups influenced 10% of the programming. The study further disclosed that no influence on programming was emanating from advertisers, business and political forces.

The study established that the majority with 50% of the respondents confirmed that their radio station broadcasts all programs including political, social, and economic, sports and religious programs. Meanwhile, 30% were found to be much focused on social and sports programs. In the same vein 20% were found to be focused on religious programs. However, no radio station was found to be only broadcasting economic and financial programs but it was just partial of other broader programs. This describes a community radio station as a nonprofit organization that is registered under the ownership of a community that is nonprofit making but purposely channels of communication for communities. (Zyl (2003)

4.4 Table 3. Showing the Target Audiences Radio and Programming

VARIABLES	ITEM	Percentage (%)
Target Audience Age Groups	Children aged between 5-15	0
	Youths aged between 16-35	20
	Adult aged between 36-50	10
	Adult aged between 51-65	0
	All the age group above	70
Main Targeted Audiences Speciality	Farmers	0
	Religious Community	10
	Women & Children	10
	General Community	80
Who Influences The Station's Programming	Station Management	20
	Advertisers	0
	Listeners/ General Community	70
	Political and Economic groups	0
	Social and Religious Groups	10
Types of the Programs Broadcasted	Political programs	0
	Social and sports programs	30
	Economic and financial programs	0
	Religious programs	20
	All the above	50

4.5 The Role of Radio in Community Service

As depicted in graph 2 below, the study found that 50% being the majority of the radio stations they contribute to community services by educating the masses on civic and social issues. In this category civic education included educating the masses on how to cast their votes, emphasizing their rights to choose candidates of their own. In the same vein, calling upon the masses to take their children for immunization and engaging themselves in poverty eradication campaigns put up by the government was also one of the benefits for these community radios. Additionally, the study showed that 20% of the radio stations played their paramount role through influencing the public to participate in community development programs like progress for all initiated by the government as well as solving community conflicts that may deter progress of the community. However, 10% perceived that radio contributes to community service through information services in the different news bulletins aired, entertainment and unmentioned factors were not considered.



As the major focus for this study of finding out the relationship between the radio and its audience in as far as community service is concerned, the researcher addressed this issue in an open ended question which yielded varied responses. In a bid to cement community service, the study showed that respondents used various mechanisms to convince listeners and attract them to like their stations and their services. For instance, the radio stations design programs that have a community outreach component. Collective vox pops, availing the free platform for women, using rights based approach of listening to all views were some of the mechanisms.

Additionally, radio stations focused much on community outreach programs through having regular giveaways, giving the news and solving particular problems of the community which give the audience confidence in the stations. Similarly, considering the listeners as the first priority, it brings them closer to station because they know it is part of them, like through promotional activities and festivals.

Notably, the study further revealed that these radio stations contributed to community services in recent times through initiating several clinics such in the fields of Law, Climate/Environment and Health. Additionally, radio also contributed to community services through community accountability, crime prevention, cases of defilement, domestic violence being reported and forwarded to concerned authorities, health rights promoted-hygiene and sanitation. Likewise, radio links the Policy makers to the community, it helped in sensitizing on health, education, agriculture, morals and climate changes social responsibility by supporting community and contributing to the well-being. Outstandingly, radio carried out various activities in the past like sensitizing people to donate blood and through this we have partnered with Uganda Red cross society as well as educating the masses and informing them pertinent issues concerning their daily lives.

In regard to community service, despite the fact that radio plays a role in community service, the study showed that government regulations affect the performance of these stations. But in order to foster community service, the radio management overcomes such a challenge through involving the community in planning and working with a few community members as fun clubs members. Equally, they engaged the community for some small support and we also got a few adverts which enables to sustain the Radio station. Use of community correspondents or local reporters as well as being neutral and objective as a station keeping focused on the stations mission and vision enabled them to advance in community services.

Conclusion

Consequently, upon the findings the researcher concluded that community radios in Uganda have a strong relationship with their audience as 50% of the respondents confirmed that radio stations contribute to community services by educating the masses on civic and social issues, like how to cast their votes. They allowed call-in of the audience, live talk shows, and conducted vox-pops among the audience, and the results indicated that 70% of programming influenced by the feedback from the listeners. Radio also educates the masses on different health behaviors like maintaining personal hygiene, immunization of their children and taking preventive measures against common disease like malaria, through mosquito net campaigns. All these are sustained by adverts and community stakeholders as the major financial base.

Besides their effort in community services, community radio stations in Uganda are faced by numerous challenges as were found by this study. These included; Financial, Unaccountable leaders and lack of awareness of rights by community members, the cost of operations is high in addition to huge taxes. Mass mobilization and limited funding for community service limited resources that do not allow them to move out to the community and shortage of skilled man power. Correspondingly, low funds to support their activities, as they get limited adverts causes many adverts go against the rules of the station.

For example, when the radio is a Muslim founded as well as politically a party based, this becomes a major challenge because some advertisers and members of the community might not fall in line with either the political party or the religion on which the station is founded. This tarnished the image of some stations and were turned into hate radio especially those which started to serve on the will of politicians or religions. As this research indicated that community radio is an instrument of power in changing the lives of the people, being against any community radio resulted into a challenge to their community services. The study recommends that other studies can be carried out integrating different media in Uganda especially TV and newspaper to assess the combined role in community services.

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